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1 Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AGA   AngloGold Ashanti 
AGC   Ashanti Goldfields Company 
ALP  Alternative Livelihood Project 
CEPIL   Centre for Public Interest Litigation  
CFA   Concerned Farmers Association  
CHRAJ  Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice  
CSO   Civil Society Organisation 
DFDR  Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement 
DIDR   Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement 
ECM   Extended-Case Method  
EIR  Extractive Industries Review  
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
FA   Farmers Association  
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment  
FIAN   FoodFirst Information- & Action- Network 
GAG   Ghanaian Australian Goldfields Limited 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GHS  Ghanaian cedi (Currency from 2007 onwards) 
HDI   Human Development Index 
IFC   International Finance Corporation  
IFI  International Financial Institution 
IRR   Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction 
IRS  Internal Revenue Service 
LAP  Land Administration Project  
MIDR   Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement 
NGO   Non Governmental Organisation 
NPP  New Patriotic Party 
OASL   Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands  
OICI   Opportunities Industrialization Center International  
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RAP   Resettlement Action Plan 
SGMC  State Gold Mining Corporation  
STD  Sexually Transmitted Disease 
UN   United Nations 
WACAM  An Association of Communities Affected by Mining (formerly: Wassa 
Association of Communities Affected by Mining) 
WBG   World Bank Group 
WHO  World Health Organisation  
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2 Introduction 
Worldwide perhaps no other industry has caused more land use disputes than mining. The 
land demands made by large-scale mining companies cause growing scarcity of land, 
particularly in developing countries. Mines are mostly situated in rural areas, in locations 
that were previously forest or agricultural land used for subsistence purposes. The 
industry’s interest is how to gain access to the minerals beneath the soil. Ghana's mining 
industry occupies 31,237 km2 of land, representing about 13.1% of Ghana´s total land 
area of 238,608km2 (The Ghana Chamber of Mines 2008: 24). 
Mining projects ought to aim at economic growth and improvement of general welfare. 
But too often poorly planned projects leave local people permanently displaced and 
disempowered. Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement (DFDR)1 expresses 
the tension between local and national development needs. The costs borne by the 
displaced people are measured against the benefits for the entire society (Oliver-Smith 
2009: 4). Mining projects justify themselves by the believe of the greater good. For the 
communities, living on top of land holding ores that are attractive for commercial 
exploitation, a 'gold curse' begins.  
The country is the second largest gold producer on the African continent and ranks 
around tenth worldwide (Akabzaa 2009). My particular interest lies with the Teberebie 
community in the Wassa West District in Ghana. For many years tension in the district is 
high due to the competition on land between mining activities and local agricultural 
communities.  Just between 1990 and 1998 mining investment in the district led to the 
displacement of a total of 14 communities with a population of over 30,000 people. 
Teberebie was one of the displaced communities (Britwum, Jonah and Tay 2001: 37). 
The Teberebie community won notoriety and is a symptomatic case for Mining-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR)2. Jean Ziegler, former Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, also took up the case of the Teberebie community in a report presented to 
                                                      
1
 For details on DFDR see 5.1.1.  
2
 For details on MIDR see 5.4.2 
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the Human Rights Council on February 29th 2008. It states that the people of Teberebie 
“have had limited access to their farms which they have cultivated for many generations 
and to their only source of income and means to procure sufficient and adequate food as 
a result of the location of a number of waste rock dumps in the area.” (U.N. Human 
Rights Council 2008: 40)  Ziegler further stresses that: “waste rock dumps of this 
particular mine, which have grown steadily in size and height, have been taking over land 
previously used for farming including traditional and subsistence agriculture. It was 
alleged that for most villagers access to their farm land has become difficult since almost 
all the routes to their farms have been blocked by tons of waste rock dumped in the area.” 
(U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 40) 
The community of Teberebie is a prime example for competition on land between large-
scale mining companies and subsistence agriculture purposes. In 1990/91 the community 
was resettled by the mining company Teberebie Goldfields Limited (TGL) to its present 
location. The community is still affected by the major disruptions caused by this initial 
MIDR. Additionally they are now affected by economic displacement caused by the 
waste rock dump. 
Risks that are often overlooked by mining companies, governments or international 
agencies and organizations are the social and also cultural risks of mining activities to 
local communities. Displacement and resettlement causes severe societal disruption and is 
a major threat to a community´s sustainability. This thesis takes a special socio-
anthropological focus.  
During my work for the international human rights organization FIAN (FoodFirst 
Information- & ActionNetwork) I first came in touch with the impacts of large-scale gold 
mining in Ghana. My interest intensified as I got to know the Ghanaian activist Mike 
Anane in October 2008. He is an advocate for communities affected by mining for years. 
He helped me establish knowledge and supported me with contacts in this field. Mr. 
Anane and other local activists and advocates made it clear that there is still lack of in 
depth studies of mining related impacts to local communities. Also Hilson (2004: 72) 
points out: “More research is needed to help evaluate the impact that mining has had on 
Ghana´s indigenous communities.”  
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2.1 Definition of the Research Problem 
This thesis deals with the societal disruption and impacts on sustainability caused by 
large-scale gold mining in the Wassa West District of Ghana. The particular focus lies on 
the Teberebie community on the Iduapriem mining concession that has been physically 
displaced and resettled to its present location in 1990/91. Starting in 2001 the community 
was confronted with a second wave of displacement. Economic displacement started to 
kick back in when a waste rock dump was constructed on community farmland. 
Displacements are not only the physical geographic removal, but also the imposed loss of 
assets and income. Due to these two waves of displacement and the still growing scarcity 
of land the community faces a set of economic, social and cultural impacts.  
My impact analysis was guided by the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model 
(IRR)3 by Michael M. Cernea and the concept of Mining-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement (MIDR) by Theodore E. Downing. The IRR model works with eight basic 
risks communities may face before, while and after they have been displaced and 
resettled. The MIDR-model rests upon this model and is further specialized in potential 
risks due to mining activities in particular. 
The main research questions are: How is the physical and economic displacement caused 
by the Iduapriem gold mine affecting the community of Teberebie? In particular, in what 
way do the following potential development-forced displacement and resettlement risks 
prove to have an impact on the Teberebie community? 
 
a) Landlessness 
b) Joblessness 
c) Homelessness 
d) Marginalization 
e) Disruption of formal educational activities 
f) Food insecurity 
g) Increased morbidity  
h) Loss of access to common property resources and services 
                                                      
3
 For details on the IRR-model see 5.4.1. 
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i) Social disarticulation4 
 
The hypothesis guiding the research was that the dislocation related to the mining 
activities has its impact on all eight risks, although in different intensities. Some negative 
impacts have already been partly documented by other researchers, for example the 
problems of landlessness, joblessness and food insecurity Teberebie faces in connection 
with the Iduapriem mine. Other risks, like marginalization or societal disarticulation have 
hardly been investigated at all. It is expected that also these rather social risks are 
negatively influenced by the dislocation caused by the gold mining activities.  
2.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The following thesis starts off with chapter 3. Gold Mining in Ghana by giving an 
overview of the Ghanaian history in gold mining, from its beginnings with artisanal 
mining long before the first European encounter, the influence of structural adjustments 
to the minerals and mining policy in the 1980s, up to the present structure of the 
Ghanaian gold mining sector. It gives insight in the recent minerals policy framework and 
discusses the contribution of the mining sector to national development and poverty 
reduction.  
Chapter 4: Ghanaian Land Tenure briefly introduces the dual Ghanaian land tenure 
system.  
In chapter 5: Anthropology and Displacement and Resettlement Research focuses on the 
contribution of Anthropology to displacement and resettlement research and discusses the 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model by Michael M. Cernea in 
connection with the Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR) Model by 
Theodore E. Downing.  
Chapter 6: Research Design and Methodology describes the underlying approach and 
methodology of the research and discusses the process of field work in Ghana.  
                                                      
4
 These risks are described in 5.5.3. 
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In chapter 7: The Study Area: Wassa West District the focus is on the larger research area 
as well as specifically on the history of the Iduapriem mine and the displacement 
processes of the Teberebie community.  
Chapter 8: Risk Impact Analysis of the Gold Rush in Teberebie discusses the impact of all 
eight displacement and resettlement risks on basis of the results of the field research in 
Ghana.  
Chapter 9: Conclusio and Ways Forward sums up the research findings, puts them into a 
larger context and tries to formulate suggestions for the prevention of negative impacts on 
mining communities and ways to support their empowerment instead. 
16 
3 Gold Mining in Ghana  
The mining of gold is deeply rooted in Ghanaian history. The following pages give an 
overview of the historic development of the gold mining sector in Ghana from the early 
days of artisanal mining in the 5th and 6th centuries B.C. until large scale open-pit mining 
in recent times.  
3.1 First Traces of Gold  
There is evidence that suggests that Ghanaian working of gold dates back to the 5th and 
6th centuries B.C. when the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians most likely reached the 
Gold Coast. In the 9th and 10th centuries the Trans-Saharan caravan trade between West 
Africa, the Mediterranean coast in North Africa and Europe also involved trade in gold, 
with much of it coming from the Gold Coast. The Moors of Northern Morocco were 
active trading partners with the Ghanaian Akans. The latter traded in gold, slaves, ivory 
and spices. This means that gold mining in the forest regions of Ghana, mostly occupied 
by Akan groups, probably dates back several centuries. Much of the gold carried across 
the Sahara found its final destination in Arab or Islamic countries in the Middle East, for 
example in form of dinars minted by the Almoravids of Morocco (Agbesinyale 2003: 
104).  
3.1.1 Ghanaian Domination of Gold Mining and First European Contact 
In search of gold, ivory and spices the Portuguese Juan de Santarem and Pedro de 
Escobar reached the Gold Coast in 1471. After discovering alluvial gold in the region 
between the river Volta and the river Ankobra they named the region Mina de Ouro 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 105). This was the time, when Ghana got its former name: “The 
whole region between Cape Three Points and Cape Coast was so rich in gold that the 
coast received the name 'the Gold Coast'.” (Ward 1966: 66) When the Portuguese first 
got into contact with the indigenous people they described their “primitive” way of life, 
but also reported about chiefs being covered in plates of gold and wearing gold chains. 
They realized that the people readily parted with the gold they had, for goods like brass, 
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lead, pewter basins, red shells, copper bangles, pots of coarse tin, simple weapons, tools 
and cloth, all things with comparably little value to the Europeans (Agbesinyale 2003: 
106). 
The discovery of gold triggered a gold rush not only in Portugal but in much of Western 
Europe, consequently several voyagers followed. In 1475 Portuguese merchants under the 
command of Diego d’Azambuja arrived close to present-day Elmina Castle5. Only seven 
years later they built a castle for the purpose of trading and as a defense post 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 105). Nevertheless, trading soon was not enough anymore, the 
Europeans wanted to gain control over at least some of the mining centers. It is reported 
that the Europeans were hardly successful in actual mining. There were arising conflicts 
between European mining ventures and African natives who owned the land. It was 
simply not in the indigenous interest that Europeans set up independent ventures. The 
Europeans succumbed tropical diseases such as malaria and did not have the manpower to 
run independent mines (Ayensu 1997: 65f).  
The Europeans assumed the indigenous gold mining methods were too primitive and 
ineffective and could be enhanced. But according to Ayensu (1997: 66ff) the local 
methods were highly effective. The indigenous evolved their gold-winning techniques, 
controlled the gold bearing land and had the necessary manpower to exploit it. Early 
observers realized how women and children worked along riverbanks and coastal 
shorelines and were panning for gold. “Some would plunge beneath the surface of rivers 
and streams to scoop up gold-bearing material from the river beds, others would dig pits 
in the sands and gravels that were exposed as the river level dropped.” (Ayensu 1997: 
68) The experts in panning gold were certainly the Ashanti. The most common way to 
extract gold from below the immediate surface was shallow mining. Simple tools were 
used to dig holes, shafts and tunnels to get to the gold just under the surface. It was done 
individually or by small family groups. But given the rich deposits even thousands could 
be involved at one site (Ayensu 1997: 68ff). 
How the indigenous located the gold bearing areas is uncertain. It seems they were aware 
that certain vegetation was found on gold bearing soil (Ayensu 1997: 68f). But they also 
                                                      
5
 The name derives from El-Mine (the Mine) 
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had additional sources of knowledge as Ayensu (1997: 70) elaborates: “[S]ome claim that 
they could detect gold in mystical ways, such as in dreams, or by seeing a mist or glow 
over the place where it lay. However they did it, they were masters at finding gold.” Gold 
mining was entirely dominated by the local people who kept the locations of their mines 
secret. The European attempts to collect information often failed. If by chance a European 
discovered a gold deposit it was quickly declared sacred by the indigenous to prevent 
foreign mining activities (Dickson 1969: 88). Common collapses of mines strengthened 
the warnings of the chiefs and priests from mining on holy grounds. The only people who 
were allowed to work in the mines were slaves and authorized free men. Southern Ghana 
and Ashanti-Brong Ahafo produced the largest part of the country´s gold (Dickson 1969: 
88). When it came to Ghanaian control over gold production the situation was much 
different from recent times: “Where gold mines were not directly owned by the state, the 
owners were obliged to pay heavy taxes, often amounting to as much as half the total 
production, to the chiefs.” (Dickson 1969: 88) 
The Gold Coast became more and more famous for its valuables and tradable goods, from 
the late 16th century onwards the competing European imperial powers scrambled for 
control. The Portuguese had main control over trading and brought large quantities of 
gold to Europe. During this period the Gold Coast was the world´s largest gold producer 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 107), between 1493 and 1600 Ghana accounted for 36% of the world 
gold output (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 7). By 1559 the Dutch arrived at the Gold Coast, 
by 1637 they have fought the Portuguese and captured Elmina from them and took over 
all Portuguese possessions by 1642. During this time the British and the Danes also 
entered the battle for control in the region and became fairly active in the trade of gold 
and slaves. Within the early parts of the 18th century the British, the Dutch and the Danes 
had built several settlements, trading posts, castles and forts on the shores of the Gold 
Coast for the trade of gold, ivory and slaves (Agbesinyale 2003: 107).  
3.1.2 The Ashanti Kingdom 
By the last quarter of the 17th century the British gained the upper hand and managed to 
supplant all other competing powers from the Gold Coast. By the early 1820s the British 
Government went in to gain direct control over the essential British settlements and by 
1825 they formed the Gold Coast Mining and Trading Company. The company did not 
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engage itself in mining but rather focused in trading. The trading relations between the 
powerful Ashanti Kingdom and the British reached staggering heights (Agbesinyale 
2003: 107). As Ayensu (1997: 65) puts it: “The story of gold in Ghana, at least up until 
the final decade of the 19th century, was largely the story of the rise and fall of the 
kingdom of Ashanti.” The power and richness of the Ashanti Kingdom was mainly built 
upon the gold that lay beneath its soil. Gold was the crucial source of the kingdom´s 
development from the mid-16th century onwards (Ayensu 1997: 65). The huge amounts of 
gold the Ashanti produced is even more impressing if you consider that they did not use 
heavy machinery or explosives but only their own strength, skills and bravery (Ayensu 
1997: 72).   
The Ghanaian dominance in the mining sector went downwards when troubles for the 
Ashanti began in the last third of the 19th century. The British and the Ashanti went to 
war several times. The British takeover of Kumasi in 1874 was a disaster for the Ashanti 
Kingdom and lead to a period of disputes and uncertainty. The Ashanti kingdom 
collapsed in 1896 and was incorporated into the British Colonial system. After a bitter 
battle over the Golden Stool, the symbol of political sovereignty of the Ashanti, the 
kingdom was eventually annexed to the British Crown in 1901 (Ayensu 1997: 66). The 
defeat of the Ashanti kingdom marked a major turning point and opened the way for 
European mining enterprises.  
3.1.3 First European Large-Scale Mining 
Towards the end of the 19th century an increasing number of educated people from the 
coast acquired mining concessions. They started to act as middlemen between the 
Europeans on the coast and the gold miners in the interior. They tried to organize the gold 
production along fairly modern lines of large-scale production (Dickson 1969: 181). The 
first European to obtain a mining concession in Ghana was the French trader and explorer 
Marie Joseph Bonnat. In 1877 he acquired a concession in Tarkwa in the Wassa West 
District (Ayensu 1997: 66). He gave an enthusiastic report in France telling about his 
prospects which led to the formation of the African Gold Coast Company. Three other 
companies, namely Messrs Swanzy and Co., Effuenta Gold Mining Co., and the Gold 
Coast Mining Company, quickly followed. Their first successes and the exaggerated 
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newspaper reports in Britain started off a gold rush leading many hasty misinformed 
fortune seekers into the country (Dickson 1969: 182f).  
During the next five years after Bonnat´s start concessions were granted all over the 
Wassa West District. In this early stage there was little attention on keeping different 
concessions from conflicting (Ward 1966: 395). Significant amount of European capital 
was invested in several mining companies, but only relatively small amounts of gold 
could be obtained despite the richness of the ore. It was due to the lack of adequate 
machinery and equipment that could not be sent to the interior that easily (Agbesinyale 
2003: 109). There was no railway or road and the necessary equipment had to be taken 
over bush paths in pieces (Ward 1966: 395).   
The gold mining industry developed slowly until the end of the 19th century. Annual 
production did not exceed 18,000 fine ounces (Ward 1966: 396). Dickson (1969: 185) 
points out two major problems of the gold mining industry towards the end of the 19th 
century. One is, as Agbesinyale and Ward also mention, the inadequate transportation 
routes between the mines and the coastal areas. The second big problem Dickson sees is 
the seasonality of labor supply. Many individual prospectors were overtaken by 
misfortune as well as the majority of the new mining companies. By 1882 not more than 
six companies showed any signs of durability (Dickson 1969: 183).  
3.2 The “First Jungle Boom” 
3.2.1 Triggers of the First Boom 
By the late 1880s the British Administration started intentions to solve the transportation 
problem and built several good roads as well as a railway from Sekondi-Takoradi to 
Tarkwa (Dickson 1969: 186). With the railway the cost for transport on this distance of 
39 miles was brought down from £ 25 a ton to about £ 2 (Ward 1966: 396). This and the 
final conquest of the Ashanti Kingdom by the British marked the start of the great gold 
boom in the Gold Coast, described as the “First Jungle Boom” starting in 1892 and 
reaching its peak in 1901. “Jungle Boom” because most of the Ghanaian gold deposits 
were found in the country’s rain forests (Agbesinyale 2003: 109f). From about 1895 the 
taking of concessions became more frequent and more overseas capital flew into the 
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industry. A concessions ordinance was passed in 1897 to regularize the acquisition of 
concessions and define the British Administration’s attitude towards ownership of land. 
This ordinance unleashed a wide protest from the chiefs and people of Southern Ghana. 
This led the Administration to later modify the ordinance but did not reverse the right of 
the Administration to award concessions on tribal land (Dickson 1969: 186). 
By 1901 as much as 3,500 concessions have been taken up in the territory (Boahen 1975: 
94). The heightened interest in gold mining at the beginning of the 20th century was not 
only reflected by the amount of mining concessions but also in the “tremendous leaps of 
gold exports from about 6,000 oz. in 1901 to over four times as much in 1902, to about 
71,000 oz. in 1903, and to about 104,000 oz. in 1904.” (Dickson 1969: 189) The 
temporary stagnation of the gold production in South Africa made the British invest in the 
development of the Ghanaian mining industry. The steady stream of extraordinary 
newspaper reports of the richness of the gold reefs in the country did the rest and created 
the boom that lasted for two years from 1900 to 1901 inclusive (Dickson 1969: 187f).  
3.2.2 First Disruptions of the Boom 
In 1901 the boom was then started to be disrupted by the Yaa Asantewaa War between 
the Ashanti resistance rebelling against the British and their domination. National gold 
output fell significantly (Agbesinyale 2003: 110). By 1904 the majority of the vast 
amount of mining concessions that were awarded during 1901 and the following year 
were discarded. Within one or two years, only 114 concessions with Certificates of 
Validity were left with only about 40 of them being truly successful and earning profits. 
Some of them were located in Ashanti but over 30 were in Southern Ghana, where 18 of 
them were grouped on the Tarkwa banket reef (Dickson 1969: 188). The neglect of many 
of the concessions was due to the way in which they were acquired. The overeagerness of 
many companies resulted in the chiefs granting overlapping concessions in recognized 
tribal lands. Also the concessions were sometimes so large that it was difficult to properly 
prospect to locate gold reefs (Dickson 1969: 189). 
Nevertheless, from 1902 gold production increased steadily and reached its next peak by 
1914 (Agbesinyale 2003: 110). By 1910 annually over £ 1 million worth of gold was 
exported overseas (Buah 1980: 122). In 1913 the first Geological Survey Department was 
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formed and organized extended tours throughout the country to investigate the variety of 
mineral wealth. The Administration´s goal was a resource inventory of the country 
(Dickman 1969: 190).  
3.2.3 World War I Ends First Boom 
The beginning of the First World War put an abrupt end to the first boom. The war ended 
gold prospecting and mine development. The First World War fuelled a huge 
international demand for base metals and other commodities to continue the war. 
Additionally, the Ghanaian gold mines lacked in labor because of the booms in the cocoa 
and the construction industry. Furthermore, laborers were pulled away by the growing 
manganese and diamond mines in other parts of the British colony. This negative 
condition stayed like that until 1928 when the situation in the gold mines improved due to 
adequate supply of labor and the implementation of labor-saving devices (Agbesinyale 
2003: 111). The whole industry was negatively affected much beyond the First World 
War but also through the depression years that followed. “[E]xports decreased from over 
400,000 oz. in 1914 to less than half that quantity in 1928.” (Dickson 1969: 190f)  
3.3 The “Second Jungle Boom” 
The “Second Jungle Boom” started around 1925 when several gold mines that were 
abandoned during the First World War underwent re-capitalization. New mines were 
opened and European money slowly streamed back into the colony´s gold sector. Several 
inactive mines, one of them being Iduapriem, were re-opened (Agbesinyale 2003: 111).  
3.3.1 Re-capitalization of the Mining Sector 
Different factors caused the new boom: 
- Huge investments in physical infrastructure like roads, railways and bridges but 
also social amenities like hospitals and schools. The modern harbor in Takoradi, 
about 800 km of railways and over 10,000 km of motorable roads that were 
constructed by 1930 made it much more convenient for the mining industry to 
transport heavy equipment from the coast to the interior mining areas. 
- The mining costs decreased due to improved mining technologies.  
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- The new infrastructure also opened the country for extensive geological survey, 
prospecting and mapping. This provided important reliable information for gold 
mining investors. 
- Due to Great Britain’s departure from the Gold Standard in 1931 the world market 
value of gold rose. This was a major stimulus to gold mining in Ghana that further 
fortified when it became reasonable that Great Britain would not return to the 
Gold Standard for a significant time (Agbesinyale 2003: 111f). 
The industry recovered and exports soared to the record figure of over 600,000 oz. in 
1938 (Dickson 1969: 191). 
3.3.2 World War II Ends Second Boom 
The “Second Jungle Boom” was put to an end just like the “First Jungle Boom” – through 
the advent of a war. In 1938 the Second World War led to the closure and abandonment 
of several mines in the Gold Coast. The British Government ordered their closure, further 
explorations and developments came to a standstill and were only resumed after the war 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 112; Huq 1989: 154). The global financial and market instabilities 
created by the Second World War also had its effects on the Ghanaian gold mines. A lot 
of investors pulled out their money. But the decline also had internal reasons. In the years 
after the Second World War the struggle for self-government and the political uncertainty 
that came along with it, hardly made the Gold Coast Colony a safe place for foreign 
investments (Agbesinyale 2003: 113). 
3.4 After Independence in 1957 until 1983 
In 1957 Ghana attained political independence from Britain. The new government under 
Kwame Nkrumah pursued a socialist path of development and followed an anti-colonial 
political agenda (Agbesinyale 2003: 113). The mining sector underwent structural 
changes during that time. 
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3.4.1 Structural Changes of the Mining Sector under Independence 
The Government under the Convention People´s Party (CPP) embarked policies 
considered hostile towards foreign private capital and multinational involvement in the 
extractive sector. Key sectors of the Ghanaian economy, such as the extractive sector, 
became state-owned and state-controlled (Agbesinyale 2003: 113; Tsikata 1997: 9).   
With the Minerals Act of 1962 (Act 126) (Government of Ghana 1962b) the ownership of 
minerals was vested in “the President in behalf of the Republic and in trust for the People 
of Ghana” and gave the President the power to demand the sale of minerals to a state 
agency. When it comes to the issue of land use, the Minerals Act and the Administration 
of Land Act 1962 (Act 123) (Government of Ghana 1962a) “gave the executive 
substantial powers to decide upon the use and management of land, in particular such as 
is owned by a community presided over by a chief, known as ‘stool land’”(Tsikata 1997: 
10). Compensation payments did not go directly to the land owning communities. 
Compensation payments in respect of stool land were required and had to be made to the 
minister who would then distribute parts of the monetary compensation to local 
government bodies, to projects that were supposed to benefit people in the affected area 
and some parts were used for “the maintenance of the […] traditional authority.” 
(Tsikata 1997: 10) 
3.4.2 State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC) Takes over Control  
After independence the country´s economy faced several problems. The most obvious 
was that the Ghanaian economy was under the complete control of foreign firms. All the 
seven gold mines were owned by expatriate companies and there was basically no control 
over the transfers of the profits abroad. In March 1961 the State Gold Mining Corporation 
(SGMC) was formed and took over six out of the seven mines. By 1965 only one 
expatriate gold mining company, Ashanti Goldfields, was left operating in the country 
(Boahen 1975: 213). 
In 1966 (21) Ward describes the state of gold mining in Ghana as follows: “Today nearly 
all the gold produced comes from inland. The great recent developments in the 
production have been made possible by the use of modern machinery for the extraction of 
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gold from deep lodes; though river gravels still yield enough gold not merely to repay the 
small scale African prospector for his efforts, but to pay a dividend to London mining 
companies.” 
By 1972 a decree empowered the state to re-organize all mining companies operating in 
Ghana as Ghanaian companies with head offices in Ghana. The decree also ensured the 
state was able to take 55% equity shares in all mining ventures in the country. The 
country´s mineral wealth was considered key and should predominantly benefit the 
country itself (Agbesinyale 2003: 113).  
3.4.3 The State-Controlled Mining Sector Struggles 
In the early 1970s the state-controlled mining sector struggled with the lack of state 
sponsored capitalization for the mines, potential foreign investors were kept out by 
government policies. The lack of investment caused dependence on old technology and 
machinery. All in all the total gold output until the mid-1980 sharply declined. By the 
beginning of the 1980s almost all gold mines were operating at a loss, with the exception 
of Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) at Obuasi. Only four companies were actively 
operating, three of them state-owned and run by SGMC, namely the Tarkwa Mine, 
Prestea Mine and Dunkwa Mine. All of them were struggling to survive as they had 
extensive debts owed to the banks (Agbesinyale 2003: 113ff). 
Agbesinyale (2003: 115) considers the policy in the 1970s until the mid-1980s, heavily 
ideologically loaded with a focus on “reinforcing state sovereignty over the country´s 
natural resource endowments” rather than for purposes that would increase production, 
efficiency and economic expediency. Gold production reached a peak in 1959-60 with 
915,317 oz. but production continuously dropped over the years to 402,000 oz. in 1978 
and to 330,000 in 1982 (Huq 1989: 155). 
3.5 Towards the “New Gold Rush” or “Third Gold Boom” 
By the early 1980s the Ghanaian economy was in a state of crisis, including the extracting 
sector. Radical changes were to come along not alone in the mining sector. The newly 
instituted Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) supported by the World Bank Group 
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(WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed forward several different 
economic policy changes (Tsikata 1997: 11). 
3.5.1 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
Several internal as well as external reasons pushed the Ghanaian Government to opt for 
the ERP in the first place. In the period of 1972-1982 “GDP per capita, real export 
earnings, cocoa exports, import volumes and domestic savings and investment declined 
steeply whilst inflation rose sharply averaging over 50 % per annum.” (Agbesinyale 
2003: 116) Black marketeering and corruption were widespread. The social and economic 
infrastructure was on the verge of collapsing and external shocks such as the global oil 
price hike of 1979 and the forced repatriation of about one million Ghanaians from 
Nigeria in 1983 and severe drought did the rest and brought the country to its knees 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 116). 
The key targets of the reform were the cocoa, mining and timber industries, as they were 
the major export sectors of the country. The reforms were mainly aimed at improving 
competitiveness and attractiveness for foreign direct investment (FDI) (Akabzaa 2009). 
The mining sector was identified as a strategic sector with the potential to create much 
needed revenues (Agbesinyale 2003: 117). A 1984 World Bank report identified the 
reasons why the extractive industry failed to play a leading role in the country´s foreign 
exchange earnings. The main causes among the abundance of factors according to them 
were: lack of investment in mining- development and new explorations; lack of capital to 
maintain and rehabilitate existing mines; faults in mining- management and inadequate 
skills; lack of needed infrastructure such as railway capacity. Other factors mentioned 
were the declining grade of gold ore; high inflation and an overvalued currency that 
caused ruthless fiscal regimes in the extractive industry; as well as illegal mining and 
smuggling of diamonds and gold. However, two factors were singled out as being 
responsible for the decline of the gold industry from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s: the 
key provisions of the Ghanaian minerals and mining laws together with the ruthless fiscal 
climate that presented no incentive in any form of foreign investment in the extractive 
industry (Agbesinyale 2003: 118). 
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Following the advice of the IMF and the WBG Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan country 
to undergo Structural Adjustment (SA) and improve the investment climate within all 
sectors of the economy and attract foreign investment (Hilson 2004: 53). Locally dubbed 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) it was essentially a WBG/IMF packaged 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). It contained reforms in the fiscal, monetary and 
trade sector of the country´s economy (Agbesinyale 2003: 116).  
The adoption of a new minerals and mining law was a key strategy under the ERP. In 
1986 the Minerals and Mining Law (PNDCL 153) (Government of Ghana 1986) was put 
in power. It was the radically reformed mining code that considerably eased the way for 
foreign investment in the sector (Agbesinyale 2003: 118). The code evolved with the help 
of the WBG and was in line with the organization’s continent-wide strategy on mining 
(Akabzaa 2009). Under this newly established law, rates for mining operations have 
decreased and the royalty regime changed significantly. In the areas of taxes, incentives 
and benefits, the 6% royalty charged on the gross value of minerals obtained has been 
lowered to between 3 to 12% (Agbesinyale 2003: 119). Since the implementation of the 
mining sector policy reforms in 1986, the ownership structure of the industry has 
dramatically changed. Foreign investors took in a leading role and controlled an average 
of 70% of shares in all mining operations in the country (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 25). 
Several other fiscal incentives have been introduced by the new law, such as: the removal 
of the minimum mineral duty; import duty and foreign exchange tax were reduced or 
waived; corporate tax which was ranging between 50% and 55% was lowered to 45%. In 
1994 the corporate tax was further reduced by 10% in the Minerals and Mining 
Amendment Act (Agbesinyale 2003: 120f). The initial intention was to keep capital costs 
low and by this attract investments into the mining sector. At the same time former state-
owned mining enterprises have undergone privatization, but with the state retaining 
minority shares between 10 to 20% (Tsikata 1997: 11f). By the late 1980s the government 
had started to divest its interest in the SGMC with the Tarkwa, Prestea, Konongo and 
Dunkwa mines. They have been taken over by foreign mining companies (Agbesinyale 
2003: 118). 
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Under this period of time the way of prospecting changed drastically as well. Traditional 
underground mining was banned in favor of surface mining with all its negative 
implications on environment and local communities (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 13). 
3.5.2 Arguable Effects of Structural Adjustment 
In the mid-1990s after two decades of pursuing economic reforms, Ghana was described 
as “the most successful of the African adjusters.” (Agbesinyale 2003: 116) Gold 
production went up by more than 500% under the process of structural adjustment 
(Hilson 2004: 64). The mining sector reforms have seen a significant investment boom, in 
exploration as well as mine development, particularly in gold mining (Akabzaa 2009). All 
the legislative and fiscal reforms have helped to create significant resurgence within the 
Ghanaian mining industry since the late 1980s. Several foreign and local mining interests 
and massive upsurge in artisanal gold mining have created what is now referred to as the 
“Third Gold Boom” or “New Gold Rush” (Agbesinyale 2003: 121). 
Nevertheless, whether the structural adjustment has had the desired positive effect on the 
Ghanaian economy is still an issue for debate. Agbesinyale (2003: 117) argues that: 
“Nonetheless, the fact that Ghana in 2001 opted for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPIC) of the World Bank/IMF after these long years of painful economic 
adjustment, should lend some credence to the notion that Ghana´s SAP has and is indeed 
far from being a success story as was previously touted.” Hilson (2002: 54) as well sees 
the effects of structural adjustment (SA) rather negative, he states that “[i]t is now 
recognized that the increased mineral output that has occurred in the country under SA 
has mainly benefited multinational mining corporations.” In a later work Hilson (2004: 
61) points out the fact that the SA process “delivers few benefits to the poor, and in many 
cases, further marginalizes impoverished groups.” 
The reforms came along with disadvantageous impacts upon the local communities. The 
expansion of mining and exploration activities caused displacement of numerous 
subsistence groups and destruction of cultural resources along with severe environmental 
impacts like pollution and land degradation (Hilson 2004: 54). The growth in the mining 
sector that was triggered by the SA has brought along considerable environmental and 
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social costs. Some civil society organizations argue that these costs have eroded the 
economic benefits that this boom brought along (Agbesinyale 2003: 121). 
3.6 Present State of the Ghanaian Mining Sector  
3.6.1 Large-Scale Mining Companies 
At present state there are 16 operating mines, six mining development projects and more 
than 150 companies with exploration licenses, mainly in the gold sub-sector, active in 
Ghana (Akabzaa 2009). Foreigners such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, the UK and 
the US own the major mining companies. In 2009 there was no entirely Ghanaian owned 
big mining company. The Ghanaian government only has shares in the projects, mostly 
just free carried interest of 10% (Nantogmah, personal interview 24 February 2009). 
Some of the mining companies have their investments promoted, guaranteed and 
protected by the WBG. For example the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has been 
among the funding sources for large-scale mining. 
About 15 years ago the trend shifted from the comparably invisible underground mining 
towards open-pit mining (Andoh, personal interview 25 February 2009). Open-pit mining 
is comparably in-expensive and much less labor intensive than underground mining. 
Today all major mines operating in Ghana are open-pit mines. An open-pit mine is "an 
excavation or cut made at the surface of the ground for the purpose of extracting ore and 
which is open to the surface for the duration of the mine’s life."  (Engineer-Mining.com 
n.d. b). For exposing and mining the ore, it is necessary to excavate large quantities of 
waste rock. Open-pit mining consumes vast tracks of land, so problems occurred right 
from the beginning as Nana Anthony Andoh of the Ghanaian Environmental Protection 
Agency (personal interview on 25 February 2009) also states.   
The evolution in mining technology made it profitable to process also rather low-grade 
ores. The most common methods nowadays are heap leaching and carbon in leach 
processes involving the highly toxic cyanide. In heap leaching the previously crushed ore 
is mixed with cement and heaped on a leach pad covered with polythene sheets. The heap 
is then constantly sprayed with a cyanide solution. This has the effect of the gold 
dissolving as the cyanide solution trickles through the heap. Finally the gold-cyanide 
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solution drains into a collection pond and is then pumped into a gold recovery plant 
where the solids are removed from the solution. 
The second main method used besides heap leaching is the carbon in leach method. The 
crushed ore is fed into tanks filled with cyanide solution. The gold is dissolved in the 
cyanide and the solution is then transferred trough several tanks, where carbon is added. 
The gold attaches to the carbon which is then removed by screening. After the gold 
bearing carbon is then introduced into a heated sodium hydroxide-cyanide-water solution 
where the gold is dissolved, the concentrated solution is passed through electro-winning 
cells, where the gold plates onto steel cathodes. Finally the gold is washed from the 
cathodes, dried and melted and at the end poured into molds for gold bricks (Engineer-
Mining.com n.d. a). The further refinery of Ghanaian gold is mostly done in the South 
African Rand Refinery.  
The large-scale gold mining industry is mainly centered in rural areas in the Western 
Region, with exception of Newmont Mining being active in the Brong Ahafo Region. 
One of the main large-scale operating mining companies in Ghana is the US-based 
Newmont Mining with active operations in the Brong Ahafo Region and new activities in 
the Eastern Region in Akyem. The developing mine in Akyem is highly controversial as 
it is to a part situated in a forest reserve.   
The Canadian Golden Star Resources is actively open-pit mining gold at its sites in the 
Western Region in Wassa and Prestea/Bogoso. The South African mining company 
Goldfields is mining gold in the Western Region as well, particularly in Tarkwa and 
Damang.  
The South African based Anglogold Ashanti is operating two large-scale mines in Ghana: 
the Obuasi mine and the Iduapriem mine.  
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Fig. 1. Prospective Gold Regions in Ghana.  
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3.6.2 Small Scale Mining Sector and “Galamsey” 
Artisanal mining is a part of Ghanaian history, it has been practiced for centuries and has 
a long tradition. It is still a vital part of Ghanaian life and economy. Artisanal mining is a 
significant subsector of the mining industry in Ghana, accounting for about 10% of the 
annual gold output (Akabzaa 2009). In Ghana, small-scale mining is defined as “mining 
(gold) by any method not involving substantial expenditure by an individual or group of 
persons not exceeding nine in number or by a co-operative society made up of ten or 
more persons.” (Government of Ghana 1989) 
The numbers of small-scale miners and galamsey operators vary. Aryee (2003: 132) 
believes about 80,000 locals are currently involved in small-scale mining. Akabzaa 
(2000: 14; 2009) and Aubynn (2009: 64) roughly estimate 100,000 – 200,000 informal 
gold miners scattered throughout the country, approximately 30% of them being women. 
Small-scale mining is very labor intensive, mostly people work in small groups, the men 
usually prospect the ore while women carry the ore out of the mine for further milling, 
grinding, sluicing and further processing. 
Small-scale miners usually have a rather poor financial basis, so most of them rely on 
traditional and manual methods of mining, which are largely artisanal. They feature 
simple equipment like shovels, pick-axes, pans, chisels and hammers. The methods used 
can be categorized into shallow alluvial mining, deep alluvial mining and hard rock (lode) 
mining. With free milling ores small-scale miners use sluicing as the main method for 
processing. Alluvial ores involve sluicing of mined material as well. When processing 
hard rock ores they use crushing and milling equipment to facilitate the process if they 
can afford it, otherwise they use traditional manual equipment. In almost all cases finally 
mercury is added to the concentrate, mixed to form a gold amalgam, which is then heated 
to separate the gold (Aryee 2003: 133f).  
Those methods create environmental damage, health and safety risks. Deadly accidents 
occur frequently. In November 2009, 15 people were killed during a mine collapse in 
Dompoase in the Western Region (BBC News 2009).  In terms of health risks miners are 
in danger of mercury contamination. The environmental problems associated with small-
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scale mining are land degradation and pollution of water bodies with toxins and 
chemicals. 
In Ghana small-scale miners who do not own a license are popularly called “galamsey”. 
The name derives from “gather and sell”. In the past galamsey often were the first to 
discover extensive gold deposits ahead of the mining company´s exploration teams. 
Galamsey workers usually were local farmers who worked in the mines during their off-
season. In recent years more and more farmers lost their land and income source to large-
scale mining operations. From the even poorer North of Ghana galamsey workers come to 
the Southern parts of Ghana to seek fortune, but galamsey mining only provides them 
with a meager income. 
Galamsey do not have an official license for mining on the land they are working on. This 
leads to numerous confrontations with both state law enforcement agencies and the 
security personnel of large-scale mining companies on whose concessions galamsey often 
mine. Frequently they also mine in areas prohibited for mining such as forest reserves. 
Large-scale mining firms, small-scale miners and galamsey are constantly competing for 
plots of gold bearing land. The industry is progressing and so its need of vast amounts of 
land (Hilson 2002c; Aryee 2003: 133). The environmental degradation caused by 
galamsey activities especially worries the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
mining director Nana Anthony Andoh (personal interview 25 February 2009). The fact 
that they are working illegally leaves the EPA with little forms of pressure. There is no 
permit they can withhold if environmental minimum standards are not met.  
Up until 1989 all artisanal mining activities were illegal. Under the Small Scale Mining 
Law (PNDC Law 218) of 1989 the government tried to register artisanal miners and 
supervise them. The government also established the Precious Minerals Marketing 
Corporation (PMMC) for purchasing the products of artisanal miners. Despite the 
possibility to legislate their operations most artisanal miners still operate without licenses 
also because of frustrations they meet in the process of registration (Akabzaa 2009). 
Legal mines operate under a license granted by the Government of Ghana on concessions 
registered in their names with the Minerals Commission (Aryee 2003: 133). Those who 
register are usually referred to as small-scale miners rather than galamsey.   
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The government established nine small-scale mining district centers to facilitate the 
provision of technical extension services. Those centers aim to help the small-scale 
miners to improve techniques, improve recoveries and protect the environment by 
limiting the use of mercury (Aryee, personal interview on 4 March 2009). 
Small-scale mining operations are now regulated by the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 
(Government of Ghana 2006) that includes limitations and curtails the property rights of 
artisanal miners (Akabzaa 2009). 
3.6.3 Policy Framework 
By the Constitution of Ghana the ownership of every mineral is vested in the hands of the 
Government of Ghana for and in behalf of the people of Ghana. The government retains 
the rights to subsurface minerals and reserves the right to take possession of any land, 
even if it is legally owned by another group (Hilson 2002a: 68). The Ghanaian 
Constitution states:  
“Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers, streams, 
water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and any area covered by 
the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the Republic of Ghana and shall 
be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana.”   
(The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana of 1992: Article 257-6) 
 
Almost all so called modern states have policies which allow them to appropriate land for 
the greater common good, the “power of eminent domain” (Shihata 1993). 
 
Once a concession has been granted by the government to a mining company 
communities living on the concession are only compensated for structures such as houses, 
crops and economic trees that are or will be affected by the mining operation. Persons are 
allowed to graze animals within the concession, but only if it does not interfere with 
mining ventures. Brought to point: Communities are liable to eviction by mining 
companies once the government has granted the mining concession to them (Sarpong 
2006: 13). 
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According to the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 (PNDCL 153), once a mining lease 
was awarded to a company, the company leased the land from the government and 
obtained the right to alienate the surface tenure rights of any person using it. The 
government passed compensation on to the mining company as well. The mineral rights 
owner was only obliged to compensate the owner or occupier for the disturbance of use of 
land by mining and the damage done to land surface, buildings, works or improvements, 
or to livestock, crops or trees in the area (Government of Ghana 1986). The land itself is 
not object of compensation.  
 
The Minerals and Mining Law 2006 is still full of gaps when it comes to access to land 
and local communities. The law is currently under review also because of compensation 
and acquisition of land issues.  
In 2001 the WBG obliged Ghana to make amendments on their minerals and mining 
policy. The uncompetitive Mining Code of 1986 was blamed for the stagnation of the 
sector (Akabzaa 2009). A new framework was laid down in the 2006 Minerals and 
Mining Act (Act 703) (Government of Ghana 2006). The major fiscal changes from the 
Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 to the revised law of 2006 is that the corporate income 
tax was further decreased to 25%. The Additional Profit Tax was brought down from 
25% to 0%. Royalty payments were as well decreased from 3% to 12% to oscillating 
between 3 to 6% (Government of Ghana 2006). According to Daniel Owusu-Koranteng 
(personal interview 28 February 2009) in reality no company pays more than 3% royalties 
although the law would allow up to 6%. In November 2009 Finance Minister Kwabena 
Duffuor, presenting the nation's 2010 budget to parliament, said the government plans to 
double minerals royalties to 6% in the future (Reuters 2009). By May 2010 the new 
royalty rate was set at 5% (Joy Business 2010). 
Royalty payments are currently distributed as follows: 80% remains with the government, 
the remaining 20% is given to a Mineral Development Fund set up by the government. 
One half of the fund is to promote the development of the mining industry, the other half 
(representing 10% of the annual royalties) is disbursed among district assemblies, stools 
and traditional authorities with jurisdiction over a mining project location. Of this 
remaining 50%, 10% stays with the Office of the Administration of Stool Lands, 25% 
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goes to stools and 20% goes to traditional authorities (Akabzaa 2009). Actually only very 
little of the royalty payments reaches the affected communities.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of mining royalty among stakeholders 
Through equity participation the government obtains dividends. The 2006 Minerals and 
Mining Act reduced the government equity share to 10%, this reduced the income from 
this source as the share previously ranged from 10% to 30% (Akabzaa 2009). 
The Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 provides the ability for companies to negotiate 
about stability agreements that ensure new legislative enactments or changes to an 
enactment do and will not adversely affect their operations for a period of 15 years 
(Government of Ghana 2006: 22). Different representatives of mining companies referred 
to this clause when the finance minister announced a planned raise in royalty payments in 
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2009 and when the royalty rate actually went up in May 2010. Which mining operations 
will be affected by the new royalty rate will still be a topic of future discussion. 
3.6.4 Institutional Framework 
Several public sector organizations were established to provide support for the mining 
industry and form a regulatory framework to ensure optimal exploitation of the country´s 
mineral wealth. The role of the institutions, described below, is seen rather critical as 
Agbesinyale (2003: 122) states: “[A]s to whether these public organizations in practice, 
effectively deliver their support and regulatory roles remains another question.” 
The key organizations are:  
The Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines: The ministry is responsible for all aspects of 
the mineral sector within the Ghanaian economy. A license for exercising a mineral right 
can only be granted by the Minister of Mines, no matter who owns the surface land. The 
power referred to the minister must be exercised contingent upon the advice of the 
Minerals Commission (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 27, Sarpong 2006: 11). 
The Minerals Commission: It was set up in 1986 to be a one-stop service for investors. 
The Commission has the authority to coordinate policies relating to minerals and to 
control and manage the exploitation of mineral resources (Sarpong 2006: 11). Its key 
tasks are formulating regulations, amending existing legislation, recommending on 
minerals policy, advising the government in mineral matters and much more. Their main 
goal is promoting the minerals sector (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 22). 
The Lands Commission: The Commission maintains legal records of exploration and 
mining licenses. It also initiates policies in relation to stool and state lands. Its valuation 
board provides the rates for valuation of property affected by mining operations 
(Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 27). 
The Chamber of Mines: The Chamber exists for nine years and is a private sector 
organization of mining companies. It is an advocacy and lobby group interested in 
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promoting mining interests. The activities are funded by members including all the big 
companies active in Ghana (Nantogmah, personal interview 24 February 2009).  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): The agency has the task to strike the balance 
between growing mining operations and economic development and the protection of the 
country’s natural resources and maintaining a sustainable environment. The law requires 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for every mining project that has to be 
approved by the EPA before mining can start (Andoh, personal interview on 25 February 
2009).  
Akabzaa and Darimani (2001: 28) argue that there is lack of cross-sectoral effective 
collaboration between these institutions that contributes to some extent to the problems 
resulting from mining.  
3.6.5 Contribution of the Mining Sector to National Development and Poverty 
Reduction 
3.6.5.1 Production Trend and Government Revenues 
The production trend of gold is pointing up as the diagram below illustrates:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Production Trend (1999-2007)  
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In 2008 the gold output rose again by 4% from 2,486,821 oz. in 2007 to 2,585,913 oz. in 
2008 (Kunateh 2009). Gold is the most important sub-sector accounting to more than 
90% of total value of mineral exports (Akabzaa 2009). In the last ten years Ghana 
consistently ranked around 10th in terms of world gold output. After South Africa Ghana 
is the second largest gold producer on the African continent (Ghana Chamber of Mines 
2008: 3).  
According to the Ghana Chamber of Mines (2008: 10) the mineral sector “continues to be 
one of the highest contributors to the Internal Revenue Service through the payment of 
mineral royalties, employee income taxes, corporate taxes and ancillary levies.” In 2007, 
the mining industry contributed about GHS 123 million to the IRS collection, 
representing 13.65% of IRS’ total collection (Ghana Chamber of Mines 2008: 10). 
The numbers of the mining industry´s contribution to GDP increased from 1.3% in 1991 
to 6.16% in 2007. In 2007 minerals’ contribution to gross export earnings was about 41% 
(The Ghana Chamber of Mines 2008: 10). In a personal interview in March 2009 
Benjamin Aryee, Chief Executive of the Minerals Commission, states that the mining 
sector is currently contributing about 40% to total export earnings, in terms of 
government revenues it contributes about 11 to 12%, in terms of GDP mining contributes 
about 6% (Aryee, personal interview on 4 March 2009). 
3.6.5.2 Paradox of the Plenty 
Despite all these figures and statements by mining advocates there is growing criticisms 
of the praised contribution of mining to national development and poverty reduction. One 
school of thought argues that the mining sector is the star performer of the Ghanaian 
economy. The other one refers to the gold paradox: It is described as paradox of the 
plenty or resource curse, no matter what you want to call it, it is a fact that despite 
Ghana´s mineral wealth it remains a poor country. In 2008 it ranked 142 out of 179 on the 
Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2008). 
Many people such as Akabzaa (2009) do not trust the bloated figures and do not see a 
significant positive impact on the country´s development: “[T]he current state of the 
Ghanaian economy does not suggest that there has been a significant positive impact 
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from the sector despite the touted flamboyant statistics. The line of argument suggests 
that the sector could have performed better in terms of its contribution to government 
revenue, employment, improvement in the livelihoods of the communities in mining 
project areas and contribution to the overall GDP of the country.”  
For many critics besides Akabzaa (2009) the question still remains whether all the policy 
changes and the increasing FDI into the sector, enhanced mining output and the value of 
gross mineral exports really translates into national development and poverty reduction. 
Akabzaa (2009) generally sees only little contribution of the mining sector to national 
revenue. The outcomes are minor, also due to the fact that it is a major challenge for 
developing countries in general to negotiate effectively with foreign mining companies 
and achieve acceptable outcomes.   
3.6.5.3 Low Capacity for Labor Absorption 
Akabzaa (2009) delivers more damning indictment of the mining sector´s role in national 
development and poverty reduction. The mining sector has shown a low capacity for 
labor absorption. In 2000 the sector’s share of total employment of the working age 
population was only 0.7%, compared to agriculture which held around 55%. This is also 
due to the shift from comparably labor intensive underground mining to much less labor 
intensive surface mining. Deployment in the sector was very intense. From 1983 to 2003 
over 15,000 mine workers have lost their jobs. 
The Ghana Chamber of Mines (2008: 23) indicates direct employment by producing 
members of the Chamber as at December 31, 2007 at 12,658 out of which 2% were 
expatriates. Ahmed Nantogmah states in February 2009 that there are about 14,000 
persons directly employed with the large-scale mining industry (Nantogmah, personal 
interview 24 February 2009). 
Officials like Nantogmah (personal interview 24 February 2009) of the Chamber of 
Mines often praise the positive effects of the mining sector to other sectors of the 
Ghanaian economy. But others like Akabzaa (2009) argue that the mining sector remains 
an economic enclave with little linkages to other sectors of the Ghanaian economy.  
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Since the mid-1990s the number of workers employed by large-scale mining dropped as 
the figures below illustrate:  
Fig. 4: Mining Sector Employment (1994-2007)  
3.6.5.4 Local Communities Bear the Brunt 
When you look at the one´s that bear the brunt of the gold mining boom it is the local 
communities. Most of the major stakeholders agree on that. Although the Ghana Chamber 
of Mines (2008: 10) attests its members a very positive attitude in terms of community 
relations: “The responsiveness of mining companies to their social responsibilities 
motivates them to contribute both in cash and kind to the development of their host 
communities. Indeed mining companies’ interest in their host communities have in recent 
times been expanded to include social investments projects where they collaborate with 
the communities to fund projects that yield both social and economic returns to the 
communities.” They even go further: “The mining industry contributes to social 
multipliers which arise from the role of mining companies in the development of human 
resources and infrastructure such as schools, colleges, clinics, roads, and housing.” 
(Ghana Chamber of Mines 2008: 23) 
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In a personal interview, Benjamin Aryee (4 March 2009), Chief Executive of the 
Minerals Commission, clearly says: “Where the brunt is felt the most doesn’t get the most 
of the benefit.” He goes even further and states that “the local community have not 
benefited as much as one would wish.” He sees the responsibility with the Government of 
Ghana: “The companies are not here as philanthropical institutions, they have to do 
business, so we as the government, people of Ghana, should ensure that the benefit 
sharing is as optimal as possible.” Owusu-Koranteng (personal interview 28 February 
2009) argues that the people of Ghana substitute international mining companies with the 
low extraction costs, low compensation payments and low mining royalties. He puts the 
blame on the government as well but also on international financial institutions such as 
the WBG or the IMF that have major influence on the way mining policy in Ghana looks 
like.  
3.6.5.5 Question of Benefit-Sharing 
On the ground level benefit-sharing only occurs when the displacees actually get their 
share of the projects benefits. Often project owners, governments or financiers tend to call 
relocation and rehabilitation measure benefits. Whereas only assets like shares in project 
equity, benefit sharing arrangements, educational investments, development of micro 
enterprises, or grants can be called benefits (Downing 2002: 14). Projects sponsored by 
mining companies like alternative livelihood projects (ALP) are also to be seen critical. 
According to Aryee (personal interview 4 March 2009) they are not necessarily 
development-oriented, mostly those projects exist to get communities of the company’s 
back, so that they are satisfied. In reality it is not about sustainable development but about 
promoting the company’s needs.  
Usual cost-benefit analysis is mostly incomplete. The displaced people are seldom under 
the beneficiaries of such projects and the real costs and losses of displacement are usually 
not properly measured and valued. A large part of the socio-economic costs are 
externalized out of the project’s budget and are left with those who suffer from 
displacement. Only parts of these costs are covered by meager compensation. An “equity 
compass” requires that costs and benefits are calculated for each sub-group that is 
affected by the project and not for the society or the project as a whole. Differential 
impacts must be recognized (Cernea 2000: 47ff). 
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4 Ghanaian Land Tenure 
One of the major risks of DFDR, especially in the Teberebie case, is landlessness. The 
risk of losing access to land is deeply connected to other risks, also because land often 
means so much to the local people as Kuntu-Mensah (1997) points out: “The land is more 
than a physical entity; it is the most important ingredient in the economic life of the 
people; it is religion to others and also has political connotations.” Ghana is an 
agricultural country, over 60% of the countries jobs are found in that sector. Ghana is 
highly dependent on land as its basis of economic development. At the same time the 
state is struggling with mounting land related problems (Blocher 2006: 168f).  
To be able to analyze the impacts of landlessness it is significant to know the basic 
principles of Ghanaian systems of land tenure. Kuntu-Mensah (1997) defines land tenure 
as follows: “Land tenure refers to the way in which rights to land is obtained and 
distributed among people.” 
4.1 Dual Tenure System 
Land tenure and land law in Ghana is a complex mix and result of coexisting regulations 
of rights. Simplified, two broad arrangements exist: customary tenure and public land 
tenure. The customary system dates far back and exists on the side of the state title system 
(Kuntu-Mensah 1997; Sarpong 2006). 
Blocher argues that it is of necessity to incorporate customary land tenure systems into 
formal state land law to promote efficient and equitable economic growth. Currently a lot 
of African countries are struggling to find a way to create land policies that merge 
customary property rights and modern state law (Blocher 2006: 168). The Ghanaian 
constitution recognizes customary land tenure systems but it is the state´s right to forcibly 
obtain lands for purposes deemed to be in the public interest. Any land title can be lost to 
the Ghanaian state on basis of acquisition as all minerals and all lands harboring minerals 
are vested in the president in trust for the Ghanaian people (Sarpong 2006: 17). This is a 
very important point, basically no matter what kind of title or ownership of land a person 
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or group has, the state has the power of eminent domain and can obtain the land in the 
name of public interest. This power of eminent domain and compensation mechanisms 
are discussed into more detail at chapter 3.6.3. 
4.1.1 Customary Land Tenure Systems 
Most of the land in Ghana is “owned”6 by customary authorities such as clans, skins, 
stools and families. They own about 78% of all lands, 2% are owned in a partnership of 
the state and customary authorities and 20% are owned by the state (Larbi 2008: 2).   
Ollennu and Woodman (1985: 8) describe the close connection between customary 
authorities and land tenure as follows: “As the stool or skin is the shrine containing the 
soul and spirit of the family, the tribe or nation and is therefore the embodiment of the 
collective authority of all the members of the community, the tribe or the family, the 
‘stool’ or the ‘skin’, of a particular village, town or tribe, is said to be the paramount or 
absolute owner of the land of the village, town or tribe. The occupant of the stool or skin, 
the head of the tribe or family, is a trustee holding the land for and on behalf of the 
community, tribe or family.”  
Customary lands “occur where the right to use or to dispose of use-rights over land rest 
neither on the exercise of brute force, nor on the evidence of rights guaranteed by 
government statute, but on the fact that they are recognized as legitimate by the 
community, the rules governing the acquisition and transmission of these rights being 
usually explicitly and generally known, but normally not recorded in writing.” (Larbi 
2008: 2) 
The ownership of such land may date back from discovery or continuous settlement on 
the land, a conquest through war and following settlement thereafter. It may have been 
purchased from another traditional leader or been a gift from another land-owning 
community. Customary land tenure systems are not static, they have undergone changes 
                                                      
6
 The term “own” is put into quotation marks as in customary land tenure, land is not owned in a capitalistic 
sense but rather been hold by a trustee for a larger group of people.  
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through the course of time and adapted to new challenges. The customary systems 
throughout Ghana are quite differentiated but share their strong, dynamic and 
evolutionary characteristics (Larbi 2008: 2f). Inheritance and succession to property are 
determined by the patrilineal systems in the Northern part of the country, most of the 
Volta and some of the Ga communities and by matrilineal systems in the Akan areas 
(Kasanga/Kotey 2001: 13) as in the case of the research area in the Western Region in 
Teberebie.  
There are basically four categories of titles to land, namely: allodial title, freehold title, 
leasehold title and lesser interests in land.  
The allodial title is the highest interest known in customary law. In some areas of Ghana 
this title is held or vested in traditional stools or skins. In other areas this title is also held 
by subgroups such as substools, clans, families or even individual people. The stool/skin 
which holds an allodial title has complete freedom in dealing with the land. Stool 
ownership means corporate ownership and not personal ownership of an individual ruler 
(Sarpong 2006: 2). Although officially mostly chiefs hold this title they do so only in the 
capacity of something like a trusteeship, administering it for the benefit of their subjects – 
living, dead and still to be born (Blocher 2006: 179). 
The freehold title can be held both in customary and common law forms. It is superior to 
all other interests in land except the allodial title. The customary freehold, also called 
usufruct, is held by individuals or groups to land that is held allodially by a chief, clan, or 
other owner. The holder of a freehold title has almost unlimited rights to do whatever he7 
wants on the property and can just be restricted by the allodial title owner. The customary 
law freehold is continuing as long as its holder continues to acknowledge the higher title 
of the allodial owner. The title is inheritable but cannot be alienated to another person or 
group by the allodial owner without the consent of the holder of the freehold title 
(Blocher 2006: 180). 
Leasehold is granted to a person to occupy specified land for a specified time period. 
Leaseholds derive from common law, not from customary law. But a lease may be 
granted by a customary freeholder or an allodial title holder. Usually under a leasehold, 
                                                      
7
 Land titles in Ghana are mostly held by men. 
46 
the lessee pays an annual rent for occupying the land and has arrangements on how the 
land will be used (Sarpong 2006: 3).  
The category of all lesser interests in land includes several rights to land that can be 
created by allodial and customary freehold owners. Most common are sharecropping 
arrangements. The two major types of sharecropping agreements are abunu, under which 
returns are split in half between landowner and tenant, and abusa, under which the 
landowner gets one third of the returns from the tenant. Whether a tenancy is abusa or 
abunu depends on various factors, like availability of land, the kinship or social 
connection between the involved parties, the intensity of labor required for cultivation or 
the reputation of the tenant. Sharecropping agreements are increasingly common in 
Ghanaian agricultural economy although the concept of sharecropping tends to inspire 
fears of exploitation (Blocher 2006: 180f).  
Ghanaian customary land law remains deeply connected to social and cultural systems 
like clans, skins and stools. Traditional leaders like chiefs have exceptional power when it 
comes to land issues (Blocher 2006: 182f). 
4.1.2 State Land Administration 
Across Africa the attempts to draft property rights have been top-down approaches driven 
by the state. In practice they tried to replace customary land tenure systems with western 
forms of property ownership often coming along with formal land title registration 
(Blocher 2006: 167). So it is also the case in Ghana.  
According to customs most land transactions happen without written documentation, 
boundaries are not defined by surveyed maps but rather by physical landmarks. There 
have been several attempts for registration systems of oral transactions of land, the first 
one was the 1962 Land Registry Act (Act 122) (Hacibeyoglu 2008: 40). The act was 
designed to deal with uncertainty of title but proved to be ineffective and insufficient in 
solving these problems (Kuntu-Mensah 1997). 
In 1986 the government enacted the Land Title Registration Law (PNDC Law 152) with 
the aim to promote title security through an official title registration system. It started 
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recording property in greater Accra and Kumasi. Implementation proved to be slow. 15 
years later less than 5% of the land in these districts had been registered. The customary 
practices remained and the law was mostly ignored (Hacibeyoglu 2008: 41f). The public 
lacked confidence in state land registration.  
There are two institutions, the Lands Commission and the Office of the Administration of 
Stool Lands (OASL), which have been established to administer public and customary 
lands (Sarpong 2006). In 1999 the National Land Policy was introduced and the Land 
Administration Programm was the tool to implement it. The program was supported by 
international donors and the first phase, named Land Administration Project (LAP), 
started in 2003. The LAP’s aim is to establish a clear and consistent set of land 
administration policies and laws including an administration system that enhances land 
tenure security (Sarpong 2006: 5). It remains to be seen what the outcomes of the LAP 
will be as the project runs over a 15-year period.  
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5 Anthropology and Displacement and Resettlement 
Research 
5.1 The Beginnings of Anthropologists in Displacement and 
Resettlement Research 
The first research on displacement and resettlement emerged in the 1950s in the concern 
for the refugees and displaced after World War II (Oliver-Smith 2009: 6). The pioneer 
document was Alexander Leighton´s The Governing of Men: General Principles and 
Recommendations Based on Experiences at a Japanese Refugee Camp (1945). The early 
focus was on displacement of refugees of war or natural disasters.  
Anthropologists were among the first during the mid-twentieth century to recognize and 
document the impoverishment risks and violations of human rights faced by people 
displaced by so-called development projects. So it is fair to say that Anthropology can 
claim to be the foundational discipline in the field of displacement and resettlement 
research. Anthropology´s holistic approach was very applicable to the complexity of the 
resettlement process and the impact it has on basically all domains of community life 
(Oliver-Smith 2009: 6). 
5.1.1 Characteristics of Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement 
(DFDR) 
Later on social scientists engaged in research of Development-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement (DIDR) or as I prefer Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement 
(DFDR)8.  
                                                      
8
 The term DFDR seems more appropriate than DIDR. “Induced” is not appropriate for something that is 
determined, decided and planned in advance. It also suggests that people may be convinced by the rewards 
of being resettled. The term “induced” makes involuntary displacement and resettlement seem voluntary 
(Oliver-Smith 2009: 23). 
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DFDR is permanent, in contrast to other forms of displacement. Once the land is 
submerged there is no point of return (Oliver-Smith 2009: 4). DFDR is a political 
phenomenon, it involves the power of one party to relocate another party. Scudder (2009: 
26ff) sums up four especially relevant characteristics of DFDR: It accelerates the rate of 
social change, it is mostly involuntary, it is a by-product of a development initiative and it 
is an extremely complex phenomenon.  
Usually displacement begins long before physical relocation. People often feel the 
economic effects in advance. An important question to ask is: When does displacement 
end? To determine when displacement ends derives from the policy that defines the 
objective of DFDR. Therefore displacement would end when the policy objective is met – 
when the displaced achieve a living standard equal or above pre-displacement levels. 
Confusing the end of displacement with the end of physical transfer is a serious mistake. 
If people have not been rehabilitated their displacement has not ended. They remain 
displaced and impoverished (Cernea 2003b: 24f). 
As the projects and programs that caused displacement multiplied all over the world, 
social scientists began to show interest in DFDR. Some of the studies published in the 
1960s and 1970s have become classic work of social science literature. Herbert Gans 
(1959, 1968) worked on urban displacement or Roy Burman (1961) carried out field work 
in India. Burman´s research model on strip mining, dams and road construction was later 
followed by other sociologists and anthropologists (Cernea 1995: 96f). 
The first real in-depth analyses of cultural, economic but also psychological effects 
caused by forced relocation in the south was the Akosombo reservoir displacement in 
Ghana by Robert Chambers (1970) as well as Elizabeth Colson’s and Thayer Scudder’s 
long-term research on the displacement of  the Gwembe Tonga due to the construction of 
the Kariba dam (Colson 1971). 
5.1.2 Four Stages Model by Thayer Scudder 
Thayer Scudder, an anthropologist that devoted most of his work to resettlement studies, 
has analyzed cross-cultural reactions to forced displacement and resettlement in Asia and 
Africa and compared them with voluntary settlement (Cernea 1995: 97). There was very 
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little theoretical work done concerning DFDR until Colson and Scudder developed a 
model based on the four stages to describe and analyze the process of forced displacement 
and resettlement in the early 1980s. Usually it is known as the stress model: There are 
three forms of stress resulting from involuntary relocation and resettlement, namely: 
physiological, psychological and socio-cultural stress - “multidimensional stress”. For 
Scudder (2009: 29ff) himself the strength of the model lies much more in the four stage 
framework. It emphasis how a majority of resettlers are expected to behave during the 
four stages. The model deals with the first and second generation of resettlers. The stages 
must be completed through the second generation if resettlement outcomes are considered 
a success (Scudder 2009: 29). The four stages for achieving successful resettlement are:  
“Stage 1: Planning for resettlement before physical removal  
Stage 2: Coping with the initial drop in living standards that tends to follow removal 
Stage 3: Initiating economic development and community-formation activities necessary 
for improving the living standards of first-generation resettlers 
Stage 4: Handing over a sustainable resettlement process to the second generation of 
resettlers and to nonproject authority institutions.” (Scudder 2009: 30) 
The development stage is often never reached in many projects because of lacking policy 
and implementation (Scudder 2009).  
During the end of the 1980s and while he was working for the World Bank Micheal 
Cernea began to develop his approach, the by now well known Impoverishment Risks and 
Reconstruction (IRR) model. The approach linked the ideas of vulnerability and risks. 
The concept rests on eight potential risks of poverty resulting from displacement and is 
described into more detail in 5.4.1. as the carried out case study mainly rests upon his 
approach.  
The two main theoretical frameworks on DFDR have many similarities. Both frameworks 
deal with processes over an extended period of time and operate on high levels of 
generalization and try to simplify the complex phenomena of DFDR. Because of the 
variability and complexity involved one need to be careful when deriving hypothesis from 
the frameworks - although it is of course possible. Both frameworks are based on 
hypothesis that can be tested. Both frameworks focus much more on rural than in urban 
resettlement. They both lack in taking into account a gender impacts and impacts on 
children (Scudder 2009: 32ff). They also to a large extent lack cultural implications. 
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As the pace of DFDR accelerated in the 1980s the displacement and resettlement studies 
also expanded, focusing more on environmental and social impacts, particularly of dam-
projects (Oliver-Smith: 2009: 7). Researchers during that period of time produced a 
significant amount of “gray literature” of studies, project reviews and evaluations. 
Anthropologists increased cooperation with NGOs to record the negative impacts of 
development projects in Mexico, India or Brazil (Oliver-Smith 2009: 8). NGOs, 
independent commissions and other institutions contributed in theorizing the challenges 
of DFDR. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is one such organization. It linked 
the concept of risks with the concept of rights (Oliver-Smith 2009: 13). Besides the WCD 
also the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) has produced important steps towards policy 
change and socially and environmentally responsible development (Oliver-Smith 2009: 
15).  
5.2 Anthropological Research Implementation in Policy Frameworks 
However, despite the growing amount of research and literature and the recognition of the 
findings by the scientific community most governments stayed oblivious to the new 
findings (Cernea 1995: 97). This had different possible reasons. On the one hand there 
was the focus of social scientists such as anthropologists and case studies with no wide 
reaching policy recommendations and on the other hand policy and decision makers that 
preferred the policy vacuum and did not enquire critical input.  
5.2.1 Limits and Significance of Case Studies 
There were few attempts by social scientists to translate their research findings into 
concrete systematic policy proposals. Cernea (1995: 97) explains it like this: “The 
'research monograph' was designed as a vehicle for conveying knowledge, but was not 
intended or used as a vehicle for translating knowledge into operational or normative 
policy recommendations.”  
But Cernea also stresses the utter importance of social research on a case-by-case basis. 
Empirical case studies are an important prerequisite to policy reforms, but necessarily do 
not make policy recommendations. They usually do not make recommendations beyond 
the case at hand. This was also the case with social scientists working in project 
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evaluation: “Impact evaluators usually carry out studies whose goal is to mitigate the 
impacts of a particular project. They seldom formulate broader, forward-looking 
policies.“ (Cernea 1995: 94) Social scientists and impact analysts must set their sights 
much higher: “Time and location-specific studies that do not look beyond their own 
'nose', and which discuss only individual instances, can hardly trickle-up messages for 
broader purposes. Somebody needs to aggregate the case-by-case work in order to distil 
broader policy and strategy lessons” (Cernea 1995: 94) 
5.2.2 Preferred Policy Vacuum 
For years social science studies on forced displacement have been ignored by policy 
makers, engineers, planners and economists, so of course the reverse question arises: 
Why did government agencies and donors not demand research findings when they had to 
deal with displacement? For decades neither policy makers, decision-makers, project-
planners nor managers demanded social expertise. Major adverse effects were belittled as 
tolerable side effects for decades (Cernea 1995: 97, 1993: 19). Cernea (1995: 95) puts it 
like this: “On the one side is a long odyssey of disastrous displacement operations that 
recur as virtual carbon copies of one another; on the other side there is a growing, but 
largely uninfluential body of social science knowledge about resettlement, that 
demonstrates the mistaken assumptions and inadequate procedures used by displacement 
planners oblivious to lessons from previous disasters.”  
Some agencies or governments preferred and still prefer to maintain a policy vacuum and 
avoid policy commitments. This leaves them more flexibility in short time, but often at 
the expense of long-term cost, externalized to others (Cernea 1995: 94f). A policy 
vacuum brings many dangers: “A vacuum in public policy allows detrimental practices to 
happen without checks or penalties. In fact, such a policy vacuum amplifies existing risks 
of adverse consequences since legal safeguards for preventing adverse are not 
institutionalized.” (Cernea 1995: 95) 
Human rights of people being affected are not considered and the complexity and gravity 
of DFDR is ignored. Oliver-Smith (2009: 8) characterizes this as the “arrogance of 
authorities in many countries of both the developed and the developing worlds.” 
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It is essential that policy formulation is open to the results of evaluation and research. 
Over the course of time the WBG took a leading role in this matter and incorporated the 
results of social research into its displacement and resettlement policies. It is far from 
being perfect, but at least it is a start. 
5.2.3 Influence of Anthropological Research on the World Bank Policy on 
Displacement and Resettlement  
The World Bank policy is significant because the Iduapriem mine was partly financed by 
the World Bank, by the IFC to be specific, from 1990 to 2007. The resettlement of the 
Teberebie village occurred early during this period of time.  
How the World Bank incorporated findings of social research into its policy is 
particularly important as they set an example, being the first ones to do so. In 1989 (8) 
Cernea admitted that there is still a long way to go but he emphasized the leading role of 
the World Bank. He observed a chain reaction to the World Bank´s use of social scientists 
in their projects and their policy design. According to him several government agencies in 
developing countries started to consult local sociologists and anthropologists. 
At first the existing knowledge was kept on a shelf but not incorporated. In 1989 (2) 
Cernea stated that: “until recently the availability of sociological ‘knowledge on the shelf’ 
about involuntary resettlement hardly, if at all, exercised any influence on the 
governments and agencies engaged in the practice of involuntary resettlement.” The 
socio-anthropological concepts and research findings kept accumulating but had little 
effect on relevant programs or policy design (Cernea 1989; 1995). But Cernea already 
emphasized the major role of anthropologists in displacement and resettlement research in 
1989 (9) when he praised their “exceptional contribution to project improvement and 
implementation.” 
The study of development related displacement by social sciences, especially sociology 
and anthropology started to have particularly strong influence during the 1980s and 
1990s. Only after those concepts were incorporated by the World Bank they became 
politically influential and were put into practice (Cernea 1995: 92).   
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1979-1980 was a significant turning point when the World Bank adopted a catalogue of 
criteria regarding to social implications involved in involuntary relocation, the internal 
policy document Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-
Financed Projects (World Bank 1980). It laid down minimal principles for resettlement 
operations involving World Bank funds. Cernea (1995: 99) working for the World Bank 
himself reports that there was good institutional support but some remained unconvinced 
that the so-called “side effects” should play such an important role, there was insufficient 
social knowledge within the Bank. 
Despite those articulated doubts the process started. The initial feeling for the need of a 
new policy document was a result of trouble-some feedback from forced relocation 
processes and progress made in-house using social science knowledge. During the 
following years the 1980 paper went through several rounds of improvement within the 
work domain of the Bank´s sociologists and anthropologists (Cernea 1993: 20; 1995: 
98f). 
In the mid-1980s a policy analysis of resettlement in World Bank-financed projects 
started. The in-house application of the 1980 guideline should be investigated. The study 
covered agriculture and hydropower projects approved between 1979 and 1985 in 27 
countries (World Bank 1986). According to Cernea (1995: 100), who was part of the 
process, concluded: “[T]he introduction of the initial 1980 policy of the Bank's 
resettlement policy had led to substantial improvement in the treatment of resettlement 
components of projects.” But at the same time the study found out that the Bank-staff was 
not applying the policy consistently. 
The key findings of the study that was published in 1986 (World Bank 1986) were: 
Preparation and planning need radical improvement; there is mismanagement of options 
to rebuild productive capacities of displaced persons; the Bank is insufficient in 
supervising the resettlement implementation. Furthermore the study concluded that the 
impact on the host population and the physical environmental costs needed to be factored 
into the project (Cernea 1995: 100). The new policy note was issued with a strengthened 
focus on the socioeconomic basis of the people affected by the project. In 1988, the 1980 
and the 1986 paper were integrated into one single paper and the World Bank´s 
resettlement policy was published and made widely available (Cernea 1988). 
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The World Bank Operational Directive on Involuntary Resettlement 4.30 was published 
in 1990 and was a directive for World Bank projects. It was mainly written by 
anthropologist Michael Cernea as well (World Bank 1990). Those guidelines were an 
important step for the limitation of negative project effects involving resettlement, but 
their implementation proved to be consistently problematic (Oliver-Smith 2009: 10). 
In 1994 another World Bank study led to new strategic measures on operations that 
demanded corrective action (World Bank 1994). According to Cernea (1995: 101) among 
the strategy measures were: “making agreement on policy with borrowing governments 
explicit and requiring the adoption of national policy and legal frameworks for projects 
with large-scale resettlement operations; increasing local capacities for carrying out 
resettlement operations adequately; improving project design by reducing displacement 
and incorporating production-based relocation strategies; providing increased allocation 
of financial resources; and promoting greater consultation and participation of affected 
people in  designing and implementing resettlement.” 
According to Cernea (1995: 103f) among the most important changes was that the Bank 
was no longer to appraise or improve financing for a project that would cause 
displacement without a proper Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). The most fundamental 
demand of the policy framework was its raison d'etre: “to counteract the poverty risks 
involved in forced displacement, prevent impoverishment of those displaced, and ensure 
that their income and livelihood are restored through adequate resettlement.” (Cernea 
1995: 103) 
The most recent World Bank policy on involuntary resettlement was issued in 2001.  n 
1999, in an act of increased transparency, the World Bank requested comments from an 
array of stakeholders including national governments, NGOs and academics (Thomas 
2002: 342). During this preliminary stage NGOs and anthropologists articulated their 
concerns with the new policy. For Bliss (2001) the draft was not reaching far enough in 
considering the people involved. He suggested, the displacement criteria should be 
tightened and further specified. If there would be no alternative, relocation should aim at 
improving the situation of people affected. The World Bank Operational Policy on 
Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) was published in 2001 and states that “[i]nvoluntary 
resettlement may cause severe long-term hardship, impoverishment, and environmental 
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damage unless appropriate measures are carefully planned and carried out.” (World 
Bank 2001) The policy and its measures got mixed reviews. According to Oliver-Smith 
(2009: 10) the 2001 World Bank policy guidelines was weakened, making it easier to 
carry out resettlements. Indigenous peoples were less protected as well as other people 
lacking formal land titles. Overall the new World Bank policy tried to reduce their 
responsibility when it came to displacement and resettlement impacts. 
In 2000 the World Bank announced an independent review of its engagement in the 
extractive sector, partly due to the repeated external critique of the Bank´s role in oil, 
mining or gas projects. Some recommendations of the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) 
were: a more explicit focus on poverty reduction associated with its projects; the principle 
of free, prior, informed consent for giving the local communities more power in the 
decision making process; benefit sharing for local communities should be ensured; the 
negative legacy of extractive projects should be tackled; more transparency of revenue 
management and project documents (Extractive Industries Review 2003). Many of those 
recommendations were already been brought to the World Bank by the civil society and 
resettlement experts for years.  
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, 
financing many mining operations, including the Iduapriem mine, revamped its approach 
on environmental and social safeguard policies and unfortunately distanced itself from 
lessons of past experience (Clark 2009: 187). In 2006 they issued a Sustainability Policy 
with the Performance Standard 5, covering land acquisition and involuntary resettlement. 
The most important problem is that this new standard reversed the World Bank policy 
with respect to recognizing the vulnerability of landless people (International Finance 
Corporation 2006). Until the IFC had their own Sustainability Policy and Performance 
Standard 5 they were still following the World Bank Operational Directive on Involuntary 
Resettlement (OD 4.30) (World Bank 1990) even though the rest of the bank group was 
already following the Operational Manual on Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) (World 
Bank 2001). Both OD 4.30 and OP 4.12 forbid discrimination against landless people and 
emphasize the improvement of affected people, whereas the IFCs Performance Standard 5 
only requires compensation for loss of land with recognized legal title. The overall 
message that the Performance Standard 5 sends to private sector clients is clear: It is 
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acceptable to externalize the negative impacts of their projects to the surrounding 
communities and environment (Clark 2009: 191). 
It is important to point out that all these mentioned policy frameworks were and are only 
relevant to projects (co)funded by the World Bank, outside relatively unregulated patterns 
continue. And also within projects (co)funded by the World Bank it is important to keep 
in mind that those policy guidelines and frameworks were and are not universally 
enforced in practice for many different reasons. According to Clark (2009: 181ff) it is not 
a blindness of problems related to DFDR that has proven the policy objectives of 
restoring or improving the displaced standard of living elusive. There are varying reasons 
ranging from lack of proper planning, institutional weakness, to lack of political will of 
enforcing policies. At the end it is a question of power imbalance. International players 
like the World Bank Group or/and multinational corporations compete against local 
communities. To be displaced is the ultimate expression of powerlessness.  
5.3 Anthropological Knowledge of Displacement and Resettlement in 
NGOs and Advocacy Work 
Anthropologists have not just engaged in policy development and production of research 
studies. Theorizing DFDR has been inseparably woven into applied concerns for 
developing approaches and needs of affected people and their legal rights. 
Anthropologists have been active in advocacy activities on behalf of affected 
communities. They often take leadership in many NGOs that work with those 
communities affected by DFDR (Oliver-Smith 2009: 11). 
5.4 Applied Anthropological Displacement and Resettlement Models 
I applied two theoretical displacement and resettlement models during my research in 
Teberebie.  
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One is the most important work in resettlement studies in recent years. The work of 
Michael M. Cernea9 and his Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model for 
resettling displaced populations that was developed during the 1990s. The origin of the 
model is both theoretical and empirical. It was first applied in a resettlement review of 
almost 200 projects carried out by the World Bank in 1993-94 (World Bank 1994).  
The second concept I applied was the Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement 
(MIDR) model by Theodore E. Downing. It is focusing especially on displacements 
caused by mining, bases on Cernea´s IRR model and takes it further.  
These two models operated as guidelines for the research in the Teberebie community, as 
a theorizing framework, for guiding the specific research and for analyzing the results. 
The following chapter gives an overview of these two concepts. Naturally with it comes 
insight in the major societal sustainability risks for displaced communities in mining 
areas. 
5.4.1 Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model by Michael M. 
Cernea 
Next to Downing’s MIDR model the IRR model by Cernea proved to be applicable as a 
theorizing framework, for guiding the specific research and for analyzing the results. 
5.4.1.1 Main Functions 
According to Cernea (2000: 22) the IRR model provides a conceptual framework for 
conducting and organizing fieldwork and facilitates the exploration of possible linkages 
between related risks. The ability to guide data collection along the model´s key variables 
makes it possible to compare responses to risks across different projects and within time.  
The model has four basic functions: 
”1. A predictive (warning and planning) function 
2. A diagnostic (explanatory and assessment) function 
                                                      
9
 Michael Cernea is both an academic researcher and an applied anthropologist whose work has focused on 
development policies, specifically social, environmental, and agricultural policies, from the perspectives of 
anthropology and sociology. He has held several senior positions at the World Bank and introduced 
sociology and anthropology into the World Bank (George Washington University 2010).  
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3. A problem-resolution function, in guiding and measuring 
resettlers´reestablishment 
4. A research function, in formulating hypotheses and conducting theory-led field 
investigations.” (Cernea 2000: 21) 
Oliver-Smith (2009: 9) calls Cernea´s IRR model “a significant tool for the prediction, 
diagnosis, and resolution of problems associated with DFDR.” The IRR model is a 
theoretical model for involuntary resettlement that highlights the risks that cause 
impoverishment through displacement. It also offers ways to eliminate or at least mitigate 
these risks. It helps to create a compass for complex resettlement situations and adds tools 
of explaining, diagnosing, predicting, and planning. The model tries to explain what 
happens during massive forced displacements itself and to create a theoretical and 
safeguarding tool. It should counteract adverse effects and be able to guide policy, 
planning and development programs (Cernea 2000: 14). 
5.4.1.2 Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement  
Involuntary resettlement is different from most voluntary movements as there are nearly 
all “push” and no “pull” factors. Involuntary resettlement programs are mostly 
indiscriminate. The social insurance mechanisms present in most peasant societies around 
the world are overwhelmed and disrupted, few indigenous coping strategies manage the 
pressures caused by resettlement (Cernea 1993: 3). Involuntary resettlement is often 
accompanied by material and cultural losses and political tension. It is a concept of 
exclusion. It is a combination of physical exclusion from a certain territory and social 
exclusion of functioning social networks (Cernea 2000: 12). During displacement the 
affected people risk losing capital in all its forms: natural capital, man-made capital, 
human and social capital (Cernea 2000: 32). Conventional planning approaches do not 
protect adequately against risks. In most cases they do not prevent impoverishment, de-
capitalization and victimization of the affected people (Cernea 2000: 13). 
5.4.1.3 Eight Basic Risks 
The IRR model consists of three fundamental concepts: risk, impoverishment and 
reconstruction that are further split into sets of specific notions. These variables are 
interlinked, influence each other and play varying roles (Cernea 2000: 19).  
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The main eight displacement risks are:  
“ 
a. Landlessness 
b. Joblessness 
c. Homelessness 
d. Marginalization 
e. Food insecurity 
f. Increased morbidity 
g. Loss of access to common property resources 
h. Community disarticulation.“ (Cernea 2000: 20) 
 
5.4.1.4 Guide for Action 
The model has a dual applicability: if you turn it upside down it shows the strategies that 
should be taken to prevent and overcome patterns of impoverishment. It is basically a 
guide for action: 
“ 
a. From landlessness to land-based resettlement 
b. From joblessness to reemployment 
c. From homelessness to house reconstruction 
d. From marginalization to social inclusion 
e. From increased morbidity to improved health care 
f. From food insecurity to adequate nutrition 
g. From loss of access to restoration of community assets and services 
h. From social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding.” (Cernea 
2000: 20) 
The model is not just a predictor of inescapable impoverishment but is supposed to be a 
self-destroying prophecy. “Read in reverse” it is a guide toward counteracting risks and 
resolving problems. The risk identification is not just an exercise carried out for academic 
purposes but should be used to “design for action” (Cernea 2000: 33f). 
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5.4.2 Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR) Model by Theodore 
E. Downing 
Mining activities are one major cause of DFDR. The concept of Mining-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR) model by Theodore E. Downing analyses the 
major risks to societal sustainability by mining activities, in particular effects caused by 
displacement and resettlement. This concept looks beyond the simple loss of land and 
opens up issues beyond economics and environment. 
Sustainable communities have difficulties in rehabilitating after displacement by mining 
activities. Downing (2002: 3) sums up MIDR and the resettlement effect like this: “MIDR 
is accompanied by what displacement specialists call the resettlement effect, defined as 
the loss of physical and non-physical assets, including homes, communities, productive 
land, income-earning assets and sources, subsistence, resources, cultural sites, social 
structures, networks and ties, cultural identity and mutual help mechanisms. The effect 
introduces well-documented risks over and above the loss of land.“ 
Many mining communities already suffer before they are affected by large-scale mining 
operations and are resettled. Often MIDR causes “new poverty” and poor people do 
become even poorer. Already the loss of a little bit of resource can be devastating 
(Downing 2002: 8). 
5.4.2.1 Vulnerable Groups 
Downing’s model turns attention to especially vulnerable groups: “Certain groups—
especially indigenous peoples, the elderly and women—have been found to be more 
vulnerable to displacement-induced impoverishment risks.“ (Downing 2002: 3) 
Vulnerable groups highly depend on their surrounding environment. Alterations in their 
surrounding ecology are much likely to overwhelm community adaptive responses. 
Especially when it comes to indigenous people Downing (2002: 11) sees high risk for 
them to slip into new poverty: “When evicted from their land – the foundation of their 
culture – without appropriate compensation or rehabilitation, the damage to indigenous 
people is extreme.” 
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5.4.2.2 The Resettlement Effect 
The most visual risk of MIDR is the loss of land, but there are also other potential risks 
that threaten the sustainability of a community. According to Downing (2002: 8) these 
include: joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of common 
lands and resources, increased health risks, social disarticulation, loss of civil and human 
rights, disruption of formal educational activities and loss of access to basic public 
services. 
This set of risks is more or less based on Michael M. Cernea´s IRR model described 
above. 
5.4.3 Interconnection of Potential Risks Models 
5.4.3.1 Risk of Landlessness 
According to Cernea (2000: 23f) the expropriation of land removes the main foundation 
of people´s productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods. Loss of land is the 
principal form of de-capitalization and pauperization of displaced persons. The affected 
families are sent into poverty unless the land basis of their productive systems is 
reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with other steady income generating employment. 
Anthropological field studies show that the loss of land has far more severe consequences 
for affected families than the loss of housing. 
MIDR raises the risk of landlessness as well. The loss of land means the loss of the 
essentials of productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods. It is a form of de-
capitalization. According to Downing (2002: 9) landlessness in relation to MIDR has four 
forms: “1) the initial loss of land to mining, 2) damages to the land´s productive potential 
in the surrounding, non-appropriated area, 3) subsequent losses in the productive value 
of land on account of environmental problems, and 4) loss of land occurring because 
landless people are unable to gain access to alternative lands.” 
5.4.3.2 Risk of Joblessness 
Cernea (2000: 24) states that the risk of losing wage employment due to displacement is 
very high both in rural as well as in urban areas. Unemployment and underemployment in 
resettlement communities often endures long after the initial physical relocation. Creating 
new jobs is a difficult task that requires extensive investments. In rural areas, landless 
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laborers lose the access to land of others (lease or sharecropped) and assets of common 
property. With displacement self employed producers, like craftsmen or shopkeepers lose 
their businesses. The sometimes offered vocational training may provide additional skills 
to resettlers but does not have to end up in regular employment. The joblessness often sets 
in with time delay. In the beginning of projects resettlers may receive employment, but 
these project-related jobs are mostly of short life and not sustainable.  
Also the MIDR model mentions potential economic impacts not directly linked to 
ownership of land. Effects of MIDR can also be the loss of wage employment, loss of 
access to leaseholds and share cropping opportunities. Underemployment and 
unemployment is often chronic after the loss of income-generating resource base. Mining 
activities only increase employment for some. To seek employment in the mining sector 
is increasingly difficult as the industry is moving to less labor-intensive methods of 
production. So it is difficult to argue that mining brings employment to unskilled local 
workers. In this sense the argument that mining jobs may substitute lost local income 
opportunities does not hold, especially not if the lifespan of a job in the mining sector is 
much shorter than the job it dismantles (Downing 2002: 10). 
5.4.3.3 Risk of Homelessness 
Loss of shelter tends to be only temporarily for many resettlers but for some 
homelessness or worsening of their housing standards remains a permanent condition. 
The risk of worsening housing standards is much higher when the compensation for 
demolished shelter is paid according to market value rather than replacement value. 
Frequently resettlers can not accomplish to quickly rebuild their house so they are forced 
to move into temporarily shelters, sometimes displaced families live in these semi-
permanent houses for years. In a broader cultural sense the loss of a family´s home or the 
loss of a group´s cultural space can lead to status deprivation and estrangement (Cernea 
2000: 25). 
According to Downing the potential risk of homelessness also follows the “new poverty” 
pattern. Most of the time this will just be temporarily but in cases where the resettlement 
was executed poorly it remains a chronic condition. It goes beyond the simple loss of a 
structure. Homelessness itself or the replacement of a house with a structure that the 
occupants don’t consider “a home” is often connected with “a profound loss of identity 
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and cultural impoverishment as the symbolic importance of place, in terms of family 
cohesion and a remembered location for mutual support, not only from the household but 
neighboring households is disturbed.” (Downing 2002: 10)  
5.4.3.4 Risk of Marginalization 
Marginalization occurs when families lose their economic power. A downward spiral 
starts, highly productive farmers are moved to less productive soils, middle-class land 
owners become small landholders, small landholders become landless tenants, small 
shopkeepers or craftsmen downsize and slip into poverty. Human capital is lost when 
individuals cannot use their acquired skills in the new environment (Cernea 2000: 26).  
This economic marginalization is most of the time accompanied by social and 
psychological marginalization as Cernea (2000: 26) further elaborates: “[Social and 
psychological marginalization is] expressed in a drop in social status, in resettlers´ loss 
of confidence in society and in themselves, a feeling of injustice, and deepened 
vulnerability.” Although anxiety, decline in self-esteem and cultural and behavioral 
derogations have been reported over years, especially psychological marginalization is 
typically overlooked in resettlement planning. The victimization of the resettlers tends to 
degrade their self-image and also lower their status compared to surrounding 
communities or the host community (Cernea 2000: 26).  
Downing also sees the problem of marginalization in communities affected by mining. 
According to him there is especially a risk of marginalization as displaced individuals and 
communities slip into lower socioeconomic status relative to the surrounding area. 
Research has shown that such marginalization leads to loss of self-esteem (Downing 
2002: 11). 
5.4.3.5 Risk of Food Insecurity 
According to Cernea (2000: 27) forced resettlement increases the risk of temporarily or 
permanent undernourishment and food insecurity. During physical relocation sudden 
drops in food crops availability are predictable. The rebuilding of functioning regular 
food production may take years and hunger and undernourishment become long-term 
effects. 
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Downing (2002: 11) mentions increased risk of food insecurity in his MIDR model as 
well.  
5.4.3.6 Risk of Increased Morbidity  
Massive relocations cause serious declines in health levels. The social stress and 
psychological stress is sometimes accompanied by location-related illnesses such as 
parasitic and vector-borne diseases such as malaria. Unsafe water supply and inadequate 
sewage systems cause vulnerability to epidemics, chronic diarrhea and so on. Children 
and the elderly are especially affected (Cernea 2000: 27f).  
Mining related health risks are especially mentioned in Downing´s MIDR model. Health 
risks faced by communities affected by mining are well documented. The initial act of 
moving can cause stress and traumas to the displacees. There is also a long list with much 
reported recurring difficulties once the communities are resettled such as gaining access 
to safe potable water and safe sewage; increase in diarrhea, dysentery and epidemic 
infections (Downing 2002: 11). Increased mortality rates are reported in connection with 
accidents associated with new water reservoirs or epidemic outbreaks around new water 
bodies (Cernea 2000: 29). 
5.4.3.7 Risk of Disruption of Formal Educational Activities 
In association with MIDR there is the risk of disruption in education and routine 
socialization. Children often do not attend school during relocation. A number of children 
do not return to school and instead join the labor force at an early age. The chaos of 
relocation distracts the parents from focusing on their children´s education (Downing 
2002: 11). 
5.4.3.8 Risk of Loss of Access to Common Property and Services 
Especially for already poor people the loss of access to common property (forest, lands, 
water bodies, burial grounds and so on) that belong to the relocated community lead to 
decrease in income and livelihood. When the access to common property resources is not 
protected the pressure on common property of other surrounding communities or reserved 
forests increases and causes social conflict and environmental degradation (Cernea 2000: 
29).  
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Downing (2002: 11) also states the risk of loss of access to common property in the 
MIDR model.  
5.4.3.9 Risk of Social Disarticulation 
Population relocation goes much beyond simple financial costs, according to historians of 
migration among the heaviest costs are the severing of personal ties in family 
surroundings. Forced displacement dismantles social networks that used to mobilize 
people to act around common interests. Forced resettlement fragments and disperses 
communities and dismantles patterns of social organization and kinship groups. Informal 
networks of mutual help or voluntary associations are disrupted. The loss of reciprocity 
networks directly worsens powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability. Cernea (2000: 
30) further describes this as a net loss of valuable “social capital” apart from the already 
broadly discussed economic capital. This loss of social capital is typically not 
compensated by the programs or projects that caused it, although the loss has long-term 
consequences. 
Downing (2002: 11) also points out the risk of social disarticulation in the MIDR model. 
5.4.4 Differential Risk Intensities 
The described risks must be seen as a pattern of variables linked to one another. Those 
risks are forced upon the affected people that have to deal with them simultaneously 
which often results in a crisis. According to Cernea (2000: 31) the intensity of these risks 
varies from site to site and risks are differently experienced by sub-groups. Site-specific 
risks may emerge, some risks may not be experienced. Individual situations are always 
richer than the pattern but the general model is present in all situations despite the 
variations. There is a gender-oriented variance. Especially women suffer more severe 
impacts like discrimination against in compensation criteria. 
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6 Research Design and Methodology 
6.1 Case Study Approach 
This research on the impacts of gold mining in the Teberebie community is basically a 
case study. A case study is something in-between an actual survey technique and a 
methodological paradigm – it is an approach and summarizes multilayered methods of 
data collection. The case study approach includes various methods like participant 
observation, interviews, group discussions, and content analyses of different documents 
(Lamnek 2005: 298ff). In my research in Teberebie I used different methods that shall be 
discussed further below. 
For case studies particularly interesting cases are chosen and are studied and analyzed in 
various dimensions and over a long period of time. The study subjects are single persons 
or much larger social entities like social groups, families, companies but also treatments 
or realizations of interventions. The chosen chase is either seen as particularly typical, 
concise or meaningful in a larger phenomenon (Lamnek 2005: 299).  
6.2 Extended Case Method 
The extended case method (ECM) was applicable for the research on the Teberebie case 
because using the ECM is suggestive in areas of social and political processes or legal 
problems, anywhere actions take in a primary role. The ECM is mainly used to analyze 
social processes in situations of crisis and conflict (Rössler 2003: 147ff). 
There was a critical debate on the paradigm of structural functionalism within British 
Social Anthropology starting in the 1930s. In the course of the 20th century it became 
more and more clear that these models, based on stable social structures, were not that 
suitable for current phenomena at that time. One methodic answer was the development 
of the ECM, especially pushed forward by Max Gluckman and in strong connection with 
the so-called Manchester School of British Anthropology (Halbmayer n.d.). 
68 
The central new orientation was the shift of attention from allegedly stable social 
structures to the “competition of individual actors for resources and status in the frame of 
contradictory, inconsistent norms and rules.” (Rössler 2003: 144; authors own 
translation). The center of attention were the actions of persons in social practice and the 
development of social conflicts rather than abstracted structures. Change, variance and 
different interests were no longer seen as dysfunctional variance from harmonic structures 
but rather as central part of social life (Halbmayer n.d.). The ECM was developed out of 
the analysis of law cases and is oriented on actors, actions and processes (Rössler 2003: 
144). The Teberebie case was notorious for this method, as the community is in constant 
state of conflict because of the displacement and the mining activities. That triggered 
social conflicts within the community and the competition for resources has lead to 
tension in the social fabric of the community as a whole.  
Using the ECM it is necessary to document the pre-story of the specific case and to be 
well aware of existing norms and institutions in the field. This makes ECM a rather time-
consuming method. The dependence on selected informants for the knowledge of the pre-
story problematic, so is the question of the representativity and selection of the cases. The 
selection of the case underlies some kind of arbitrariness of the anthropologist. The role 
of the anthropologist is problematic as well, as she or he necessarily is a confidant in 
times of crisis and conflict (Rössler 2003: 148ff). Gathering information on the pre-story 
of the Teberebie displacement and resettlement was quite time consuming as there is not 
all too much written information available. Luckily I found respondents in Teberebie that 
could give precise information on the history that got the community to the situation they 
are in by now. While doing research in Teberebie I found myself in a situation of crisis, 
tension within the community and various sometimes conflicting interests. I tried to talk 
to all parties concerned which made it problematic at times as well. I had to deliberately 
distance myself in these situations and tried to remain unbiased when conflicts within the 
community were discussed.  
6.3 Selection of the Teberebie Case 
The Teberebie case is probably one of the worst hit mining communities in Ghana. Most 
of the various impacts of mining are compressed in this village. Therefore the Teberebie 
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case is particular significant because it uncovers a larger syndrome. The list of Ghanaian 
and communities worldwide affected by large-scale gold mining is long and all of them 
face similar issues like the people of Teberebie.  
I had the chance to visit Ghana and various mining communities in February and March 
2009 together with Austrian journalist Thomas Seifert of “Die Presse” to do 
investigations on the gold mining sector in Ghana in context of the project “Reporter’09”. 
This gave me the great chance to get an overview of the whole mining sector and visit 
close to ten mining communities, among them also Teberebie. This way it was easier to 
assess the significance of the Teberebie case. NGO representatives confirmed my 
estimation. They also helped to establish contact to the community, laid down my 
research enquiry to them and priorly asked permission to do the research.  
6.4 Methods of Data Collection and Process of Field Work   
Prior to the main research in Teberebie in May and June 2009 I had the possibility to 
conduct interviews with leading officials of the Ghanaian mining sector in Accra in 
February and March 2009. Namely interviews with: Benjamin Aryee, Chief Executive for 
the Minerals Commission; Ahmed Nantogmah, Director of Public Affairs and 
Environment for the Ghana Chamber of Mines; Nana Anthony Andoh, Director for 
Mining for the Environmental Protection Agency and John Owusu, General Manager, 
Corporate Affairs of AngloGold Ashanti. Those interviews conducted prior to the 
research in Teberebie were of great importance for getting insight in the mechanisms of 
the Ghanaian mining sector. The information out of these interviews is part of the greater 
framework of my Teberebie case study and significantly helped to prepare the research in 
Teberebie itself.  
Another significant part at the beginning of the research on the ground was the analyses 
of documents like the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) with detailed information on the 
demographic structure of the Teberebie community and the resettlement process. Rather 
important were also multiple different maps that were handed to me, according to which 
the rather complex history of the whole concession, the mining site and the resettlement 
became much clearer.  
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A next step was participant observation during my research. I took part in meetings of 
community, government, NGO and company representatives, in particular a Monitoring 
Advisory Group (MAG) - meeting at the Iduapriem mine that helped to get a better grasp 
on the different roles the stakeholders play in this conflicting situation. 
The main part of the research was the large amount of semi-structured interviews I 
conducted with 33 persons over a period of four weeks in May and June 2009. 
I did expert interviews with members of advocacy groups such as WACAM and FIAN. 
These interviews were of particular importance as they gave the outside perspective of the 
situation in Teberebie. They helped to better adjust and focus my research during the 
process of interviewing in Teberebie, as both groups know the situation in Teberebie very 
well. Namely I conducted expert interviews with Mike Anane, Chief Executive of FIAN-
Ghana and Daniel Owusu-Koranteng, Chief Executive of WACAM.  
The expert interviews and informal talks with them took place during all stages of my 
field work. Informal talks were already held in the preparation phase while working on 
the research questions and during the process of establishing interview guidelines. In the 
later process of analyzing and first interpretation of my research material, their expertise 
was extremely helpful to reflect on my findings and compare with their experience in a 
topic they have been following for many years.  
The core of my research was semi-structured interviews with 31 Teberebie residents. The 
interviews were conducted mostly in the Teberebie village at the person’s homes or in 
public places such as the community center, some interviews were done at various 
galamsey sites on the Iduapriem concession. All interviews were digitally recorded. The 
interviews had lengths between 20 minutes to almost two hours, the average interview 
was about 40 minutes. 
19 interview partners were male, twelve interview partners were female. It proofed to be 
much harder to get into contact with women. They were more reluctant to participate in 
interviews and in average they needed more assistance from the interpreter. A local of 
Teberebie functioned as my interpreter. His full assistance was needed with 39% of the 
persons and only partly with 22% of the persons. The communication with the remaining 
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39% persons was in English and without any outside interpretation. It was tried to avoid a 
bias on either the side of the non-English speakers or the English speaking population of 
Teberebie. Of course it would have been of great advantage to speak local languages like 
Wassa. 
With five community members who emerged as being very well-informed and outspoken 
I conducted multiple interviews over the course of my research and followed up issues of 
their particular expertise: two women (age 34 and 53) and three men (age 25, 59 and 72). 
With the exception of the 53-year old women I was able to communicate with them 
without an interpreter.  
The comfort level of the community rose with time. At some points originally planned 
single interviews emerged into group discussions between up to three participants, when 
interested community members came closer and wanted to share their information and 
point of view. This was very helpful to observe how the dynamics of the community 
worked and to gain results out of the discussions. On the other hand this was not initially 
planned and could have been much better prepared in advance.  
Most of the interview partners asked to remain anonymous, for different reasons. Some 
articulated some fear of possible frictions in the community or with the mining company. 
Of course I respect those whishes and therefore almost all names, with few exceptions, 
have been anonymized.  
6.5 Disturbances, Problems and Improvement Suggestions  
Apart from the already mentioned disturbances, problems and improvement suggestions 
in the description of the process of field work, there are some additional points important 
to mention in this context.  
Some people were reluctant to talk to me for different reasons: They feared consequences 
by the mining company; they thought I was employed with the mining company and 
doing research for them; they were frustrated with talking to one more researcher and 
were unsure about the outcome of the research altogether.  
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Although I am a woman it was much harder to get into touch with female Teberebie 
residents. Perhaps this was caused by the fact that the interpreter was male and many 
women needed his assistance. During the course of my stay I built up a relationship with 
a female opinion leader and she softly convinced other women to participate. I believe 
having a female interpreter would have been of advantage. Of course not needing an 
interpreter at all and knowing at least one of the local languages like Wassa would have 
been even better.  
My contact with the NGO FIAN was advantage and disadvantage at the same time. I was 
doing this research as a private entity and not for FIAN, but the connection helped me to 
gain access to the Teberebie community and to additional interview partners. This way I 
gained peoples trust. On the other hand it was also a disadvantage as I continuously had 
to set the record straight and disassociate myself from the organization and establish 
myself as an independent researcher. 
The research was done in a situation of crisis in Teberebie and people put much hope in 
the power of “outsiders”. It was necessary to repeatedly explain my mission in Teberebie 
and to not give false hope of drastic change in their situation that could be provoked 
through my research findings.  
6.6 Process of Interview Analyses 
I oriented my interview content analyses on the qualitative text analyses according to 
Mayring(2008) with particular focus on structuralizing content analyses.  
At first all interviews conducted were transcribed. The structure of analyses derived from 
the nine impact risks of the IRR- and MIDR-models and my main research question 
resting upon them. This led to deductive application of the basic categories. I filtered out 
all text passages that were addressed by one or more of the categories. I systematically 
extracted the material and summarized it to get a manageable amount of text. Some 
categories were further differentiated during the course of the analyses. I also filtered out 
very significant examples for a specific category that included particular representative 
statements for a category. 
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7 The Study Area: Wassa West District  
The Wassa West District is the most heavily mineralized geological zone in the country, 
has a century of mining history and is currently the most heavily mined district in Ghana 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 171). Some sources go even further and state that the Wassa West 
District is the district within the African continent with the largest concentration of mines 
(Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 29). The district has rich mineral deposits including gold, 
bauxite, manganese and diamonds. The mineral wealth of the district attracted a huge 
number of foreign mining companies. This has various impacts and on almost all facets of 
the district. It has led to frequent clashes between local communities and mining 
companies over environmental and social issues. This also resulted in the emerging of 
environmental and social movements among the district´s population. One example is 
WACAM, an association of communities affected by mining with its roots in the district´s 
capital Tarkwa. 
Despite its resource wealth the district faces major problems as outlined in a Five-Year-
Development Plan (1996-2000) by the Wassa West District Assembly (1996): Limited 
road networks and poor quality of roads; inadequate and low access to potable water, 
close to 40% of the district´s population lacks access to clean water and depends and 
streams and ponds for water; limited access to health facilities and services; high 
illiteracy levels, poor access to educational facilities, low quality of education, high 
school drop-out rate, over 40% of the population can neither read nor write; poor housing 
conditions and overcrowding especially in urban mining centers; environmental 
degradation and pollution as the result of aggressive and ecologically damaging resource 
extraction; Although this plan was developed in 1996 the problems are still very much the 
same. 
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7.1 Location and Physical Characteristics 
The Wassa West District is part of the Western Region of Ghana which is the most 
Western part of Southern Ghana. The Wassa West District is one of the sixteen 
administrative districts of that region. In the North the district is bordered by the Wassa 
Amenfi District, to the South by Mpophor-Wassa East and Ahanta West, in the East by 
Mpophor-Wassa East and to the West by Nzema East District. The Wassa West district 
lies between latitudes 4° N and 5° 40’ N and longitudes 1° 45’ W and 2° 10’W.  It covers 
a total area of 2.578 km². The district´s capital is Tarkwa, which is home to several big 
mining companies. In Ghana, the district and its capital are almost a synonym for gold. 
 
Fig. 5. Districts of Ghana’s Western Region 
The area contains a significant amount of the country´s tropical rainforest. The vegetation 
is characterized by rich undergrowth of climbers and shrubs of differing heights. The 
trees can reach heights between 15 to 45 meters. Due to the mining activities the density 
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of the vegetation is decreasing. In areas that have been mined out the vegetation consists 
of ferns and other shrubs (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 30). Wassa West District falls within 
the equatorial climatic zone. The region experiences the heaviest rains in Ghana, the 
annual rainfall ranges between 1500mm and 1933mm with the most rain occurring 
between April to June and from October to November. Humidity in the area is ranging 
from 70 to 90%. Mean temperature ranges from 24 celcius to 30 celcius 
(Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 29f).  
The evergreen mountain ranges within the district constitute a source of water for the 
rivers and streams of the region. The Tarkwa area lies in the Ankobra Basin, an extensive 
drainage basin.  The rivers of the area are the Ankobra, Essumang, Angonabeng, 
Ahumabru and the Bonsa (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 30). The soil in the Wassa West 
District is generally not very fertile, which is characteristically for tropical rainforest 
soils.  Once the vegetation cover is removed and the soil is exposed to tropical rainfalls 
there is severe erosion and degradation. Nonetheless the soils support the cultivation of 
several tree and food crops such as cocoa, oil palm, rubber, citrus, plantain, cassava, rice 
and maize (Agbesinyale 2003: 175). 
7.2 Demography, Ethnicity, Religion 
In 2008 the entire population of Ghana was estimated to be 23.8 million (UN - 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2009: 2). Ghana ranks 
142nd of 179 listed countries in the 2008 Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 
2008). Life expectancy at birth was 59.4 years in 2008, adult literacy rate (ages 15 and 
above) was 64.2% (UNDP 2008). GDP per capita stood at 1,247 US-dollar (UNDP 
2008). 
In 2000 the census enumeration gave the Wassa West District a total population of 
232,699 at a growth rate of almost 3% (Ghana Districts 2006b).The 2009 estimation for 
the Wassa West District was a population of 295,753 (Ghana Districts, n. d.). In 2005 the 
male – female ratio for the district was 103:100. A rather probable explanation for the 
male dominance in the district could be the high level of male in-migration in search of 
employment in the mining sector. The ages up to 14 years constitute about 25% of the 
population, however it is much lower than the national and regional figures of 44.8% and 
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45%. On the other hand the labor force in the district comprising age groups 15 plus to 
less than 64 constitutes 70.1%, which is extremely high compared to the regional and 
national figures of 53.1 and 52.2% respectively (Ghana Districts 2006b). 
The Wassa people, who belong to the Akan group, are natives of the area and constitute 
about 43% of the population (Ghana Districts 2006a). There is heavy ethnic variation in 
the area also caused by the mining activities. A growing number of people from outside 
migrate in the Wassa West District in search for employment in the large-scale mining 
industry or in small-scale or galamsey mining. This drift of unemployed (especially male) 
youth from other regions of the country into the district are major contributory factors to 
the growing population in the district (Akabzaa 2000: 33f). The other main ethnic groups 
in the Wassa West District are Ahanta, Fanti, Brong, Ewe, Ga, Kokomba and others that 
make up 57% of the population (Ghana Districts 2006a).  
The dominant religion in the district is Christianity, accounting for 92% of the population. 
The Moslem population forms 6.6% and traditional religion only 1.4% (Ghana Districts 
2006a) although it is not uncommon to find traditional believe systems still governing 
social life in some of the rural communities (Agbesinyale 2003: 203f). 
7.3 Economy  
The district is by no doubt rich in resources. Nevertheless, more than 40% of the district´s 
population lives on far less than one US-dollar per day. Income distribution is skewed in 
favor of those who work in the urban mining centers and those who are directly engaged 
in the mining industry (Agbesinyale 2003: 194). Figures from 2002 cited by Pooley 
(2003: 6) indicate that 48% of the district’s population is employed in agricultural 
activities, 23% in commerce, 16.5% in services and 12.5% in some form of mining 
activity.  
7.3.1 Agriculture 
Agricultural land use in the district forms 46% of the total land area. In 2008 46.9% of the 
total labor force is engaged in subsistence farming and about 10% in forms of plantation 
farming. The food crops that are grown are maize, yams, cocoyam, rice and other staple 
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crops. The cash crops that are grown are cocoa, rubber, oil palm and others in smaller 
scales (Kusimi 2008: 255). The average farm size is estimated at 5.3 acres. About 93% of 
the district´s farmers employ the bush fallow system or shifting cultivation in their 
farming activities (Agbesinyale 2003: 180). The agricultural sector in the Wassa West 
District is dominated by women. During the years 2002 and 2004 about 70% of the 
farmers were female (Kusimi 2008: 255).  
Just less than 33% of the available land in the district is under commercial mining 
concessions. However the Chamber of Mines pointed out that only around one third of 
the concession land are actually being utilized by the mining companies and much of the 
remaining land can be used for farming purposes (Pooley 2003: 6). 
7.3.2 Mining Industry 
There are more than 30 companies known to be actively exploring or prospecting 
minerals in the district (Agbesinyale 2003: 182). The main mining companies active in 
the Wassa West District are: Golden Star Resources with its Wassa and Bogoso/Prestea 
Mines, Goldfields with its Tarkwa and Damang Mines and AngloGold Ashanti with its 
Iduapriem Mine. Basically all large-scale mines are working with surface mining, heap 
leaching and carbon in leach processing. Labor force employed by large-scale mining is 
modest. In addition small-scale mining and galamsey employ large amounts of labor 
force. 
Besides the big companies there are over 200 registered small-scale miners and an 
estimated number of over 50.000 galamsey operators active in the district (Agbesinyale 
2003: 181). In the year 2000 the district´s gold production accounted for nearly 40% of 
the national output (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001). In 2003 it is estimated at 35% (Pooley 
2003: 6). Besides gold mining, the district also gives home to a large commercial 
manganese mine located in Nsuta and several smaller diamond mines. 
7.3.3 Other Economic Activities 
Besides mining, other industrial activities in the district are not very well developed, 
despite the rich resource base of the district. 
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The Western Region and within it the Wassa West District is one of the country´s richest 
in terms of natural resource endowment: rainforest, agriculture, rivers, well-watered soils 
and mineral wealth. The Western Region accounts for nearly 45% of Ghana´s foreign 
exchange earnings through the export of timber, cocoa, rubber and of course minerals 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 171). The mining industry had the effect of attracting some 
commerce and trade and other key services to the district. They are mostly concentrated 
in the major mining towns such as Tarkwa, Prestea and Bogosu. Retailing and petty 
trading in agricultural products and food items are major components of commerce. The 
district depends on food imports from outside and is not self-sufficient in food production 
due to many difficulties in agriculture (Agbesinyale 2003: 184f). 
7.4 Iduapriem Mine and the Displacements of the Teberebie 
Community 
7.4.1 Iduapriem Mining Operation  
The Iduapriem mining operation is situated 10 km southwest of the district capital 
Tarkwa. It is 85 km northwest of the coastal city Takoradi. American-Ghanaian mining 
company Teberebie Goldfields Limited (TGL) obtained a mining concession in the 
Teberebie area in 1990. In the 1990s it was Ghana’s second largest mine and was 
considered the richest of the new generation of open-pit mines. TGL was owned 90% by 
the USA-based Pioneer Group and 10% by the Ghanaian government (Pooley 2003: 12).  
Construction work of the mine started in 1991 after feasibility studies were conducted in 
1989/90. The mining operations commenced in June 1992 and the first gold was poured 
in September that year. The official opening of the mine was done by the then president 
of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, in February 1993. The gold extraction was conducted from 
low-grade ore using carbon in leach absorption and zadra electronic method. In 1994 a 
considerable expansion process started resulting in a workforce of about 1000 workers by 
1996. In 1999 TGL opted to sell the Teberebie mine and in March 2000 Ashanti 
Goldfields Company (AGC) announced to acquire two pits from TGL, the Teberebie and 
Awuaben pit (Pooley 2003: 11f). After 2000 the mine changed hands several times and 
had a variety of investors. The private lending arm of the World Bank, the International 
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Finance Corporation (IFC) and European state financial institutions have co-financed the 
Iduapriem mine for many years.  
Ghanaian Australian Goldfields (GAG) was initially owned by Australia’s Gold 
Shamrock (70%), the IFC (20%) and the Ghanaian Government (10%). Over time GAG 
then merged with AGC which in 2003 owned 80% of the mine while the IFC held 20%. 
Mining was done by open-pit operations involving blasting, excavation of ore and the 
disposal of waste rock in surface dumps. The gold extraction was carried out using heap 
leaching for low ore and carbon in leach and carbon in pulp circuit for high grade ore 
(Pooley 2003: 11f).  
In April 2004 the Iduapriem Mine and with it the Teberebie property was taken over by 
AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) when the business combination of Ashanti and South African-
based AngloGold came into effect (AngloGold Ashanti 2008). AGA is one of the leading 
producers of gold worldwide. Its headquarters are in Johannesburg, South Africa. The 
AngloGold Ashanti Group has over 20 operations and a number of exploration programs 
in gold-producing regions of the world (AngloGold Ashanti 2008: 4). 
 
Fig. 6. Location of the Iduapriem Mine  
80 
During the year 2007 AGA acquired the 15% minority shareholding of the Ghanaian 
government and the IFC, so since September 2007, the Iduapriem mine is 100%-owned 
by AGA (AngloGold Ashanti 2008: 1). Today, the Iduapriem Mine comprises two 
properties, Iduapriem and Teberebie (AngloGold Ashanti 2008: 7). In 2008 the operation 
had 732 employees and 1,048 contractors, in total 1,780 people working at the mining site 
(AngloGold Ashanti 2009: 18). Eight communities are affected by the Iduapriem mining 
activities: Adisakrom, Adieyie (Mile 8), Mile 7, Techiman, Nkwantakrom, 
Wangarakrom, Teberebie and Abompuniso (AngloGold Ashanti 2009: 29). 
7.4.2 Teberebie Village Physical Displacement 
The first bigger settlement named Teberebie started in 1912/13. It was a small village, 
surrounded by forests. The name of the river close to the settlement was Teberebie that is 
where the name of the community derives from. The term Teberebie means as much as 
“shaking head” (Minnah II, personal interview 11 June 2009). Teberebie was to be the 
first resettlement village in the Wassa area to make way for mining activities.  
The land, which the mine was constructed on, was stool land particularly that of the 
Apinto stool. The Apinto chief at that time was named Fabil II. He was informed about 
the construction of the mine and the planned resettlement of the Teberebie community 
(Minnah II, personal interview 11 June 2009). 
The Teberebie village originally compromised about 168 households and 2000 people. It 
was located to its present location by TGL in 1990/91 (Pooley 2003: 12, 38). The 
resettlement cost approximately one million US-dollars and the resettlement process took 
about 13 months (People’s Daily Graphic, 4 May 1991). The relocation agreement 
between TGL and the Teberebie Village Committee and a local Assemblyman was signed 
in December 1989. The agreement stipulated that modern housing units would be 
constructed in the new village, along with a primary school, a nursery school and a junior 
secondary school. TGL also agreed to provide a chief’s palace, a community centre, a 
hand pump and communal toilets. All the mentioned structures exist in Teberebie today 
(Pooley 2003: 15). In the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), prepared in 2003, the 
resettlement site is described as following: “A relatively modern settlement with good 
quality housing structures, six churches, sanitation […] and clean drinking water. There 
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is no health centre and inhabitants rely instead on facilities in Tarkwa for medical 
attention. Teberebie has a primary school, a Junior Secondary School (JSS) and a 
nursery school, as well as a community centre.” (Pooley 2003: 8) In 2003 Teberebie’s 
estimated population was around 1140 (Pooley 2003: 8). 
7.4.3 (New) Teberebie Village Economic Displacement 
Most displacement of mining communities in the Tarkwa area involved physical 
displacement. In Teberebie in recent years additionally economic displacement occurred 
caused by the waste rock dump scenario started by GAG. For several years now waste 
rock of mining activities is being dumped on land, which used to be cultivated by 
Teberebie farmers. The waste rock dumping started in 2001 and was still ongoing in June 
2009. The process shall be discussed much further in 8.1.1.  
7.4.4 Traditional Authorities 
The traditional authorities in Teberebie itself, especially the chief, play an important role 
in the community and their dealing with the mining activities. Although in terms of 
allocation of land to third parties the Teberebie chief has not much authority. He is a 
divisional caretaker. The main custodian of the land is the Apinto stool. The Teberebie 
chief is related to the Apinto stool in family ways. 
The Teberebie chief is also referred to as odikro, meaning “the owner of the town or the 
community”. He is representing the Apinto chief. During the research the overall majority 
of respondents confirmed the importance of a chief in terms of decision making and 
dispute settling within the community. He is also responsible for family and development 
issues. Additionally a chief has a strong leadership role and should represent the interests 
of the community to the outside.  
The kingmakers, who are also part of the royal family, decide on the next chief and 
appoint the person to the general public. Only males of the royal family can be chosen as 
chief. The system of inheritance and kinship in Teberebie is matrilineal (Minnah II, 
personal interview 11 June 2009).  
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During the 1980s and during the time of the resettlement agreement the Teberebie chief 
was Nana Asare. The one following him was Nana Awuah. His leadership was contested 
and he was forcibly removed in 1999. That created a vacuum as he was not replaced for 
several years. The kingmakers were undecided on who should be the next chief. It 
became a vacant stool until 2004 (N. J., personal interview 8 June 2009). The present 
Teberebie chief, by the name of Nana Kojo Minnah II., was en-stooled on September 17, 
2004 (Minnah II, personal interview 11 June 2009). 
Beside the chief there are also other important authorities like: the queen mothers, the 
Tufuhene – the chief’s advisor, the chief linguist, the chief announcer, the Mbrantieahene 
- the chief for the youth and the chief priest.  
7.4.5 Land Allocation 
Land around Teberebie in the Iduapriem mining concession is a mixture between: Land 
actually being used by the mining company, land set aside for future mining activities and 
land being used for subsistence farming by local communities. 
A representative part of the Teberebie community was interviewed for the RAP in 2003 
(Pooley: 47). About 55% of them “owned” their plots, 28% were share cropping tenants, 
8% leased their land and 9% rented it from landlords. The main crops cultivated in 
Teberebie included cassava and plantain as the most important ones, followed by 
pineapple, oil palm, yam, cocoyam, maize, cocoa and other fruits and vegetables. Many 
of them are seasonally planted, others like cocoa and oil palm can produce for years.  
The land of the Teberebie community is Apinto stool land. The Apinto stool is the main 
custodian of the land and allocated it to the Teberebie community. The Apinto chief is a 
divisional chief, in hierarchy he is below the paramount chief and the Wassa Fiase 
Traditional Council. Before the resettlement village was built and the whole community 
was moved there, people from other villages, who owned the land for plantation farming 
were compensated. Much of the land was also secondary forest (N. J., personal interview 
25 May 2009).  
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If there is need of land in the community it is the duty of the royal family to go to the 
Apinto chief and ask for land for the community, not just anybody can request land from 
the Apinto stool (Minnah II, personal interview 12 June 2009). The land in Teberebie was 
initially communally owned. The local chief and other traditional authorities, who had the 
mandate of the Apinto chief to allocate land, had the authority to share it equally within 
the community (N. J., personal interview 25 May 2009). In practice it worked something 
like this: “They were portioning the land to the ones who needed it. It was on leasehold. 
You worked on the land, you went to see the people, who had the mandate and they 
demarcated the land for you. So you just worked on it, took your food and everything you 
want. When the time was up they took it again from you or you sat down and saw through 
it again and saw if you could continue to work on the land.” (N. J., personal interview 25 
May 2009). 
Not all people in Teberebie “owned” their land. Some also acquired sharecropping land 
from a landlord who already “owned” land. The prospects were then either divided abuna 
(split in half) or abusa (in three parts, two belong to the tenant). 
The land within Teberebie was also mostly passed down matrilineal within the family - to 
male family members. In the Akan matrilineal system land is bequeathed to nephews or 
other male members of the family, in accordance to the head of family. Initially wives 
and children were left with no rights to the man´s property if he died, but in recent times 
land is increasingly inherited directly by wives and children. The increasing scarcity of 
land has led to the development of land transactions through markets (Kasanga/Kotey 
2001: 15). 
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8 Risk Impact Analysis of the Gold Rush in Teberebie 
According to company statements the Iduapriem mine should have many positive effects 
on the surrounding communities such as Teberebie as John Owusu (personal interview 24 
February 2009) of AGA states: “Mining communities are in remote areas. There are no 
schools there, […] no good drinking water, they depend on streams. When the mining 
companies go there they bring new life. They bring technology the people there haven´t 
seen yet. The expatriates bring a new way of life to the people. The mining companies 
have the responsibility to do something to improve their social and economic life.” 
8.1 Landlessness 
After the initial physical displacement and resettlement during the early 1990s the 
Teberebie community had access to farmland, it was already somehow limited, but they 
still had access to it. They used farmland close to the new resettlement site or continued 
to walk to their former farmland to cultivate crops.  
The people of Teberebie were mostly no commercial farmers, very few of them had 
plantations. Most of them were subsistence farmers, just selling some of their goods on a 
nearby market to gain some cash to buy additional food, clothes and school supplies for 
their children. The extended families were farming mostly on one plot of land that was 
partitioned between the family members.  
The land mostly was held by men but cultivated by men and women together. Usually the 
“owners” of the land were men, although changes have been observed and also some few 
women were given land to - mostly from their husbands.  
The situation after the initial physical displacement and resettlement was described as 
fairly passable by the respondents. Most farmers still had access to land and were 
cultivating it. The Teberebie farmers, almost everybody was a farmer at that time, 
describe their live then as follows: “Life was quite okay with it [the farmland]. The 
amount of income was alright.” (G. A., personal interview 26 May 2009); “Life was quite 
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okay when I was doing farming. It was very good compared to today.” (A. A. personal 
interview 11 June 2009); “It was good. I was able to support my family, but then I lost my 
land to the waste rock.“ (K. E., personal interview 2 June 2009) 
People have a deep connection to their land and are well aware of the importance of land 
for their livelihood: “Land was like life. In the absence of land I don’t know how to live 
my life.” (K. Y., personal interview 13 June 2009); “It makes you feel proud if you have 
land you can cultivate anything on that you want to. You don´t have to lean on anybody, 
to provide you something.” (Q. J., personal interview 7 June 2009) The Teberebie people 
associated independence and dignity with the livelihood their land provided for them.  
8.1.1 Teberebie South East Waste Rock Dump 
In February 2001 the local farmers were informed by GAG of a proposed waste rock 
dump south of their village where a major part of the Teberebie community was 
cultivating land. A decade after their physical relocation this land was used by many 
locals for farming, mainly subsistence farming. 
According to the RAP, technically the area that by now has been used as a waste rock 
dump should not have been cultivated or settled by Teberebie residents since 1990. 
However, the land was not used by TGL for years, in fact until the conclusion of the TGL 
operations, so local people utilized the land south of the new village. For them it was a 
logical reaction as their old land was either lost or made less accessible due to the 
relocation process. Additionally, there is no record that TGL put any efforts in 
demarcating the land or enforce the 1000 meters ”no development - zone” (Pooley 2003: 
19). This predominance of the mining company over land use on the concession was 
backed up by Ghanaian mining law10 and is an issue of larger debate. 
 
                                                      
10
 Further information on the Ghanaian minerals and mining policies at 3.6.3. 
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Fig. 7. Map of Teberebie and Waste Rock Dump 
 
Fig. 8. Waste Rock Dump close to Teberebie  
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In the 1989 agreement between the Teberebie community and at that time TGL, Clause 
12 exactly stated that: “the residents of the new site will not build, engage in farming 
activities or carry out any other business within an area of 1000 m of the Teberebie 
Ridge, Awunben Ridge and Mantraim Ridge, mining in plant and/or installations.” (cited 
in Pooley 2003: 19) 
Most Teberebie farmers had no knowledge of this agreement. For them it was logical to 
cultivate the land around their village, which remained untouched by mining activities 
until 2000/2001. The people now affected by the waste rock dump have already been 
physically displaced once and many lost their initial land at that time, so today they are 
doubly affected. The dumping site was still growing in June 2009 and probably will in 
future. 
From the start the community uttered their severe objections against the waste rock 
dumping on their farmlands. The Teberebie south east waste rock dump sparked a 
community petition and the mine management was summoned to the Wassa West District 
Assembly in October 2001 to discuss the issue. In early 2002 the EPA even halted the 
dumping of waste rock for a period of time. Later the EPA lifted the ban and the dumping 
continued (Pooley 2003: 19f). The dump grew and more and more people have been 
affected by it over the years. According to the RAP of 2003 (Pooley 2003: 3) a total of 
84.1 ha consisting of 248 fields belonging to 173 households and one NGO called Kristo 
Asafo was destroyed by the waste rock dump. The average field size was 0.35 ha, ranging 
between 0.1 and 4.7 ha. 
The farmers being affected by the waste dump operations have been farming in the area 
for time periods ranging between six month and forty years (Pooley 2003: 47). 
The Teberebie people see the big shift towards negative when the construction of the 
waste rock dump started. Like long-time farmer O. C. (personal interview 25 May 2009) 
describes her changing situation: “During TGL-times I still had land around here. The 
farm was around 7-8 acres and we grew palmtrees, plantain, cassava, pineapple. It was a 
big farm. I have 7 children, the farm fed everybody, I was fine. […] They took it totally 
from me. All at once, about 6 years ago. When I was farming, things were very good to 
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me. Life was quite okay, but these days it´s not like that. I lost my land and now 
everything is spoilt. I see that land is one of the most precious things in my life.”  
Not all famers lost their land all at once. There was a first big patch and after that it has 
been a gradual process. But nevertheless O. C.’s statement is typical for Teberebie 
farmers. I came across many almost identical stories. Most were cultivating their farms 
themselves, some had tenants they shared the income with. Usually the abusa-way, 
meaning two thirds of the farming income stayed with the tenant. U. C. (personal 
interview 26 May 2009) is one of those farmers who had given land to tenants. She and 
her husband had a big patch of land with ten tenants working on it, some even had palm 
plantations. She was satisfied with her income. The whole farmland was taken over by the 
waste dump in the early 2000s. After that she had to go elsewhere to farm. It was fairly 
difficult to find land for her, she just found farmland near the village of Adisakrom four 
years ago. Gaining enough income has become more difficult as she is only a tenant 
farmer on 0.5 acres of land now and has to give one third of the farming income to her 
landlord. The waste rock dumping started a spiral were once landlords became tenants 
themselves.  
People in Teberebie who still have farmland that has remained untouched by mining have 
become a rare commodity to find. During my research I only came across one such 
person. The farmer in her mid-40s stated that she is the only one she knows who still has 
the land as of before the waste rock activities. The lucky ones still have a small patch of 
land left which has not been affected by mining or were able to snatch a piece of land in 
one of the surrounding villages like Adisakrom, Mile 6, Mile 7 or Mile 8. For those who 
are tenant farmers now in other parts of the concession a new problem has arisen. It is 
very difficult for them to gather the money they need for transportation to their farms. 
Depending on where their farm is located it is between five to ten kilometers one way. 
Because of the long distance most farmers can only afford to go there once or twice a 
week and join a taxi-car for this purpose. The transport of the farm products becomes 
another problem they are facing.  
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8.1.2 Compensation Process  
There was much litigation surrounding the nature and value of compensation 
arrangements and made it necessary for the District Assembly to get involved as a 
mediating agency (Pooley 2003: 12). The mode of compensation during that time was 
oriented on the Minerals and Mining Act of 1986 (Government of Ghana 1986). This 
meant that farmers were compensated for the season’s production, not on basis of their 
productive system that would include i.e. land that has been lost. By Ghanaian law the 
mining company was obliged to identify, notify and compensate all parties whose 
properties were affected by the rock dumping. The affected area is rather large, so GAG 
together with the then still involved IFC commissioned a team to prepare a RAP in 2003. 
The IFC asked GAG to follow the World Bank Operational Directive on Involuntary 
Resettlement 4.30 (World Bank 1990). Under normal circumstances RAPs are prepared 
in advance. When the Teberebie RAP was commissioned in 2003 the waste rock dumping 
was already going on since 2001 and already affecting many farmers. So issues like 
compensation arrangements were only dealt with retrospectively (Pooley 2003: 24).  
The whole process of compensation was a new field for the Teberebie people they had no 
experience in. Many of them were overwhelmed and complained about the lack of 
transparency of the process of evaluation of their crops, like K. M. (personal interview 28 
May 2009) who now is a tenant on a farm close to Mile 7, explains her thoughts on the 
compensation process: “They cheated us. They capitalized on us. We, the indigenous, 
hadn´t seen a mine before. We knew nothing about evaluation.” 
The whole process of evaluation and the lack of transparency created frustration. People 
told about repeated “computer mistakes” reported to them that minimized their amount of 
compensation. Some people signed papers with unclear compensation amounts or were 
not particularly aware of the consequences of their signature. All in all, it was a rather 
semi-transparent process and therefore not easy to reconstruct in the course of this 
research.  
Not all farmers were compensated at once, it was in steps. The first people were 
compensated in a head-count-system. All their crops were counted one by one to calculate 
the final compensation amount. Different crops had different values. Every crop was 
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compensated. After two or three rounds of compensation the system was changed to what 
the people refer to as the acreage-system. The Teberebie people saw this as a 
disadvantage to them as the crops were not head-counted anymore. Estimations per acre 
were used from then on, the main crop on the field was taken into account. Many 
meetings were organized to discuss those issues, many still wanted to be compensated in 
the head-count-system. The change from one compensation scheme to another created 
much misunderstanding between AGA and the community, also with this farmer: “The 
community relations officer came and explained to us why they are doing it that way, but 
initially they were doing it with the head-count system. They had money, were making 
profits, so why do they tell me that they have to go with the acre-system? That brought a 
lot of confrontation.” (E. A., personal interview 25 May 2009) 
Compensation money was almost exclusively paid to men. Most women were not 
integrated in the process. Almost no women even had a clue on the amount of 
compensation money their husbands received. The compensation paid out to the farmers I 
interviewed ranged from 150 to 1200 GHS. All of them were very unsatisfied with the 
amount and felt it was not representing their losses. In almost every interview, when the 
topic of compensation came up, phrases like this were mentioned: “They cheated us.”; 
“The compensation I got was inadequate.”; “The compensation was meager.”  
They spent the compensation money on various things like food, school supplies for their 
children, household utensils. None of the interviewed was able to secure replacement land 
with the compensation he or she got because the amount was not enough for that at all.  
8.1.3 Formation of Associations  
 
To be stronger in the compensation process the affected farmers formed the Teberebie 
Farmers Association (FA). Before the compensation issue came up there were no 
associations of that kind. It was something new community members thought they need to 
defend their interests. Also because during this period of time there was a gap in the 
chieftaincy system, so they were not able to rely on those traditional structures. So they 
formed a registered organization: “Now you have to speak with one voice and have some 
kind of registered organization or group. If a group is not registered they will not listen to 
you.” (N. J., personal interview 1 June 2009) 
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Gathered in an organization they felt they will gain power in negotiations about 
compensation. The FA had leaders and the executives that were the front of people who 
were talking to the company on compensation procedures. Initially, before the formation 
of the FA farmers were negotiating with the company individually. At the beginning it 
can be roughly estimated about 180 farmers were in the FA. 
 
Later on, part of the FA split off and formed the Teberebie Concerned Farmers 
Association (CFA). The ones that formed the new organization where not willing to 
accept the new acreage-system for compensation. They wanted to be compensated in the 
head-count-system like the farmers before them. But most of the farmers stayed with the 
FA and went with the acre-system. The FA was not relevant any more after the 
compensation process with the member farmers was concluded.  
 
As of June 2009 the members of the CFA were still waiting for their compensation 
process to finish. At the beginning it was about 60-80 farmers. They wanted to fight for 
more compensation and were not satisfied with the way the FA and the chief were 
handling things. Later WACAM pitched in and with their support the CFA was able to 
take the case to court. The court case was filed in 2004. The CFA are fighting for fair and 
adequate compensation. The lawyers representing the members of the CFA are supported 
by WACAM. The case was still pending in 2009 and the CFA-members accused AGA of 
delaying the proceedings, for example with witnesses not showing up for court dates. 
 
Several members of the FA initially wanted to join the CFA and take their case to court as 
well but due to economic constraints they were not able to wait any longer for 
compensation money. It was not the costs for the lawyers, those were covered by 
WACAM, but they have already lost their land and were basically without income. The 
negotiations beforehand and the case at court are time consuming. For many farmers it is 
too time consuming and they agree to accept the compensation offered to them, also if 
they are not at all satisfied with it. The case was pending in June 2009 for about five 
years. Farmers continue to drop out and go in for the money. As of June 2009 there are 
about 35 farmers left in the CFA who challenged AGA at court. 
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8.1.4 Replacement Land 
People are still waiting and hoping for replacement land. Many have not given up the idea 
yet. But it is going to proof very difficult as the land in the region has become scarce. The 
Teberebie chief and AGA-officials enquired at the Apinto stool for land but the land that 
they at one point considered was already allocated to another community (Minnah II, 
personal interview 12 June 2009). 
The RAP stipulates land-for-land replacement in addition to monetary compensation 
(Pooley 2003) but in fact up until now community members who lost their farmlands to 
the waste rock dump have not received alternative land. The topic of replacement land 
has been going on for years and there is no solution in sight. At a Monitory Advisory 
Group (MAG) – meeting, held on June 4, 2009 at the Iduapriem mine offices, one of the 
company’s officials Mr. Kwamena Sekyi-Yorke, Community Relations Officer of 
AngloGold Ashanti, stated again that they have been unsuccessful in securing alternative 
farming land and it continues to be a challenge. 
NGO representatives of WACAM and FIAN, working on this topic for many years, see 
the hopes for adequate replacement land diminishing. Like WACAM’s Owusu-Koranteng 
is saying: “The company can´t get land anywhere, but they tried to give hope and 
discussed. Later they said that they can’t get land and that the community should look for 
land. Those are major issue and I don´t have a clue how it should be resolved, we have to 
come up with some innovations.” (Owusu-Koranteng, personal interview 18 June 2009) 
Mike Anane (Anane, personal interview 18 June 2009) of FIAN is not too optimistic as 
well, but stresses that there is an obligation to provide alternative land to the Teberebie 
community: “It is an obligation, according to RAP they need to be given land, but it´s 
almost as if this would never happen. Now they have to walk several kilometers in search 
of land and in search of food.” 
Summing things up, the expropriation of the major part of the farmland by the waste rock 
dump led to economic displacement of the Teberebie community and basically removed 
the main foundation of their productive systems, commercial activities and livelihood. 
Because the land, being their basis of life, was not replaced and the compensation was 
inadequate, the loss was basically a form of de-capitalization and pauperization of the 
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Teberebie community. The impact of landlessness in Teberebie is by far the most severe 
of all MIDR-impacts and has further implications on so many other areas of life that will 
be discussed in detail in the following chapters. The different impacts are hard to separate 
from each other as they are deeply linked, but what it boils down to is mostly the lost 
access to land. 
The mining industry has major control over the access to land in the district in general as 
Agbesinyale (2003: 173) explains: “[M]ore than a third of the district´s land surface 
area has already been leased out to several mining companies either for extensive 
mineral exploration or for active mining.”  
Teberebie is not a single case. Sarpong (2006: 14) sees landlessness caused by mining 
activities all over the country. After being evicted and paid compensation communities 
may end up landless, especially if monetary compensation was too low to purchase 
alternative land. The ability of adequate compensation, monetary or in form of 
replacement land is highly dependent on the negotiation capacity of the affected 
community. If there is no legal expertise, chances of adequate compensation diminish.  
8.2 Joblessness 
The overwhelming majority of Teberebie community members were farmers. Their main 
occupation was subsistence farming. Very few were farming commercially although most 
farmers sold some of their products at the market to gain cash for other products.  
As stated in a Community Development Plan of 2004, one of the priority problems of the 
communities on the Iduapriem concession was unemployment (Royal Haskoning 2004: 
22). The unemployment levels of the youth in the area were as high as 70-90% while the 
national unemployment average of the population in the age group 15-24 was 30%.  
After people have lost almost all or at least a significant part of their farmland, their 
source of income has been taken away from them. There are some other ways people 
have developed to gain at least some income – with different results, but mostly not at all 
satisfying their needs and not sustainable in the long run like farming used to be.  
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8.2.1 Occupation at the Iduapriem Mining Site  
Jobs, or better, the lack of jobs at the Iduapriem mining site are a hot topic of discussion 
in the community. There are very little indigenous Teberebie community members, who 
have lost land to the construction of the waste rock dump, that have been employed by the 
mine on a permanent basis.  
The widespread unemployment in Teberebie and the complaints of locals for not being 
employed by AGA is also stipulated in the CHRAJ-report (Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 103). There is little understanding in the 
community for this and much frustration that has built up. A rather typical statement 
during the interviews was: “The mining company is employing outsiders, instead of 
employing those whose land has been taken.” (N. E., personal interview 7 June 2009) The 
people working permanent jobs in the mine are mostly Ghanaians from bigger mining 
towns or urban centers like Takoradi, Kumasi or Accra. 
The company’s encounter that the locals are missing the necessary skills, is not popular 
amongst the Teberebie people: “Men can´t get jobs at the mine, because our men don’t 
know how to use the machines they are using.” (A. E., personal interview 8 June 2009) 
Many locals say they would be willing to get technical training in order to obtain a 
permanent job at the site, like this man: “I myself don´t have skills. How can I get a job at 
the mine? But why do they refuse to train us? They could. We can learn.” (M. S., personal 
interview 13 June 2009) The desire for in-house training at the Iduapriem mine for locals 
was mention several times. Especially the youth would be eager to acquire skills to work 
in the mining industry. A research conducted in 2004 (Royal Haskoning: 23) states that 
the unemployed youth in Teberebie would like to learn following skills or work in 
following jobs: Machine operator, electrician, mechanics (car/fridge/fitting), computer 
skills, tie and dye; Technical skills were high in the ranking. Although one has to take 
into account the persons taking part in the research were probably mainly male.  
People demand permanent employment at the mining site. They are not at all satisfied 
with what they are offered. It is almost exclusively short term casual labor jobs or work at 
one of the external security companies. The offered work is not sustainable as A. J. 
(personal interview 7 June 2009) points out: “They employ you for casual labor and […] 
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you can work with them for about two or three weeks. […] They don’t employ people 
from here as permanent workers.”  
The distribution of the limited amount of short-time jobs they are offering is causing 
additional stir-up in the community. The offered jobs are shared between the interested 
community members according to the random principle, usually using pieces of paper 
with a written “yes” or “no” on it, stating whether one got the job or not. The limited 
amount of jobs and its distribution in the community brings tension and conflicts. The 
already very limited job market is highly competitive. Especially the youth is expecting 
the chief to do more about the gloomy job situation. There are many rumors and 
accusations floating around. Some say you have to pay bribes to company employees to 
get a job (A. B., personal interview 16 June 2009). Others accuse that by far not all casual 
labor jobs are distributed by a random principle and some handpicking is taking place: 
“Suddenly you see people working and you don’t know how they were employed.” (N. J., 
personal interview 1 June 2009) 
8.2.2 Galamsey 
The lack of land for farming and wage employment that would absorb this loss brings the 
community members to turn to activities they do not favor themselves but see as 
necessary for their survival. One of those activities is galamsey11 mining. The loss of farm 
land and the economical displacement caused by it is very much connected to the rise in 
galamsey activities: “After I stopped schooling I was doing small scale mining, there was 
no farm land for me. I was then the family man, I had to get money for the family. That is 
why I got myself into that. When there is no land for us to farm. It is a problem for us, 
there is no work. So we turn to galamsey.” (A. S. personal interview 6 June 2009) 
                                                      
11
 For details about galamsey mining see 3.6.2. 
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Fig. 9. Galamsey site at Iduapriem mining concession  
Galamsey was already practiced before the mine was developed and before the waste 
rock dump covered much of the community’s land. In the early 70s there was not much 
galamsey but in the early 80s when the people realized they were sitting on gold people 
started mining (N. J., personal interview 1 June 2009). Some galamsey during off-season 
of farming was usual but the amount of Teberebie people that do galamsey mining now 
has reached a new scale. There are several galamsey sites on the Iduapriem concession 
where groups of Teberebie community members do small scale mining. They are 
organized in groups of seven to twelve. It is mostly young men, but also some women 
who carry and wash load, others go and cook for the men. Also the Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (2008: 103) state in their report that galamsey 
activities are very widespread in the Teberebie community, especially among young men. 
97 
The sites are hidden deep in the concession, galamsey would not start their operations 
near the road side. It is important for them to hide from the security personnel. There is a 
lot of tension between the mine and the galamsey, sometimes AGA brings in security and 
police. After all, galamsey mining on the AGA concession is illegal.  
In November 2006, the police and military in Ghana started the so-called “Operation 
Flush Out”, during which hundreds of galamsey miners were forced from the land they 
were mining on. Equipment was destroyed, people were beaten up and seriously injured, 
some were even shot. In many cases private security personnel of the mining companies 
was highly involved if not taking the lead in this operation (FIAN International 2008: 3). 
Talking with people in Teberebie about galamsey was not easy at first. People were very 
reluctant to talk about this activity. Many men first rather said that they are not working at 
all. Galamsey is not a much respected job. Only after a while some people opened up, like 
this young man: “They [the galamsey] think it’s not good work, but because of the 
unemployment situation here they have to do it! You will not get rich, you will die early. 
People don’t respect you. They think: you have not been to school, you have no skills.” 
(M. S., personal interview 13 June 2009) 
Galamsey is spread very much, particularly in the male population of Teberebie, some 
even go so far and say galamsey has taken over farming as the major form of occupation: 
“The major occupation here is galamsey, it used to be farming! […] In the morning 
around six there are a lot of people going for galamsey, but it is illegal! But they have 
taken their land! And now they chase them of the galamsey site!” (M. S., personal 
interview 13 June 2009) 
Almost all galamsey I interviewed at their mining sites on the concession or after their 
return back home to Teberebie village, said their occupation before becoming a full-time 
galamsey was farming. N. J. (personal interview 12 June 2009) stated: “When I was a 
farmer, we ate the things I got from the farm. As a galamsey, I go there for the whole day, 
if I am not lucky I will not get anything. And I have wasted a whole day. At my farm I had 
cassava, plantain, all those items we used to eat and sell some to buy clothes for the 
family. Farming is better than galamsey. If I had land I would leave galamsey.” 
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Galamsey is not a sustainable source of income and carries many risks compared to 
farming. 
8.2.3 Petty Trading 
Petty trading has become a typical women’s source of income to catch up for lost income 
from their families’ farms or by now also for misfortune at galamsey mining.  
The mostly young women go to the near towns like Tarkwa and buy foot wear, jewels, 
earrings and all sorts of household utensils to later sell in Teberebie, also to absorb the 
men’s unemployment. G. A.’s (personal interview 10 June 2009) statement is typical 
among young women in Teberebie: “The man is not working so I have to do the trading 
to support the family. I go to town and buy it and then sell it here.” It is once again the 
women that carry much of the burden.  
Like A. A., she used to be farming on 20 acres of land together with her husband to 
support their six children. After they have lost the land to the waste rock dump the man is 
jobless and the family is living of A.’s income alone: “I am trading, but it’s just for food, 
this work cannot take the children to school. We only survive with this. I always put 
something down. When it is enough the children will go to school with it.” (A. A., 
personal interview 9 June 2009) 
Trading is not paying well considering the economic situation in Teberebie as young 
trader O. N. (personal interview 4 June 2009) explains: “The money from trading is not 
much considering that the majority of the community members are jobless. The business 
is not going well, many buy on credit until they can pay back, it sometimes takes a long 
time.” 
The income from trading is not adequate to substitute the lost income from farming 
activities.  
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8.2.4 Casual Sex and/or Prostitution 
For young women there are even less income earning opportunities than for young men. 
Due to joblessness, lack of farming opportunities and missing prospects, young women 
also turn to prostitution or as people in Teberebie refer to it: casual sex.  
Generally both mobile sex workers and resident prostitution are increasing in the whole 
district. Most mobile prostitutes come from Takoradi, Cape Coast, Kumasi, Accra or 
Obuasi and target expatriate mine workers and rich small-scale miners. The resident sex 
workers service mostly local mine workers and galamsey (Agbesinyale 2003: 292; 
Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 44f). 
 
Prostitution has already existed in Teberebie before the present mine was constructed but 
today it reached a new scale: “It’s a new thing that happened. It was always there, but not 
commercialized like that. It was not that popular.” This man, who is living in Teberebie 
even before the resettlement, further explains: “In the olden days you found prostitution 
in certain places, but now it is all over. It has generalized to everywhere. We don’t call it 
prostitution, because that is on a special place. Here we call it casual sex.” (N. J., 
personal interview 1 June 2009) The men, the young women are engaging in sex with, 
are: mine workers, small-scale miners and galamsey, taxi drivers, security workers – all 
men who have some sort of monetary income.  
 
People estimate the problem of female prostitution really arose some five years ago. A 
34-year-old woman (A. E., personal interview 8 June 2009) is talking about casual sex: 
“It is happening here, also small girls, it´s happening. This is a new problem […] but 
nobody in the community is talking against those people. If you don´t have land and don´t 
have a job, you go for the men.” The link to the loss of land and the lack of other income 
earning activities is made by many respondents. As already mentioned in the statement 
above, women, who engage in casual sex, are accepted in the community and not 
stigmatized, although it is not seen as proper behavior. Q. J. (personal interview 7 June 
2009), a mother of six children mentions: “Prostitution is a problem, some do it, not all 
of them. We see it´s not good, but we can´t do anything about it, there are no jobs, there 
is nothing else. But they are still part of the community, that´s what they do to support 
their living.” 
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There is also a growing number of cases of teenage pregnancies  that have been reported 
in Teberebie as well as single teen mothers with no or only little support from the baby’s 
father. This especially triggers the fear of many respondents of the disruption of social 
values and the family unit.  
 
Prostitution is a poverty-driven activity and not an adequate replacement for farming 
activities. It is also dangerous for people’s health as discussed at 8.7.4. 
8.2.5 Alternative Livelihood Projects 
There have been attempts by GAG and also AGA to introduce alternative livelihood 
projects (ALP) in Teberebie. AGA has contracted Opportunities Industrialization Center 
International (OICI) an American NGO that is a regular partner for mining companies to 
develop ALPs for communities affected by mining activities. As of 2009 OICI is no 
longer engaged in the ALP at Iduapriem mine. 
The “Hand-in-Hand” program was first established in Teberebie at the beginning of 2005 
and was supposed to aim at building capacity and promoting economic activity: “The 
capacity-building component includes training in entrepreneurial skills; micro-credit 
management; animal husbandry and livestock; food processing and value-adding 
technologies; water, sanitation and personal hygiene; participatory decision-making and 
problemsolving; and teacher-training for Early Childhood Development Centres 
(ECDCs).” (Temeng/Abew 2009: 224). 
ALPs in mining communities across Ghana are implemented by almost all mining 
companies. The effectiveness and their abilities to meet their intended goals and the 
communities’ needs are difficult to ascertain. There is near uniformity among the projects 
nationwide across various different areas - which raises serious questions. Some 
appreciate the programs and criticize the lack of offer and others see them as mere public 
relations gimmick that make little impact in the community as a whole (Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 190). Teberebie is no exception in this 
point. Anane (personal interview 18 June 2009) criticized that neither the company nor 
101 
OICI have conducted market surveys to find out whether anybody would buy products 
they were producing in the ALPs. 
Overall ALPs did not seem to have made a large impact in Teberebie, the projects did not 
come up in many conversations. E. A. (personal interview 25 May 2009) says the ALPs 
were started because AGA wanted to help the community, but it rather started to create 
problems. The animal farming like piggery, which was newly brought in, was not 
anticipated very much. The Teberebie residents were used to agrofarming. According to 
the CHRAJ-report (Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 103) 
some members of the Teberebie community were trained in animal breeding and were 
provided with goats, sheep and fowls. Others were given small loans for businesses.  
Really the only ALP somewhat working that was mentioned by some respondents was a 
palm oil press AGA constructed at the entry of the village. I found one women who was 
using the press. The women, who used to be a farmer, has lost the majority of the family’s 
land. She is a single mother of six children after her husband left the community. She is 
saying: “I for myself try and make oil at the alternative livelihood project but it´s hard. I 
go from village to village and buy oil palm fruit and then I process it and then I sell the 
oil. I can manage my income from that. Only very few people are using the alternative 
livelihood project and the machine, they don´t like to use it.” (Q. J., personal interview 8 
June 2009) Others call the palm oil press a “white elephant”. AGA has brought the 
machine but due to scarcity of land the raw materials are missing to a large extent (E. A., 
personal interview 25 May 2009). 
To generally sum things up concerning joblessness, it was the loss of land that made 
people dependent on other forms of income instead of their farm products. The 
unemployment rate is extremely high after the loss of the people’s income-generating 
resource base. 
Long-term employment at the mining company is far out of sight for the Teberebie 
community. The only jobs that are occasionally offered to them are of short life and not 
sustainable. This competition for rare jobs is creating additional social tension in the 
community. Permanent employment at the mining company is only available to a very 
limited group of people and becoming even more difficult as the industry generally has 
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moved to less labor-intensive methods of production that require skills the locals of 
Teberebie mostly do not have. 
The alternative sources of income besides farming Teberebie people have to seek look 
rather grim. People turn to poverty-driven activities such as galamsey mining. This is not 
sustainable at all, neither for nature nor for the galamsey miners, and is connected to a lot 
of danger and health impacts. Petty trading can only supplement a family income but 
cannot fully support a family. The general lack of income has many implications on other 
areas like the families’ food security and their children’s education opportunities. The 
competition for jobs additionally causes tension in the community and social 
disarticulation. 
8.3 Homelessness 
The MIDR permanently impacted the housing conditions of the Teberebie community 
also almost two decades after their initial resettlement. The initially agreed number of 
houses (168 units in 148 houses) was never built, instead 127 houses were constructed. 
When litigation was entered TGL argued that the number of original inhabitants was 
lower because some had acquired houses speculatively (Pooley 2003: 15). People who 
were not owners of houses in the old village, for example only rented a house, were not 
eligible for a resettlement house at the new village. This affected a number of people such 
as persons who just have moved to old Teberebie shortly before the resettlement. 
Also not all households inhabiting the old Teberebie village were relocated by the mining 
company. These households were paid out in cash and afterwards left on their own 
devices. Those people mostly moved to other local settlements in the area. Some of them 
were resettled later on as well (Pooley 2003: 16). 
Many people were partly frustrated with the way the resettlement houses were 
constructed and expressed the feeling that their housing standards worsened although 
their mud-houses have been replaced with solid brick houses. The new houses were 
containing fewer rooms than their old ones and lacked kitchen and washing facilities, like 
an older man (N. K. personal interview 25 May 2009) among many others states: “There 
were some lapses in the agreement that was negotiated between the then District 
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Assembly and the mining company. They built the houses without kitchen and toilet 
facilities. They provided a public toilet but the manner the houses were built has so many 
lapses.“ 
This dissatisfaction of the community with the provided facilities in the Teberebie 
resettlement process is also expressed in the CHRAJ report (Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 102). 
 
Fig. 10. Resettlement House in Teberebie  
Several families extended the resettlement houses TGL built for them. Many were not 
satisfied with the number of rooms the new houses were having. They complained they 
used to have more rooms in their former mud-houses. A. A. (personal interview 9 June 
2009), a former farmer of 20 acres land and mother of six children says: “We got a 
resettlement house here. It is not good. I had six rooms and now I have two rooms. It`s a 
cheat. We added additional rooms, we extended it.”  
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For many the limited amount of rooms was a problem within the family as it was usually 
common the parents and children slept in separate rooms. M. Q. (personal interview, 4 
June 2009) mother of several children says: “The old house was better, it had two rooms, 
the children were in one and we were in one, this house just has one room.” The limited 
space had its social impacts on family life. 
Walking through Teberebie it is a common sight to see resettlement houses with 
additional constructions to win living space. Usually the additional constructions or 
houses are out of wood and mud. Although some of the Teberebie residents would prefer 
brick extensions, most cannot afford it. Officially, the Teberebie residents would have to 
file permission at the mining company, to construct further structures on the concession. 
In reality this mechanism was largely ignored by the Teberebie community.  
The children of the almost 80-years-old M. C. (personal interview 11 June 2009) built the 
extension of her house. She brings it to the point: “If you had two rooms you got one, if 
you had three you got two. So I got one room here, that was it. So the kids made the 
extension for me.” She also explains that neighborhoods changed in the new settlement: 
“They gave the houses numbers, but when we came here, they mixed everything together. 
It never stayed like it was in the old place. We would have loved to stay with the people 
that we used to stay.” This circumstance was not mentioned often in the interviews, 
probably because by now, so many years after the resettlement, the initial neighborhoods 
and relationships have faded into obscurity. M. C. also mentions that they nevertheless 
met and chatted, they “wouldn’t let the distance be a barrier.”  
According to Agbesinyale (2003: 294f) many communities that have been resettled in the 
Wassa West District faced similar problems concerning housing facilities. The previously 
owned mud and thatch roofed houses were replaced with sandcrete and corrugated iron-
sheet roofed houses. On the surface the people were provided with a better quality of 
houses than previously owned by them. But most communities were very dissatisfied 
with the new housing units because of the inadequate space the new homes were 
providing compared to their old settlements. The mining companies provided more 
expensive houses but neglected the family sizes and number of rooms in the old 
structures. This led to reduced number of rooms and space and tended to disrupt family 
life leading to social tension. Teberebie is a prime example for this general phenomenon.  
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Summed up, the resettlement and planning of housing units was executed poorly and the 
dissatisfaction with the built structures remains a chronic condition. The Teberebie people 
partly helped themselves with constructing missing additional structures to their 
resettlement houses to gain additional space. 
8.4 Marginalization 
8.4.1 Economic Marginalization 
 
The economic downward spiral that developed due to the loss of access to land and the 
lack of alternative sustainable income sources is discussed in detail at 8.1. and 8.2.  
8.4.2 Social and Psychological Marginalization 
In Teberebie the economic marginalization experienced through the effects of vanishing 
land through the waste rock dump is accompanied by severe social and psychological 
marginalization.  
8.4.2.1 Feeling of Injustice and Loss of Confidence 
The way the MIDR was handled over the years has left marks on the social and 
psychological wellbeing of the Teberebie people – on the community as a whole as well 
as on an individual level.  
 
Respondents have articulated a general feeling of injustice that has been committed on 
them. Being in the economically marginalized situation they are in, they feel cheated by 
the mining company and government officials. Phrases like “It was a cheat.” or “We 
have all been cheated.” arose in almost every interview, mostly in connection with 
compensation payments but also in a larger context. Many see great injustice in the fact 
that the community only bears the brunt of mining activities whereas others receive the 
profits. 
 
The Teberebie chief criticized this as well but also the fact that according to him local 
traditional leaders are not consulted enough in the decision making process when their 
community is affected by mining activities. He articulated discontent with important 
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decisions only being made somewhere in Accra by the central government, without 
enough consultation of the affected communities (Minnah II, personal interview 11 June 
2009). 
 
People articulated their anger about their feeling of not being taken seriously by 
government officials and mining company representatives. This resulted in a feeling of 
growing powerlessness and diminishing self-esteem. After years and years of struggle 
many in the community have resigned to fight against the company and for their rights, 
like N. J. (personal interview 25 May 2009): “These companies, they have got their 
lawyers. You can´t defeat them. How can a person like me fight with an organization like 
AngloGold? […] They will never recognize you.”  
A. B. (personal interview 16 June 2009), a 20-year-old male resident of Teberebie is 
expressing his feelings of injustice and the feeling of powerlessness:“The shareholders, 
the managers and their children are not living here, so they don’t bother. We don’t have 
any money. They will come and destroy your land and come with their machines, you 
don’t have anything to say. You can’t fight with them, because they are mining people.” 
Nevertheless, there is also a group called Concerned Farmers Association (CFA) that has 
taken their compensation cases at court. As of June 2009 the court case against AGA is 
pending. People of this group feel strong support from WACAM and the lawyers they 
hired. Their self-esteem was much higher compared to other citizens of Teberebie. Non-
members of the CFA have articulated some kind of admiration for the members of the 
CFA and the fight for their rights they are putting on, as “they have not lost their 
dignity”.  
Once independent famers many have the feeling of being robbed their dignity. They are 
not used being dependent on others for income.  Anane (personal interview 18 June 2009) 
has a similar sight on things: “It’s a culture of dependence for the people of Teberebie 
now. […] [T]hey are not free, not even in their own community!”  
The Iduapriem mine has a Community Relations Unit to manage community and social 
issues. There are different levels the company engages with the communities. Each 
village, also Teberebie, has a Community Consultative Committee (CCC) with which the 
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mine meets monthly. This committee consists of the chief, a youth leader, a religious 
leader, a women’s representative, a CBO representative and a leader from the farmers in 
the village (AngloGold Ashanti 2009: 29). The community knows about the meetings but 
do not see any great outcomes. They see them rather skeptical and miss real commitment 
of the mining company to not only hear what the community has to say but also to act. A 
great majority feels powerless and caught in a situation, they have the feeling they cannot 
change anything anymore, as if Teberebie is caught in a deadlock, like this man is 
articulating: “Teberebie as for now, we are in a mess. The harm is already been done. 
The situation we are in now, we don’t know how to get out.” (N. J., personal interview 25 
May 2009)  
Overall it must be said that frustration has set in after many years of struggling. People 
are still hoping for alternative land but as of today it does not seem this will happen 
anytime soon. Anane (personal interview 18 June 2009) also connects the built up 
frustration with the fact that the community was promised replacement land which has so 
far not been given to them.  
These feelings of powerlessness and ongoing frustration about their situation and the lack 
of improvements also made them reluctant to talk to journalists, researchers, company 
representatives, NGO-staff or government people. They have done so in the past – 
without the results they were hoping for. A lot are frustrated about answering questions 
without knowing what the outcome will be, like B. E. (personal interview 8 June): “A lot 
of people come here, but what is the outcome? What do they do to help us?” Or as N. J. 
(personal interview 12 June), a very active spokesperson in the past, puts it: “We are tired 
of talking to people. Nothing changes at the end of the day.” 
MIDR not only has led to social and psychological marginalization of the group but also 
pressed on the moral of individuals. S. J., (personal interview 9 June 2009) is one of 
them. He is an old time Teberebie resident, who has lost his farming land after a yearlong 
intense battle with AGA. He says explaining his situation: “It was very lively here. But 
today, look at it? It has changed me. It is a destitute, it has changed my moral. It has 
changed everything. When I look back and compare it to today, I feel like I am taken 
away to a foreign land.” 
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Many still feel proud to be from Teberebie but about half of the respondents have mixed 
feelings when it comes to their community. G. A. (personal interview 10 June 2009) is 
one of the half of the respondents that feel ashamed for being a Teberebie resident: “I feel 
pity for myself, if somebody is asking me where I come from, I feel reluctant to tell him I 
come from Teberebie.” 
8.4.2.2 Intimidation and Harassment 
AGA has established permanent posts on their concession for private security personnel 
but also for military and police to protect their concession and property from encroachers 
and trespassers (Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 180). 
There has been much report about indiscriminate harassment of innocent community 
members and growing mistrust and skepticism about the security agencies, police and 
military. Quite a number of respondents mentioned their fear of being harassed by the 
company, security personal and police forces, especially while walking to the farmland 
some of them cultivate near other villages like Mile 8.  
In connection with their fear they recall an incident that happened in 2006 when 
community members used foot paths AGA did not want them to use anymore. The 
company blocked the path and brought in armed forces. In a confrontation on February 
2nd 2006 one Teberebie farmer was even shot by the military. It took close to two hours to 
get him to a clinic. This incident is deeply etched into the memory of the Teberebie 
people.  
NGOs like FIAN and WACAM are very concerned about the growing militarization in 
the Ghanaian mining areas in general and submitted a report as part of the UN Council for 
Human Rights’ universal periodic review on Ghana in 2008. The submission addresses 
the increasing deployment of military and police personnel in the country’s mining 
districts and human rights violations in mining areas and reports from mining 
communities who indicate a high degree of complicity of multinational mining companies 
in these human rights violations (FIAN International 2008: 3). 
The harassment of community members at security gates on concession roads is still 
going on at some of these gates. Farmers trespass them when they go to their farmland 
near other communities on the concession. Respondents reported of security personal and 
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police stopping and searching them before they can continue walking. They feel 
intimidated and treated undignified. This form of harassment is something particular 
Teberebie people are affected by, as Anane (personal interview, 18 June 2009) points out: 
“When you have the presence of private security on the roads leading to farms and when 
you are searched before and after you can go to your farm - that never happens in any 
other communities, to the extent that you are searched, I have never come across that.”  
People also feel intimidated to talk to strangers about the effects of the mining activities 
on them. People who speak up and talk to outsiders like researchers or journalists will 
most likely not have any chance of being employed by the mining company.  
8.4.2.3 Degradation of Self-Image  
Teberebie people see themselves as a community that has been to a large part neglected 
by AGA and government officials, especially in contrast to other communities. Other 
communities like Mile 8 have been resettled by AGA whereas Teberebie was resettled by 
TGL. Teberebie people feel as if more attention is given to the needs of those 
communities compared to themselves that have been resettled by a previous company. 
The competition between the mining communities is growing. O. C. (personal interview 4 
June 2009), an older women living in Teberebie for decades, says: “Everything AGA does 
goes to Mile 8. It looks as if they can put pressure on the company much better than our 
leaders here can do. Other communities seem more important, maybe because they have 
been resettled by AGA.” 
Outsiders, even people of surrounding villages and towns, often believe Teberebie must 
be a rich community, because they are situated so close to the mine. This fact causes 
some amusement with the Teberebie people but also a feeling of misconception. A 27-
years-old women (O. N. personal interview 4 June 2009), who is trading and therefore 
often in contact with other people of other towns and villages, puts it like this: “Outside 
people think we have money because we live in a mining area, others think we are even 
walking on gold. They should come here and see what is happening.” 
8.4.2.4 Nostalgia for Former Times 
The discontent with the present state of their lives in Teberebie makes many of their 
minds wander in the past. A lot of the Teberebie people like to look back into the old days 
and reminiscent of their lives in the community when TGL was running the mine and 
110 
they still had their farmland. O. C. (personal interview 4 June 2009) said: “It used to be a 
very nice community, especially when TGL was around, people saw us as very peaceful 
until all that land and compensation issues came into sight.”  
 
People were caught relatively unaware when TGL left and the creation of the waste rock 
dump started shortly after. They tend to lapse into nostalgia when talking about former 
times and their relationship with TGL. Mike Anane (personal interview 18 June 2009) 
confirms my findings: “People always had nostalgia for what I would call the golden 
days when GAG and TGL were around. They would always cite these moments. When you 
compare those days to now, it is a totally different story. It is a community that has been 
abandoned to its own fate.” 
 
The social and psychological impacts MIDR has had on the Teberebie community and on 
other mining communities as well, has been greatly overlooked in past research and 
resettlement planning, although economic marginalization is most often accompanied by 
social and psychological marginalization as the Teberebie example shows as well. 
Dwindling down an economic downward spiral leaves its marks on people psyche and the 
social fabric of a community. The loss of power and confidence in society and in 
themselves, after many years of constant struggle, are only replicable. Hopes for 
improvement of their situation, including hopes for alternative farmland, have been 
scattered multiple times. Intimidation and harassment by security, police and military 
guarding the interests of a mining company tend to not have positive effect on the self-
confidence of Teberebie people either.  
8.5 Disruption of Formal Educational Activities 
There is a basic school in Teberebie with a Nursery, Primary and Junior Secondary 
School. There are about 520 children enrolled in school mostly from the close 
surrounding villages. When Araba Bentum, the Head Mistress of the Teberebie school, 
took over the job in 2008, enrollment was down to about 400. Enrollment increased due 
to a school feeding project (Bentum, personal interview 1 June 2009). In 2004 about 70% 
of the Teberebie children were attending primary school (Royal Haskoning 2004: 16).  
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The economic displacement caused by the waste rock dump has caused disruption in 
children’s education. There is no school fee in Ghanaian public schools, but parents must 
provide for school uniform, sandals, pencils and writing materials. Sometimes Teberebie 
parents can’t afford the uniform for their kids and it takes them 6-8 months to collect the 
money for it. A school uniform costs approximately 10 GHS.  Bentum sees the reasons 
for the lack of finances of Teberebie parents among others connected to the mining 
activities:  “For some this is a lot of money. […] Some of them are also not working, 
some have been farming and because of the mining activities the land has been taken 
from them, so they don’t have anything else to do. You see the men sitting in town playing 
crafts and the women doing nothing. One meal a day is even a problem for them. It is 
very difficult for them to take care of their children.” (Bentum, personal interview 1 June 
2009) When money is rare children are also taken out of school temporarily. Respondents 
indicated their money is often just enough to provide food for the family, school supplies 
is something they can cut back for a certain time.   
Anane confirms the connection of lack of income in Teberebie and the implication on 
children’s enrollment in school. He further stresses implications on their learning 
abilities:  “Attending school is free, but not so school uniform, shoes, bags, books. The 
people simply cannot afford this because they have no jobs and no income. They rather 
leave kids at home than send them to school with tattered clothes. This has a lot of 
implications even for the education of children. Gold mining is taking a toll on the 
children´s education and also learning abilities. How can you learn in such an 
environment? Where there is blasting, where parents don´t have money? This has 
implications on learning abilities as well, not just enrollment.” (Mike Anane, personal 
interview 18 June 2009) 
The pupils who make it to school often lack role models that would encourage them to 
study hard and attend school regularly as Bentum (personal interview 1 June 2009) sees 
this, as well as others: “The pupils do not learn, they don’t have role models. Their 
parents, their older siblings are in the house, so they think it is unnecessary to waste their 
time and learn.”  
 
Many respondents were complaining about changes concerning the school after 
1999/2000. The school used to be more vibrant and attract more pupils when TGL was 
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providing a school bus for surrounding villages and towns to carry children to the 
Teberebie school. The present company decided not to link the school to other towns like 
Tarkwa, so numbers of pupils dropped. The school’s performance has been going down 
and many parents from surrounding areas took their children out of the Teberebie school.  
Most parents that can provide their children with at least some years of primary school, 
further education becomes more difficult for them to finance. AGA gives scholarships for 
further education. Respondents welcomed this opportunity but also criticized that it is 
very difficult for them to pre-finance until the company refunds. This keeps many pupils 
away from the already considered very few scholarships. 
8.5.1 School Feeding Program 
The school feeding program is limiting the negative effects of the mining activities on 
school attendance and education, as it is attracting more children to school.   
The school feeding program is a nationwide program with pilot projects in various 
schools, Teberebie school is one of them. The NPP government started the program: The 
goal is that every child should have at least one hot meal a day, also children whose 
parents cannot afford it.  The program should attracted pupils that have abandoned school 
to return to school. At Teberebie it started in January 2009.  The enrollment numbers 
have increased and Bentum clearly connects this to the feeding program: “The enrollment 
has increased and the pupils are more happy. They are now smiling. Most of them are 
given 20 Pesawas for breakfast and lunch which is inadequate! Now they get an 
additional hot meal. Some even don´t want to go home after school because they are not 
hungry. They want to stay on the compound. People are enjoying the program.” (Bentum, 
personal interview 1 June 2009) 
The MIDR and the mining activities in general have indirectly taken its toll on the 
children’s education in various ways. Some parents who have lost their land simply 
cannot afford to continuously send their children to school, in some cases they have to 
juggle between food and education for their children. The situation the children are in is 
not beneficial for learning abilities and motivation.  
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8.6 Food Insecurity 
The school feeding program described above was much needed in Teberebie as the 
community is largely affected by food insecurity. The uncertainty of food supply is very 
deeply connected to the loss of land and the lack of other meaningful, sustainable 
alternative sources of income. During the research I often came across statements like: 
“They took the land and we don’t have anything to eat now.” (G. A., personal interview 
10 June 2009); “If I would have land, I would have already eaten today.” (A. A., 
personal interview 9 June 2009) 
According to the respondents people are having one to two meals a day although they 
would very much prefer more and also know about the implications malnutrition has on 
themselves and their children.  Especially women report about major difficulties to feed 
their children. The loss of land has increased food insecurity. Also the Teberebie chief is 
concerned: “How to get food? For years we were dependent on this land for our 
livelihood. When you put your waste here, you are gradually telling us that the people 
must starve to death. Because no land – no food.” (Minnah II, personal interview 11 June 
2009)  
In connection to food insecurity the case of the Teberebie community has come to sad 
prominence when Jean Ziegler, former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, took up 
the case in a report presented to the Human Rights Council on February 29, 2008 stating 
that the people of Teberebie  “have had limited access to their farms which they have 
cultivated for many generations and to their only source of income and means to procure 
sufficient and adequate food as a result of the location of a number of waste rock dumps 
in the area.” (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 40)   
Food insecurity in Teberebie also becomes visible concerning catering for visitors in the 
community. Like E. A. (personal interview 26 May 2009) is explaining: “When we had 
visitors everybody would bring food, that´s how we behaved. Everybody needed to be well 
fed and catered for.  Everything is harder now. […] I find it difficult to feed myself, so I 
can´t give it away to others. Things were on a silver platter compared to today.” 
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After the lost access to land the Teberebie community became dependent on cash 
economy to get food. They have to go to surrounding towns and villages to buy food at 
markets or from farmers of other communities. The price levels in the Tarkwa region are 
much higher compared to the rest of the Western region. For once the decline of food 
production in an area accounts for high food prices. Also the disbalance between the 
income of locals and the income of employees of the mining industry whose wages are 
indexed to the US-dollar and are internationally competitive (Akabzaa/Darimani 2001: 
46). This drives the prices in the district up, to the harm of the local communities such as 
Teberebie that have become dependent on cash economy for their alimentation.   
The daily struggle for food is also taking its toll on the psyche of the people. They were 
used to independently cater for themselves and not constantly have to worry about the 
acquisition of food, as E. A. (personal interview 26 May 2009) says: “Food was always 
in abundance, food was nothing we were thinking about, it was life.”  Or as S. J. 
(personal interview 9 June 2009), who has been a farmer in Teberebie for decades, 
compares former days to today: “Formerly we just entered the bush: cattlers, jams, 
cassava, everything was fresh here. I only needed firewood and my food was ready.” For 
the Teberebie people it is still hard to grasp that they are the ones that buy food at a 
market, when they believe it should rather be vice versa - as they have been a farming 
community forever.  
The availability of food crops dropped significantly in the years since the development of 
the waste rock dump. The Teberebie farmers lost their land which had a direct effect on 
their food security as there were no significant alternatives for them to seek livelihood. 
They became dependent on cash economy and have to deal with the relatively high prices 
of food in the Tarkwa region.  
8.7 Increased Morbidity  
The new location and therefore the closeness to the mining activities expose the 
Teberebie community to location-related diseases. There are various negative health 
affects in the community of Teberebie caused by MIDR and the mining activities that are 
reported by the respondents.  
115 
According to a study conducted by Agbesinyale (2003: 288f) the most frequently 
occurring diseases in the district included: Malaria, respiratory tract diseases, diarrheal 
diseases, skin diseases, urinary tract infections, gynecological disorders, hypertension, 
sexually transmitted diseases, injuries from mine/industrial accidents and anemia. 
Personal conversation with the people of Teberebie confirm these findings. Especially 
Malaria, respiratory tract diseases, diarrheal diseases and skin diseases were frequently 
mentioned.  
The community complained that there is no health post in Teberebie and the closest clinic 
available to them is the government hospital in Tarkwa, about 8 kilometers away. The 
clinic on the concession supposedly is for AGA workers and their families only. 
8.7.1 Sickness Related to Unsafe Water Supply  
Water quality data from the CHRAJ-report of 2008 showed that some of the Teberebie 
water sources are a threat to people’s health.  The concentration of silica in the Teberebie 
borehole water was higher than allowed World Health Organisation (WHO) levels. The 
Teberebie river had increased parameters in iron and nickel (Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice 2008: 175).  People are very concerned about the water 
quality in Teberebie and do not trust the sanitary safety of the water. Like A. B. (personal 
interview 16 June 2009) is articulating his concerns:  “The water has chemicals in it. It 
brings sickness in our bodies. We don’t know what to do.” 
Respondents were connecting chronic diarrhea and headaches to the consumption of 
water of the dwells and the borehole. Children and the elderly are especially affected.  
8.7.2 Respiratory Tract Diseases 
Excavating rocks through mine blasting causes noise and vibration along with dust 
development. The Teberebie community is very much concerned about the dust 
dissemination in their community caused by the mining activities, like A. B. (personal 
interview 16 June 2009) said: “The chemicals and the dust. It’s too much. The dust just 
explodes here. The dust will just spoil everything. “ 
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The dust levels were reported to be higher in the dry season, but also during my stay in 
Teberebie in the wet season the dust problem became evident and people were also then 
very conscious about the effects of the “toxic dust”. People in Teberebie relate respiratory 
tract diseases that they experience to the dust in the community. Many report coughing, 
chest pains and headaches they relate to the dust dissemination.  The dust is bothering 
them very much:  “The pollution is bringing diseases. […] The air will bring the dust, 
when you inhale it will bring cough and chest pain.” (O. N., personal interview 4 June 
2009) 
Teberebie people have already filed complaint about the dust development several times:  
“The environment, it is very, very bad. […] They built another crusher plant and they 
started working on it. Whilst they are working the dust comes straight to this town and 
causes problems.  We have cautioned them but they refused to do something about it. “ 
(A. J., personal interview 7 June 2009) After several complaints AGA is spraying water 
on the roads leading through Teberebie to somehow limit further dust dissemination. 
According to the respondents this is not happening on a regular basis.  
Dust pollution and respiratory diseases, especially among children in Teberebie, were 
also reported by the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
in 2008 (99).  According to district wide health data published from Agbesinyale (2003: 
290) there is an increasing trend in upper respiratory tract infections and chest diseases 
between 1990 and 2000. This coincides with the district’s gold boom. The rate is 
relatively high compared to other parts of the country. According to the 2003 Agbesinyale 
research the average incidence of pulmonary tuberculosis in the district was 0.5/1000 
compared to a national average of 0.003/1000.  
8.7.3 Vector Borne Diseases 
During the mining processes many water bodies have been diverted or dammed. This has 
caused many stagnant water bodies on the concession. One of them is very close to the 
community, just behind the waste rock dump. Locally this body of water is called 
“mosquito headquarters”. These waters have become major breeding grounds for malarial 
mosquitoes.  
 
117 
 
Fig. 11. “Mosquito Headquarters”, stagnant water at Iduapriem Mine 
Several interview partners mentioned the very high number of malaria cases. People have 
become used to the fact that many of them suffer malaria attacks two to three times a 
year. According to them people who work close to the stagnant water bodies, like locals 
that are hired as short time security personal or for casual labor, are especially threatened.  
According to a report of the District Medical Office, cited by Akabzaa (2000: 42) the 
Wassa West District has the highest incidence of malaria in the country. Agbesinyale 
(2003: 289) confirms this and states that the Wassa West District malaria incidence rate is 
ranging between 165/1000 to 200/1000 per year, compared to a national average from 
40/1000. So the district overtook other southern regions, where the disease is known to be 
highly prevalent. In the Wassa West District malaria tops all clinical cases.   
Malaria in the region is not new, it is a tropical wet region and ideal for mass breading of 
malaria vectors. But the upsurge in cases can be linked to the mining activities and the 
stagnant water bodies they provide to mosquitoes.  
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8.7.4 Sexual Transmitted Diseases  
It can be expected that the HIV/AIDS rate has already increased in Teberebie. Anane 
(personal interview 18 June 2009) suspects this as well: “It is no secret that a lot of the 
young women sleep with people from the mining company, just to earn a living. Ladies in 
particular go to Tarkwa to do prostitution. This will obviously increase HIV/AIDS in 
these villages.”  
Prostitution and “casual sex” is in upsurge in Teberebie and very much connected to 
MIDR and the mining activities. It is a poverty driven activity and an alternative form of 
income for farmers deprived of land due to mining activities. This connection is discussed 
into more detail at 8.2.4.   
Studies in the area have already measured increased cases of syphilis and HIV caused by 
rapid migration in the area and growing prostitution (Akabzaa 2000: 44f). Health 
authorities in the district report an upsurge in STDs including gonorrhea, syphilis and 
HIV/AIDS. From six recorded HIV/AIDS cases in 1992 it increased to close to 300 in 
2002. The high rate of migration on account of the gold rush is blamed for this trend as 
well (Agbesinyale 2003: 292). The extreme income incline between mine workers and 
local communities has to be taken into account as well, as Agbesinyale (2003: 292) points 
out: “The gold industry […] is particularly susceptible to the AIDS scourge on account of 
the relatively high incomes of mineworkers in otherwise deprived communities. 
Historically, the sex industry has tended to thrive in and around most mining 
communities.”  
All in all, health levels declined due to the mining activities. Apart from the initial stress 
of moving, there are many health problems that are caused by the mining activities now. 
Access to safe potable water is a big problem in the community and can be related to 
increase in diarrhea diseases. The dust creation by the mining activities is likely to trigger 
respiratory tract diseases. Vector borne diseases such as malaria are supported by new 
stagnant water bodies created by the mining activities. Additionally, poverty-driven 
prostitution increases the spread of STDs.  
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8.8 Loss of Access to Common Property Resources and Services 
 
The access to common property like forest, land and water bodies decreased seriously due 
to MIDR and environmental degradation caused by the mining activities. 
What the community of Teberebie did not lose was the access to their former burial 
grounds. They still access the same cemetery than before the resettlement and it has not 
been affected by the waste rock dump. Except from that much of their common property 
has been lost. 
8.8.1 Access to Land 
Almost all access to land has been lost. Some already because of the initial resettlement 
and the larger part because of the creation of the waste rock dump. Land in Teberebie is 
communally owned by the people and only distributed for useage over a certain time 
period. The issues concerning lost access to land is discussed in full detail at 8.2.  
8.8.2 Access to Forest 
Mineral exploration and mining activities have contributed substantially to deforestation 
particularly around the areas of Tarkwa, Bogosu, Prestea, Damang and Teberebie 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 176). In the Wassa West District there are three major forest reserves, 
namely the Bonsa Reserve, Ekumfi Reserve and the Neung Reserve that are already 
threatened by large and small-scale mining and logging. The extensive land clearance 
caused by open pit mining resulted in the destruction of forest vegetation and loss of 
biodiversity. It destroyed the habitant of wildlife in the area (Akabzaa 2000: 67). 
Generally the natural land cover in the district changed dramatically starting in 1986. The 
human induced land use was increasing, the primary forest (closed canopy) has reduced 
from 88% to 69% from 1986 to 2002. This comes to a reduction of 76.6% in 16 years 
(Kusimi 2008: 255). The primary forest changed into secondary forest due to many 
factors. One major cause are the mining activities. Although mining companies try to 
reclaim the land by reforestation the changes in the natural ecosystem are severe. Other 
causes for deforestation are traditional modes of farming, fuel wood extraction, logging of 
timber for export and illegal lumbering. Urbanization is another cause. Urban centers like 
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Tarkwa, Damang and Bogoso have expanded. The impact of the mining industry has been 
direct as well as indirect. The direct impact is caused by the land consumed by open pit 
mining. But there are indirect impacts as well. The mining industry attracts migrants in 
search for jobs in the mines. They cause the urban centers to grow, many of them engage 
in small-scale mining or galamsey as well, another cause for deforestation (Kusimi 2008: 
250ff). Agbesinyale (2003: 173) sees the dramatic change of the natural and physical 
environment of the district in the last two decades mainly caused by large- scale surface 
mining. He argues that in the past underground mining was practiced in the district which 
left the surface of the region almost untouched compared to nowadays surface mining 
activities.  
Particularly Teberebie women are affected by the diminishing forests. They are the ones 
that are mainly responsible for gathering firewood and increasingly face the problem of 
finding it close to their village. The burden is on them to walk farther and farther to gather 
wood, often with the children on their backs. Firewood is not the only thing the Teberebie 
community picks up from the forest, also food like wild animals, mushrooms, fruits, 
herbs and so on. Especially the amount of larger animals the Teberebie people can hunt in 
the forest has gone down drastically according to them. Now they are just able to find 
cattlers. 
Deforestation remains a major problem in the whole district. Other causes next to large-
scale mining are subsistence agriculture with their slash and burn and bush fallow 
systems, small-scale mining, commercial logging and commercial fuel wood harvesting 
(Agbesinyale 2003: 175).  
8.8.3 Access to Water 
In the whole Wassa West District the increased surface mining has negative impacts on 
ground water resources. Dewatering has rendered a number of boreholes, streams and 
hand-dug wells in being unproductive or with reduced yield. Open pit mining, 
characterized by excavation of large tracts of land, ultimately also reverses ground water 
flow direction and causes dewatering, especially in the dry season (Akabzaa 2000: 66). 
Already in 2000 only one of the two boreholes in Teberebie was working while the one 
working gave extremely low yield (Akabzaa 2000: 66).  
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Prior to the mining activities the people’s main source of water was the river Angonabeng 
and the Bonsa stream. There have been contaminations of the water bodies surrounding 
Teberebie in the past. One of the worst cases of cyanide spillage happened on June 18th 
1996. An estimated 36,000 m3 of gold-laced cyanide solution with a cyanide 
concentration of 8-100 parts per million spilled from one of TGLs tailings ponds into the 
Angonabeng stream, a main tributary to the Bonsa river. In total nine villages were 
affected downstream. TGL cleaned up the physical evidence of the pollution rather than 
warning the communities and notifying authorities. The result was considerable illnesses 
and losses of crops, fishponds, and wildlife (Armstrong 2008: 29). 
By now there is no river left around the village the Teberebie people trust to go for 
potable water. They are dependent on the water supply TGL has provided to them for all 
the water they need for drinking, preparing food and washing. There is only one 
functioning borehole and three wells serving the community. The community sees the 
amount of water connections as not adequate to the population of whole Teberebie. Some 
people also complained that the borehole is too remote from the households in the 
community. The borehole is indeed not in the center of the community but rather at the 
outside skirt. 
During the dry season from January to March the water of the borehole is very limited. 
One has to stand in line for several hours and get up early in the morning to get water. 
This is usually a chore women and children take care of. Sometimes there is not enough 
water for everybody and some have to buy drinking water in packs (“pure water”).   
To get water from the borehole people have to pay five Pesawas for two buckets of water 
- after the chief and other community elders decided to outsource the maintenance work 
of the borehole and the dwells. Somebody from outside the community has a contract for 
this work and the community members now have to pay for the water. Many in the 
community believe it would have been better to leave the maintenance work with the 
community itself, instead of giving the main source of drinking water to somebody else to 
manage. There have been enquiries by individual community members to the company to 
manage the maintenance themselves and keep the water free of charge. The water from 
the borehole is only available at certain times of the day, usually in the morning. At other 
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times of the day the hand gear is chained down and the borehole is not accessible to the 
community.  
 
Fig. 12. Borehole with chained hand gear in Teberebie  
The chief is satisfied with the decision to outsource the maintenance of the water supply 
and make the community independent from the mining company: “I thought of it because 
we were always dependent on the mine to come and repair it. What when the mine is not 
there, what do we do? So we gave it to private people for them to manage it and control 
it. At the end of the month we are going to pay an amount. […] That is what we did about 
the water. The contractor takes care of the borehole and the wells.” (Minnah II, personal 
interview 12 June 2009) 
There are three toilet facilities in Teberebie that were built by TGL. Sometimes they are 
maintained but not regularly. In June 2009 they were full and could not be used. One well 
is just next to a toilet facility. Because of this some people are reluctant to drink water of 
this well because they fear getting sick from the water. They are not sure whether it is 
safe to drink the water from the borehole and the dwells in general.  
All in all, the environmental degradation around Teberebie caused by large-scale mining 
has severely decreased forests and farmland. Things like firewood or food that used to be 
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sourced from the forest are not available to the extent of the past before the mining 
activities started. At the new resettlement the community already had less amount of land 
compared to their old settlement, but the increasing mining activities and the development 
of the waste rock dump made the land even scarcer.  
The access to water in Teberebie is inadequate. Their initial sources of water, the streams 
and rivers nearby, have either seized to exist due the construction of the mine or have 
been polluted. The water supplied to the community with wells and boreholes is not a 
sufficient replacement. 
8.9 Social Disarticulation 
The gold mining activities have not only led to economic disruptions in the community 
but also to social dislocation and social destabilization in the community that has been 
largely neglected by past research. 
8.9.1  Disruption of Family Unit 
The MIDR has changed personal ties in the families and has put the relationship and roles 
of men and women in the families to a though test. 
Men are seen as the breadwinners and heads of the family. After the waste rock dumping 
many men lost their land and therefore their main source of income. This forced some 
men to migrate and leave their family so seek a job somewhere else. It is mainly men that 
leave the community due to economic hardship. In the absence of the men the whole 
burden of supporting themselves and the children is put on the women who were left 
behind. Women, who once were farming, had to seek other income opportunities like 
trading, galamsey or even prostitution as described in 8.3. There was a shift in many 
families making the women the main providers of the family. It is the women, who have 
to catch up for the men. 
A women, whose husband found work far away after they lost their land, says: “A lot of 
the time the men leave for work somewhere else. The families are not the same. If you 
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don´t have a good husband, they don’t send money and they don’t come back! This 
happened to some women here.“ (B. E., personal interview 8 June 2009)  
It was the men who were given the compensation for the crops, women mostly did not 
even know how much it was and if so, only given a small amount of money from the 
husband. Most women were not taking part in the compensation process. Once some men 
had the compensation money they left their families and left their wives to take care of 
the children and themselves. The family unit was disintegrated. Also a majority of men 
state that the main part of the burden to support the family has been transferred to the 
women, as this statement of an older man confirms: “Women suffer a lot. Most of the time 
it is the man who is the breadwinner of the house, so if the man is not working, the land is 
taken from the man’s hand, the man is doing nothing, so the whole burden goes to the 
women.” (S. J., personal interview 9 June 2009) 
8.9.2 Dismantlement of Social Organization and Mutual Help Mechanisms 
At the beginning of the compensation process for the waste rock dump the affected 
farmers formed the Farmers Association (FA). They wanted to represent their interests 
themselves and did not have the impression traditional leaders would do so. Some of the 
members of the FA accepted the compensation that was offered to them, other declined 
and took the case to court with the help of WACAM. They decided to fight for better 
compensation. They formed another association called the Concerned Farmers 
Association (CFA) to represent their interests. At the time of the split this created unrest 
in the whole community. There were many misunderstandings, mistrust and mutual 
allegations between the two groups. This conflict is still very much in the minds of people 
although it has cooled off in recent time.  
Also the way how the compensation worked did trigger conflicts in the community. Some 
farmers were compensated in the head-count system, others were compensated in the 
acre-system. This created conflict as people were treated differently. The waste rock 
dump and the compensation process created tension in the community, as community 
members tell: “When they took the land it nearly split the community. I call it divide and 
rule diplomacy. They capitalized on it and divided the people. […] Gradually it was 
eroding the relationships between the community members. Because of the compensation 
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money, they gave one more, one less. People started arguing.” (N. J., personal interview 
1 June 2009) 
Segregation processes in the community mainly started when the waste rock dump started 
to cover more and more land, as this statement highlights: “Before AGA came the people 
were still together. When AGA came and started the waste rock that was when the 
segregation started coming up. People started struggling for land. The tranquility that 
existed got lost. Because everybody was now scratching for land. […] Even when you 
were a friend of mine because of land we had to be like enemies. […] It brought conflict 
to people.” (M. C., personal interview 11 June 2009) 
Individualization in Teberebie was then pushing forward. Community members say there 
is still cordiality but it is not like it used to be. The competition for land, compensation 
money and rare jobs is too severe. In the conversations people tended to say phrases like: 
“You have to fight for your own”; “It is about the survival of the fittest”; “You cry your 
own cry.”  
An older woman, close to 70, tells: “At first we fought a lot, but now it´s not like that, the 
fight has been lost. It used to be that one's problem is everybody's problem. […] But 
today it´s not like that anymore: if it affects you, it affects you alone.” 
Teberebie is not a single case where mining and resettlement has caused segregation in 
the community. Owusu-Koranteng (personal interview, 18 June 2009) sees a pattern: 
“Mining always divides communities, you will never have the community be one again.” 
8.9.3 Disruption in the Chieftaincy System 
 
Chieftaincy in general is held very high in Teberebie and seen as important within the 
social fabric of the community. After TGL left, the new companies were asking for a 
chief to negotiate and debate the further development of the mine. But during the very 
significant time from 1999/2000 to 2004 there was no chief en-stooled in Teberebie. 
There was a gap in the chieftaincy system. There were caretakers, but no chief. Many see 
this fact as a huge disadvantage in this interim period. 
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Many Teberebie people do not feel the chief is representing the whole community but 
rather his immediate family, like N. J. (personal interview 25 May 2009) is saying: “The 
chief is expected to speak on our behalf but the man who is supposed to speak on your 
behalf is speaking for him or herself, leaving the grassroots. This is the problem here. 
The power is invested in the chief. But the chief will speak on behalf of his or her 
household, leaving the rest behind.” 
He is losing the respect of the community members because of his engagement with the 
company, which in a lot of situations does not help the community. A lot of mistrust and 
allegations are circulating in the community about the chief and other traditional leaders. 
Statements like: “They don’t help us, they are all receiving something”; “The chief is 
receiving money from them, so he will not say anything against them.”; “He loves the 
mine, every secret he is telling the company” were common on conversations with 
various community members. There is no evidence any of these facts are true, but it is 
sure that people are suspecting it and rumors are going around. All this is harming 
community relations.  
Many people lost their trust in the chief and do not feel represented by him anymore. This 
is also caused by lacks in communication, they are unsure what position the chief is 
taking in meetings with the company. As a result of the mistrust towards the chief part of 
the youth12 started to boycott communal labor. Some stopped doing communal labor, like 
cleaning the environment or helping with the community center, for several months after 
they were dissatisfied with the way the chief was performing his duty. Some still refuse to 
participate permanently. 
The chief himself is very aware of the allegations towards him and the general sentiment 
in the community. He is saying: “You can’t satisfy all people, but you must try and satisfy 
a percentage. […] I am not a magician that can give out money. You cannot always listen 
to all of them, it will turn you crazy. But you must try and do something for them. You 
must try. Not all people will appreciate it, but some will.” (Minnah II, personal interview 
12 June 2009) At one point a few months ago he also took some of the youth to join him 
at a MAG-meeting to show them how those meetings with the company function and 
                                                      
12
 In Teberebie people from 18 to 45 are called youth.  
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verify he is not receiving bribes or anything of that kind (Minnah II, personal interview 
12 June 2009). 
Nevertheless, some see the power of the chief further diminishing and him losing 
credibility, also with the company. Some community members do not see much the chief 
and other traditional authorities can do for the benefit of the community. They doubt the 
chief is even powerful enough to put pressure on the company after he lost much of the 
support by his community. Owusu-Koranteng (personal interview 18 June 2009) says that 
“the chieftaincy institution in the town is losing its respect. A chief becomes chief because 
he enjoys popular support of his people, but […] usually […] if the companies see that 
the chief is no longer in the power to convince its people they can also abandon him, so 
the chiefs can lose with the company and the people too.”  
Putting these chieftaincy issues in a larger perspective, Teberebie is not an exemption. 
There has been a divide and rule attitude that has been adopted by many mining 
companies, not just AGA. The usual tactic is to go to the chief first, give him a contract to 
supply something to the company and once the chief agrees on this, there is no way that 
he can ever champion the company anymore and articulate the concerns, the problems of 
the community members to the mining company. It is “divide and rule” - diplomacy, they 
pick the chief and some other favorites among the community and keep them close by 
giving them contracts (Anane, personal interview 18 June 2009). 
Chieftaincy disruptions in mining communities are not a rare reality. During 
Agbesinyale’s (2003: 293) research in the Wassa West District he found out that some 
local chiefs in the district were forcibly de-stooled, also through rebellious actions of the 
youth over actions mainly pertaining resource allocation. Chiefs were accused of crimes 
that were later found to be mere allegations that were never thoroughly investigated. 
Tension among social groups is common in mining communities. Often one finds the 
youth pitched against traditional authorities and chiefs. These developments pose serious 
threats to communal and social stability.  
 
To sum it up, the relocation, the ongoing loss of land and the mining activities as a whole 
took their toll on the social stability of the Teberebie community. The growing 
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competition for land, jobs and income is dismantling social networks. The poverty-driven 
migration of a part of the male population of the community is a threat to social stability 
in the community as a whole and in the families. The “divide and rule” approach by the 
company is dispersing the patterns of social organization. Informal networks of mutual 
help or voluntary associations, like the communal labor performed by the youth, are 
disrupted. Reciprocity runs out and people feel they have to struggle on their own. This 
social disarticulation makes the community much more vulnerable.  
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9 Conclusion and Ways Forward 
9.1 Summary of Research Findings 
“I have been to almost all these mining communities, but looking at the extent of 
degradation and deprivation when it comes to land, water and other rights; I would say 
that Teberebie is one of the worst.” (Anane, personal interview 18 June 2009)  
As Anane states, the Teberebie community is one of the most negatively affected mining 
communities in the Wassa West District. Teberebie was severely affected by two waves 
of displacement: Physical removal and economic displacement. But Teberebie is not an 
isolated case, the large-scale mining activities in the whole district have drastically 
intensified.  
My research was guided by the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model (IRR) 
by Michael M. Cernea and the concept of Mining-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement (MIDR) by Theodore E. Downing. The impact analysis consisted of nine 
main indicators, namely:  
a) Landlessness 
b) Joblessness 
c) Homelessness 
d) Marginalization 
e) Disruption of formal educational activities 
f) Food insecurity 
g) Increased morbidity  
h) Loss of access to common property resources and services 
i) Social disarticulation 
The hypothesis that the nine potential DFDR-risks impacted the Teberebie community 
was largely confirmed. The risks became reality in different intensities and different 
connections to one another and cannot be separated 
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research findings, the Teberebie community is negatively affected by all nine 
displacement risks, most of them deeply linked to landlessness.  
The expropriation of the major part of the Teberebie farmland by the waste rock dump led 
to economic displacement of the community. It removed the main foundation of their 
productive systems, commercial activities and livelihood. Because the land, being their 
basis of life, was not replaced and the compensation was inadequate, the loss was 
basically a form of de-capitalization and pauperization of the Teberebie community. The 
impact of landlessness in Teberebie is by far the most severe of all DFDR-impacts and 
has further implications on many other areas of life. The Teberebie people associated 
independence and dignity with the livelihood their land provided for them. Hopes for 
alternative farmland have been scattered multiple times. 
The main occupation in Teberebie was subsistence farming. After people have lost almost 
or at least a significant part of their farmland, their source of livelihood has been taken 
away from them. Jobs in the Iduapriem gold mine are mostly not accessible for Teberebie 
people, also due to the lack of their technical skills. People developed ways to support 
their lives, mostly not as sustainable as farming used to be. They turned to poverty-driven 
activities such as galamsey mining, which is not sustainable and connected to 
environmental degradation and health impacts to the miners. Activities that were mainly 
picked up by women were petty trading, which can only supplement a family income but 
cannot fully support a family. Other clearly poverty-driven activity that picked up is 
female prostitution. The lack of farmland and the lack of income had many implications 
on other areas like the families’ food security and their children’s education opportunities. 
On the social level the competition for rare jobs caused tension in the community and 
social disarticulation. 
In terms of the risk of homelessness, the resettlement and planning of housing units was 
executed poorly and the dissatisfaction with the built structures remains a chronic 
condition. The culturally common form of housing and especially the number of rooms 
was not taken into account. The limited number of rooms and space tended to disrupt 
family life and to lead to social tension.  
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The economic marginalization experienced in Teberebie through the effects of vanishing 
land through the waste rock dump is accompanied by severe social and psychological 
marginalization. The Teberebie people are feeling injustice that has been committed on 
them and growing powerlessness to continue to fight for their rights. Intimidation and 
harassment by the mining company, military and security personal has led to social and 
psychological marginalization of the group but also pressed on the moral of individuals. 
The economic losses left its marks on people’s psyche and the social fabric of the 
community, it led to the loss of confidence in their community, their leaders and in 
themselves.  
Formal educational activities have been impacted by the mining activities and have 
indirectly taken its toll on the children’s education in various ways. Some parents who 
have lost their land simply cannot afford to continuously send their children to school. 
Powerful role models are missing. The situation the children are in is not beneficial for 
learning abilities and motivation.  
Food insecurity in Teberebie is deeply connected to the loss of land and the lack of other 
meaningful, sustainable alternative sources of income. The availability of food crops 
dropped significantly in the years since the development of the waste rock dump. After 
the loss of their land they became dependent on cash economy. The daily struggle for 
food is also taking its toll on the psyche of the people. They were used to independently 
cater for themselves and not constantly have to worry about the acquisition of food.  
The new location and therefore the closeness to the mining activities expose the 
Teberebie community to location-related diseases and add to the risk of increased 
morbidity. Sicknesses like chronic diarrhea and headaches are related to unsafe water 
supply. The Teberebie community is very much concerned with respiratory tract diseases 
they connect to dust dissemination in their community caused by the mining activities. 
Vector borne diseases such as malaria are supported by new stagnant water bodies created 
by the mining activities. Additionally, poverty-driven prostitution increases the spread of 
STDs.  
The loss of access to common property, like forest, land and water bodies in Teberebie 
due to MIDR and environmental degradation caused by the mining activities is severe. 
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Almost all access to land, which is communally owned by the people and only distributed 
for useage over a certain time period, has been lost. Some already because of the initial 
resettlement and the larger part because of the creation of the waste rock dump. 
Deforestation and dewatering caused by mining activities remain major problems in the 
whole district. Particularly Teberebie women are affected by this as they are traditionally 
responsible for gathering fire wood and taking care of the family’s water supply. 
Dewatering has rendered a number of boreholes, streams and hand-dug wells in being 
unproductive or with reduced yield. Streams and rivers nearby have either seized to exist 
due the construction of the mine or have been polluted.  
The social destabilization in the Teberebie community is caused by growing competition 
for land, jobs and income. Segregation processes in the community mainly started when 
the waste rock dump started to cover more and more land. These developments posed 
serious threats to communal and social stability. All this dismantled social networks and 
made the community more vulnerable. The poverty-driven migration of a part of the male 
population of the community is a threat to social stability in the community as a whole 
and in the families. The family unit was disintegrated. The majority of men state that the 
main part of the burden to support the family has been transferred to the women. The 
MIDR has changed personal ties in the families and has put the relationship and roles of 
men and women in the families to a though test.  
The “divide and rule” approach by the company is dispersing the patterns of social 
organization. This created conflicts as people were treated differently, especially in the 
compensation process. Subgroups formed and for example, most women were not even 
part of the compensation process. Individualization in Teberebie was pushed forward by 
all this. 
Chieftaincy in general is held very high in Teberebie and is seen as important within the 
social fabric of the community, but the displacement and the “divide and rule” approach 
by the company took a severe toll on the respect the community members have for their 
traditional leaders. They have lost a big part of trust into the chieftaincy system. Informal 
networks of mutual help or voluntary associations, like the communal labor performed by 
the youth, were disrupted. Big parts of the youth oppose traditional authorities and the 
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chief. Like in other mining communities, tension among social groups is common in 
Teberebie. 
9.2 Towards Rights-Respecting Policy and Practice 
9.2.1 Rights-based Approach 
Like many NGOs and CSOs I want to link the impacts faced by mining communities like 
Teberebie to an approach based on the recognition of rights, particularly rights that are at 
risk of not being respected.  
Several fundamental rights of the Teberebie community have been compromised for the 
development of the Iduapriem gold mine. Like the 2008 (172) report on the state of 
human rights in mining communities in Ghana by the Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice concludes: “[T]here is evidence of widespread violations of 
human rights of individual members of communities and communities’ collective  
rightsinsome [sic] mining areas in the country.” 
Several articles of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be 
connected to the Teberebie case and show how the people´s basic rights are withheld 
from them. Starting with Article 22 (United Nations 1948) that states: „Everyone, as a 
member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for 
his dignity and the free development of his personality.“ 
The ownership of land, communal as well as individual, of the Teberebie community is 
not respected. The way the community was deprived from its property comes into conflict 
with Article 17: „(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.“ 
People are dependent on their land to fulfil Article 25 on their right to an adequate 
standard of living which touches the risks of food insecurity, homelessness, increased 
morbidity and joblessness. Article 25 (United Nations 1948) states „ (1) Everyone has the 
134 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care  […]“ 
The reported harassment and intimidation by the mining company that creates discomfort 
and reluctance among community members to speak freely are forms of human rights 
violations related to the rights to personal liberty and human dignity. Article 19 (United 
Nations 1948) deals with „the right to freedom of opinion and expression“. 
DFDR-risks cannot only be connected to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For 
example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights states in Article 24: “All 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development.” This right is clearly not being respected or fulfilled in the Teberebie 
community.  
Many more MIDR-impacts on the Teberebie community can be connected to violations 
of basic rights.  
There are many incentives in the Ghanaian mining regulations for prospective investors 
and mining companies. The regulatory mechanisms are in their favor and deliberately 
relaxed to attract foreign mining investors. On the other hand they trample on the rights of 
the people that are directly affecting with their actions. The research of the various 
impacts of DFDR and mining activities in Teberebie shows the whole extent to which 
their rights have been disrespected.  
The way gold mining operations, like the one in Teberebie, are granted licenses in the 
first place and are extracting and working later on, are not coherent with international 
laws, legal principles and human rights. Policy and also practice must respect and not 
violate the mining community’s human rights. This also includes their economic, social 
and cultural rights.  
9.2.2 National vs. Local Needs 
Gold mining is aimed at generating economic growth and the projects are justified by the 
believe of the greater value for the Ghanaian society. Here national and local 
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development needs clash. The DFDR-costs borne by local communities, such as 
Teberebie, cannot be outweighed by the benefits for other parts of the society enjoying 
the profits of the implementation of a gold mine.  
The national government of Ghana, as many governments in similar positions, finds itself 
in a conflict of interest: The government is responsible to respect, protect and fulfill the 
affected community’s human rights but is also interested in the revenues from a gold 
mine – for the so called “greater good”. The importance for governments, like Ghana, 
must shift towards the affected people’s human rights. Clark (2009: 186) brings to the 
point why: “Development benefits that come at the expense of other people’s human 
rights are antithetical to sustainable development. Rather, they represent exploitative and 
inequitable development.” 
9.2.3 Recoupment of Selfdetermination 
Taking the case of Teberebie in larger perspective, it is symptomatic for the structural 
failures in policies and practice. The Teberebie community, like so many others, was not 
allowed to self-determine their fate when it came to mine development and displacement. 
They lost control over fundamental features of their lives and lacked information on their 
future after the displacement process began. I agree with Oliver-Smith (2009: 12) who 
believes that when understanding and control in displacement and resettlement processes 
are diminished, this process will be characterized by tension, conflicts, and maybe active 
resistance.   
Participation and consultation are not enough. Affected people must be given back the 
decision-making power over their future. A truly free, prior and informed consent 
constitutes a crucial element in elevating the bargaining power and negotiating strength of 
the affected communities. The power differences in the decision making process and the 
differences in access to information must be addressed during the decisions over projects 
involving displacement. A fair process of negotiation must include: “reliable mechanisms 
to ensure that all terms agreed to as a result of such negotiations are fully implemented, 
that all applicable laws and policies are complied with, that the process results in 
equitable benefit sharing that tangibly improves the quality of life of affected people, 
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including full restoration of lost livelihoods, and the end result reflects the development 
priorities of the affected communities.” (Clark 2009: 193) 
9.2.4 Rehabilitation before Displacement  
A true paradox is that many mining projects, especially in the past, move forward and are 
funded although affected people are not truly involved in the decision making process and 
the project impacts on the ecosystem and the people are only dealt with after the project 
has already started. The fact that displacement mostly occurs before disbursement creates 
enormous problems. Clark (2009: 194) puts it like this: “rehabilitate up front, not in the 
face of impending disaster.” This shift in the general approach is not such a fundamental 
recommendation, there are already existing laws that recognize this, but there is still a 
severe gap between policy and practice. A resettlement plan, like the one for the 
Iduapriem mine, which only exists on paper, is not sufficient enough.  
If the true costs for the displacement and resettlement of affected communities would not 
be externalized but included in the project up front, many mining projects would never be 
realized.  
9.3 The Future of Anthropological Displacement and Resettlement 
Research 
There is no question that DFDR has become an important subfield of anthropological 
research. Decades of sociological and socio-anthropological research on resettlement 
have cumulated a substantial body of social knowledge and extensive literature. This 
knowledge has been integrated in policy and operational descriptions and has helped to 
improve resettlement operations (Cernea 1999: 6; Scudder 2009: 25).  Cernea (1999: 5) 
calls for “a constructive ‘alliance’ between economic and sociological knowledge on 
resettlement”. I agree with Cernea that neither social sciences nor economics should 
monopolize research on resettlement (Cernea 1999:6).  
In retrospect of this application of the IRR-model on the Teberebie case some things need 
to be pointed out. The power and advantage of the IRR-model is its holistic approach as 
the process of displacement affects virtually all aspects of life. Basically all the DFDR-
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risks are connected to each other and influence each other. Nevertheless this broad 
approach also creates difficulties at the same time, as one needs great research capacity to 
cover all risks in detail.  
I believe much more research of social and especially cultural impacts on mining 
community is needed. I agree with Downing and Downing-Garcia (2009) who argue that 
insufficient attention is given to psycho-socio-cultural risks and impoverishment in 
involuntary displacements and resettlements. The IRR-model includes social risks, but 
still lacks specific cultural risks and should be further developed in this direction. Social 
aspects like the risk of marginalization or societal disarticulation in Teberebie have hardly 
been investigated at all and this thesis is a first step into this direction and looked beyond 
the economic and environmental impacts on mining communities and also included 
socio-anthropologic analysis.  
Scudder (2009: 26) calls for “carrying out […] systematic and comparative long-term 
research […] for improving policy-relevant theory.” In this way anthropology and other 
social sciences truly lack behind, for example, environmental sciences. I also agree with 
Oliver-Smith (2009: 6ff) who believes anthropology has a responsibility to expand the 
array of approaches and methods addressing the growing challenges in DFDR. There is 
also a considerable need for research on the growing number of solely private funded 
projects. The significance of this research will grow as the privatization of previously 
publicly owned services continues. For a long time international concern was largely on 
internationally financed projects, but they make up only a small proportion of projects 
(Guggenheim/Cernea 1993: 2). This is also the case with mining projects. Government 
shares of formerly state-owned mines diminish and International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) pull out of projects and often leave behind a disastrous legacy, as it is the case in 
Teberebie.  
For a long time anthropology has already been playing a central role in documenting the 
problems of displaced people and framing the debate in displacement and resettlement 
studies. The present context calls for more involvement of anthropologists in the research 
of DFDR to support the strategies of affected peoples (and NGOs and CSOs) defending 
themselves by referring to their human rights.  
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10.2 Personal Interviews 
 
ANANE, Mike: Coordinator of FIAN, FoodFirst Information and Action Network Ghana 
(18 June 2009 in Accra, Ghana) 
 
ANDOH, Nana Anthony: Director for Mining for the Environmental Protection Agency 
(25 February 2009 in Accra, Ghana) 
 
ARYEE, Benjamin: Chief Executive for the Minerals Commission (4 March 2009 in 
Accra, Ghana) 
 
BENTUM, Araba: Head Mistress of Teberebie Basic School (1 June 2009 in Teberebie, 
Ghana) 
 
MINNAH II, Nana Kojo: Chief/Odinkru of Teberebie (11 June 2009 in Teberebie, 
Ghana) 
 
MINNAH II, Nana Kojo: Chief/Odinkru of Teberebie (12 June 2009 in Teberebie, 
Ghana) 
 
NANTOGMAH, Ahmed: Director of Public Affairs and Environment for the Ghana 
Chamber of Mines (24 February 2009 in Accra, Ghana) 
 
OWUSU, John: General Manager, Corporate Affairs of AngloGold Ashanti (24 February 
2009 in Accra, Ghana) 
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OWUSU-KORANTENG, Daniel: Chief Executive of WACAM, an Association of 
Communities Affected by Mining (28 February 2009 in Tarkwa, Ghana) 
 
OWUSU-KORANTENG, Daniel: Chief Executive of WACAM, an Association of 
Communities Affected by Mining (18 June 2009 in Accra, Ghana) 
 
…and various more. Interviews with most Teberebie community members are only cited 
with abbreviations and remain anonymous. 
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11 Annex 
11.1 Zusammenfassung (Abstract) 
Weltweit hat wahrscheinlich fast keine andere Industrie mehr Landkonflikte verursacht 
als Bergbau. Das Dorf Teberebie in Westghana ist ein Beispiel für den Kampf um die 
Ressource Land zwischen Minenunternehmen und lokaler Bevölkerung. Teberebie wurde 
1990/91 umgesiedelt, um Platz für die Expansion der Iduapriem Goldmine zu machen. 
Seit 2001 ist die Teberebie-Community durch Abraumhalden der Mine, die auf ihren 
Feldern abgeladen wurden, zusätzlicher ökonomischer Vertreibung ausgesetzt.  
Die Auswirkungen der Vertreibung und Umsiedlung verursacht durch die Iduapriem 
Goldmine auf das Dorf Teberebie wurden anhand von neun Indikatoren untersucht: 
Landlosigkeit, Obdachlosigkeit, Arbeitslosigkeit, Marginalisierung, Störung der formalen 
Bildungsaktivitäten, Ernährungsunsicherheit, erhöhte Sterblichkeit, Verlust von Zugang 
zu gemeinschaftlichem Eigentum, Verlust des sozialen Zusammenhalts;  
Die Analyse stützte sich auf das “Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model 
(IRR)” von Michael M. Cernea und das Konzept von “Mining-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement” (MIDR) von Theodore E. Downing.  
Negative Effekte konnten bei allen neun Indikatoren bestätigt werden, besonders 
gravierende Auswirkungen hatte der Verlust von Zugang zu Land. Landlosigkeit in 
Teberebie hatte starke ökonomische Auswirkungen und steht in enger Verbindung zu den 
meisten anderen Indikatoren. Zusätzlich ist die Teberebie Community durch die 
Vertreibungs- und Umsiedlungsprozesse von sozialer und kultureller Destabilisierung und 
sozialer und psychologischer Marginalisierung betroffen.  
Die Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie spielt eine zentrale Rolle in der Untersuchung von 
Vertreibungs- und Umsiedlungsprozessen. Besonders soziale und kulturelle 
Auswirkungen auf von Minenprojekten betroffene Gruppen wurden noch viel zu wenig 
untersucht und dokumentiert.  
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